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COUNTRY STUDY
THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
Thb stndy attempls to analyse the substantial changcs in the perlornancc of the German cconomy in thc l9g0s
and to ,tsscss the implications for Comntnity partncrs atd rhc pnocess of European integration. The main
economic poltcy challenges, particularly tlu implications of German Ecottomic,'MoortorT and Social gnion(GEMSU) are also dbcussed.
Thefirstpartof thcsrudyisanattcmptroossesJ thenewclnllengesfacingGcrmany,louowingtheconsiderable
degrce of snccess achieved by the cconomic policy responsc ro problens inihe early ig'aos as aiicussed inChapterI. Chapter 2 provides an ovemiew of recent cconomic dcvelojnunts. nlost notably the acceleration in growth'andtlv yrong rccovery of investmcnt. Short-term prospccts, heavily influenccd ry CilUSU, and in paiticular thc
outlook for inflation are also assessed. An analysis of tlu lacais inder$ing ih" lorg" iurrent rccount surplus
and an assessment of how persistent it b likely to prove are given in inalter J.T-hc implications of Geiman
economic, ,rtonetary and social union are discussed in Chapter 4. Finally, at-the end of pori I, the perfirnance of
tiscal and monetar! policies is reviewed in Chapters 5 antl 6.
Parl two of thc study copes with institutional dssues, relevant ro nedium and long-term growth and employmentprosPects as well as for thc process of European integration. Regularion, subsidies anisuppty-side cinditions,
wliclwere senerally regarded as an area of weakness in the mid-Ib82s, are reviewed in Chajtei 7.The experience
of 20 years of budgetary co-ordination is assesscd in Cluprer g.
Part thrce of the sudy provides some basic inlormation on the GDR-cconomy at the turn of rhc decade and at thebeginning ol tlu Gernan uniftcation proccss (Clupter 9). Finatly, thc impliiations oy ceusU for rhe GDR-econ-
omy are analysed (Chapter 10).
Part I
Macroeconomic performance and economic policy issues
Chapter I
Economic performance and policy issues
in the mid-1980s
In the mid-1980s, the cconomic and financial situation
in the Federal Republic of Germany displayed many of
the symptoms of what had become known as ,'Euroscle-
rosis": slow growth of output, high unemployment, a
weak investment record and a decelerating growth in
productive potential dospitc continued falls in real unit
labour costs. In addition, there had been little progress
in reducing rigidities and stimulating markets. Despite
the restoration ofa sound budgetary position, the current
account surplus seemed to reflect a lack of confidence
on part of German investors and consumers in their own
economic prospccts. This performance - aided by the oit
price falls of 1986 - temporarily reduced the inllation
rate closc to zero. Against this background, German
monetary policy was often suspected of imposing a dis-
inflationary bias on the economic perforrrance of other
EMS members.
In the past three years, the picture has changed dramati-
cally. Output growth is vibrant, domestic demand has
recovered considerabln invessnent is booming and un-
emplolment has been falling. The current eccount sur-
plus is even larger than it was in 1987 but now reflects
a world-wide investment boom rather than low domestic
demand in Germany. Less encouraging, however, is the
outlook for stability - overshadowed by the German4er-
man monetary union. Furthermore, questions are being
raised about Germany's anchor role in the EMS and the
appropriateness of a very expansionary fiscal policy.
After the second oil-price shock, the German economy,
along with most other economies, was confronted with
important policy challenges. Inflation was fairly high,
unemployment was rising, relative factor prices were
distorted and the public sector deficit was becoming
unsustainable. Throughout the mid-1980s, therfore,
economic policies were aimed at budgetary consolida-
tion and a reduction of the inllation rate. In the labour
market, trade unions accepted a reduction of real unit
labour costs allowing the profitability of capital to rise.
In retrospect, economic policy may be seen to have been
successful in many respects:
. the reduction of inllation rates - the most conspicious
achievemenq
. thc consolidation of the public finances - as indicated
by the reduction of the deficit and the gradual decrease
in the ratio of public expenditure to GDp;
. a reduction in the distortion in relative factor prices
(weges, profits), allowing for a significant improv-
ment in profitability;
. a particularly good external trade performance.
The substantial improvement in the ovcrall supply-side
performance of the economy was accomPanied by events
and measures further strengthening the conditions for a
long-lasting upswing. The oil-price fall in 1986 boosted
disposable income. Moreover, the entire enterPrise sec-
tor underwent a successful structural adjustment, prepar-
ing the economy to cope with new challenges.
When the world trade boom began in 1987, (and in
particular the boom in investment in industrialized coun-
tries), demand for German exPorts increas€d consider-
ably and activity in Germany accelerated accordingly.
Three years of monetary overshooting (in 1986-88)' suc-
cessive rounds of tax cuts 8nd r€ductions in real intercst
rates worldwide helped further stimultte domestic de-
mand and medium-term demand expectatiom. Positive
exp€ctations related to the single market have reinforced
the favourable prospects and German economic, mon-
etary, and social union (GEMSU) will provide a temPor-
ary but powerful impetus to demand in West Germany.
Budgetary consolidation and real wage moderrtion pro-
vided the essential foundations for the recovery by re-
storing a margin of manoeuwe in the private - and
particularly entrePreneurial - sector. This was I Desess-
ary condition for a long lasting growth acceleration. The
consolidation effort was sufficient to perrrit reductions
in tax rates. Inde€d, th€ recent uPswing has now entered
its eight consecutive Year.
The interpretation of Germany's cutrent account surplus
has given rise to Gxtensive debatc. Lr the mid-1980's, for
example, with unemployment high and capacity utiliza-
tion and inflation low in Germany and its European
paruler countries, the surplus was often seen as indica-
tive of insufficient demand growth in Germany and as a
depressing inlluence on outPut and employment in its
partner economies.
Since 1987, however, domestic demand in Germany has
been growing 8t sbove trend rates. In these conditions,
the surplus reflects not weak German demand but vcry
strong foreign demand. Therefore, the German surplus
can be seen as a "shock-absorber" for inflationary press-
ures in a number of other countries, to such 8n extent that
rising capacity utilization has led to at least incipient
inflationary pressures within Germany itself. Any direct
policy action to reduce the surplus (i.e. a major fiscal
loosening) would have had to be coupled with a tighte-
ning of monetary policy and a rise in the real-exchange
rate if serious overheating in Germany were to be
avoided. Such a combination would have been a switch
towards a Reagan-Volcker policy mix. On the other
hand, the absence of monetary tightening would have
atlowed for a significant increase in inllation in the EMS
anchor country. Neither option would have been wel-
come to Germany's partners.
The factors underlying the German surplus, at least in
the most recent period, seem to have been favourable for
most other European countries. If the German surplus
melts away under the impact of GEMSU world real
interest rates may rise. This may hurt some countries vir
temporary "crowding-out" of investment but will benefit
saverr throughout the world.
With the benefit of hindsight, the point can be made that
without the German surplus (and the accompanying
budgetary consolidation) the Federal Republic would
not have bcen in a position to Pursue a policy of econ-
omic unificatio,n. That policy will be 8n important ele-
ment in underpinning German growth performance and
in providing a classic and significant example of a mar-
ket-orientated approach to the rcstoration of the East
European economies to the international division of la-
bour.
ChaPter 2
Recent economic performance and short'
term outlook
2.1 Determinants of growth
The West German cconomy is experiencing a revival
with trends for 1990 and 1991 indicating an acceleration
in the upswing. Growth rates are exPected to reach 3
3/4% in both yean). The main expansionary impulses arc
coming from the 1990 tax cuts of more than l% of GDP
and from thc dynamics of German4crman develop-
ments. Additionel demandfromEast Germany will lead
to I net contribution to West German growth of morc
than 1% each year. This will outweight the appreciation
of the Deutsche Mark, which has gained more than 6%
(average nominal effective exchange rate in 1990 over
1989), thc slowdown in world demand and the 200 basis
points increase in interest rates since mid-1989. The
appreciation and the slowdown of world demand will
mainly effect the investment goods sector, which had, in
any case, becn facing sevore caPacity constrainrc. On the
other hand, the expansionary impulse coming from the
GDR will probably most affect the construction s€ctor
(which has feced even morc constraints than lhe invest-
ment goods sector) and consumPtion goods sector
(where constraints, excePt for some durables, are less
spparent).
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2.2 Investment and production potential
Although profits were already recovering from their lowpoint in the early 1980s, it is only sinci t9g7 that the
economic upswing has been fuelled by a dynamic invest_
ment performance in response to improved profitabilitn
Iow interest rates and favourable exiernal and domestic
demand. Gross fixed investment is expected to reach
21.3% of GDP in 1990 compared to tg.4%in 19g7. Even
the construction sector, which suffered from a severe
recession in the 1980s, has recovered in the light oflow
interest rates and favourable demand prospects.
The poor investmenr figures of the early l9g0s hide adynamic structural adjustment in favour of the services
sector. Investment performed very well in the services'
se1l9r 
-from the beginnipg of the economic upswing,while declining branches of manufacturing even disin-
vested in the light of gloomy demand prospects and
Gxcess production capacities. The capital stock of the
services ssctor, which now represents about 25% of the
total capital stock in the enterprise sector, grew by al_
most'l9o per year in real terms during the l9g0s.
In the manufacturing sector, a dynamic intra-sectoral
adjustment affected both overall investment and capital
stock figures during the early l9g0s. In 19g5, investmenr
in manufactures recovered and became very dynamic
thanks to a slowdown in disinvestment Uy aet[ning
industries and double digit growth rates foiinvesrment
in sectors such as the chemical, mechanical and elcctro_
mechanical engineering and the car producing branches.
In_ the mid-8Os, growth was supported by external factors(rising exports, which have grown by 6 to l0% a yeer
since 1984, the significant positive ierms_of-trade im_
pact on domestic real incomes in 19g6, and, more recent_ly the rapidty rising investment demand abroad).
However as medium-term demand expectations were
favourable and the capacity utilization iatio was rising,
the domestic investment performance improved also.
Since 1987 domestic itrvestment has been the most dy_
namic growth componcnt (see2.2). After slow growth inthe early 1980's, real private consumption has bcen
boosted by higher real incomes since 19-g6, induced not
only by gains in the terms of trade but also by substantial
tax cuts in 1986, 1988 and 1990. In l9g-9, however,growth in private consumption was surprisingly low, noi
least because of the contractionary efflcts oi UuOgetary
developments.
All in all, domestic demand growth has contributed
around 3% ayet to GDp growth since 19g6, whereas itgrew moderately between lggl and 19g5. The buoyancy
in domestic demand has sucked in imports, which have
Srown ar jusr below 6% a year since 19g7.
Public expenditure, in general, has grown less rapidly
than GDP.Since 1982, rhe public expinditure_GDp ratio
has declined from 47lo to the 44.3% forecasr for thisyear. In contrast to the early l9g0s, when investment
expenditures were reduced, a relative reduction in public
cons'rnption is the main factor behind the decline of thepublic share in GDp since l9g?. Although in accounting
terms the public sector has not stimulated demand
groyth, the supply effects ofreduced public interference
in the economy together with a signihcant reduction in
the deficit have gradually improvid rhe overall climatefor private economic activity, enabling the economy to
respond to demand generated externally and by the do_
mestic private sector.
Du1 to investment growth of around lO% a year, rhe
capital stock in the manufacturing sector has grown more
rapidln i.e. at around 3-3 ltT% r year since 19g7.
Joggth.er with an implied improvement of capital pro_ductivity through new investment and a more flexible
use of the capital stock, potential output in the manufac-
turing sector is probably growing more rapidly than has
been assumed in the past. potential bottlenecks can also
be avoided by reduced scrapping although this wouldprobably lower average capital productivity. Survey_
based evidence (see box) suggestJ th"t pot"rrtial output
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growth in the manufacturing sector has accelerated to
around 3 U2% Per year compared to the stagnation of
the mid-80s.
Therefore, although capacity utilization may reach his-
torically high levels, inllationary pressures will be eased
by a gieater flexibility in the production process' In
"iaitioo, 
stronSer imPorts in context of continuing Eu-
ropean economic integration may reducc supply bottle-
necks.
whole economy; in manufacturing, however, wages Per
head increased at an annual rate of 4.l?o. As unit labour
costs have only edged up by 1.5% Per year in the whole
eiconomy and by 2% in manufacturing, the West German
cconomy cannot be said to have been characterised by a
serious cost-push inflation over this period.
Real unit labour costs are forecast to decline for the tenth
consocutiveyear in 1991; the gross operating surplus has
increased by an annual rate of almos t Wo since I 98 1 and
CAPACITY CONSTRAINTS IrV GERMAN
INDUSTRY
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2.3 Inflation and costs
In terms of consumer price inflation, the period since
1986 has been almost the mirror-image of the years from
1983 to 1986. In the earlier period, inllation dipped from
3.2% to a negative 0.5%. After 1986, it rose again to
3.1%in1989. According to the latest Commission short-
term forecasts (ApriVMay 1990), it will remain 8t or
close to 3% this Year and next.
Within the Community, only the Netherlands has experi-
enced a (marginally) lower inflation rate over the 1980's'
Average inllation Performance in the period since l98l
has been relatively satisfactory; the undershooting
below the trend rate in 1986 was mainly the result of the
oil price fall. Domestic cost developments have shown
a smoother trend since 1981.
Prolonged wage mderation and stable and even declin-
ing import prices have been the main contributory fac-
tors to the impressive inllation record of the 1980s. The
wage bill has risen at an arurual r*e of 3.64o since 1981:
wages per head increased by an annual 3.29o fot the
is expected to rise by about the same Pace this year and
in 1991. Rising profit margins can be interpreted as the
counterpart to the desirable improvement in the real rate
of rettrn on investment, on thc assumption that they do
not reflect any severQ lack of comPetition and/or entre-
preneurial initiative. The improvement in the profita-
Uitiry of German enterPrises has largely taken place in
an environment of social cons€nsus' ensuring the ab-
sence of inflationary risks during the process of income
redistribution.
Nominal wage settlements indicate per capita increases
of around 6-7% fot those workers whose contrac$ are
renewable this year. The effect on current wsge costs i8
likely to be partly reduced by a reduction in wage drift'
The re-esttblishment of sound profit ability in the enter-
prise sector suggests that temporary increases in unit
iabour costs could be ab$rbcd without undue difficulty
in the forthcoming period. Thereafter, renewed wage
moderation can be exPccted. Thc huge inflow of labour
from the GDR and other Eastern European'countries
could reduce labour market bottlenecks, and the integra-
chaDter 2: Recent economlc performance and short.term outlook 5
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tion of the labour markers of the FRG and the GDR will
increase labour market flexibility. However, the current
demand situation does not suggest any scvere pressure
on firms to absorb cost increases, rather than to pass
them on in higher prices. The short-term outlook, there-
fore, is not without risks. At least, the rise in German
long-term interest retes since February of this year, com-
bined with a reduction of the risk premium on important
EMS currencies ask for caution.
2.4 The labour market
Since 1983, a resumption of steady growth in employ-
ment has been recorded after some decline at the begin-
ning of the decade. However, unemployment has
increasingly become r structural problem and has re_
mained at an unacceptably high levet for almost the
whole decade.
Since 1983, almosr I l/2 million new jobs have been
created; between 1983 and 1989, employment rose on
average by O9% per year. Job creation has become even
more dynamic since late 1988 onwards and the current
trend is expected to continue. At the end of 1991, there
will be in excess of 2 million more jobs in the Federal
Republic than at the beginning of the recenr upswing in
1983.
A sectoral breakdown of employment-creation between
1983 and 1989 indicates growrh in the manufacuring
sector (+().3 million) end in all services sectors (+1.5
million). Long series show that, since 1960, employment
has risen by more than 50% or more than 5 l/2 million
in the services sector while it has dropped by 25% or 4
million in the producing sectors and agriculture.
Despite the rise in employment since 19g3, a clearly
downward trend in unemployment has emerged only
since mid-1988, with the fall partly arrributable ro
changes in statistics. Unemployment in Germany is be_
coming increasingly structural. Almost l/3 of registered
unemployed (1.9 million) have been unemployed for
more than I year, about 30% are more than 50 years old
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the GDR labour market may wonen the employment
prospects of those currently unemployed in West Ger_
many.
Persistently high unemployment in Germany can mainly
be explained by demographic factors and a change in the
behaviour of women. While employment has iisen by
640.fiD since 1980, the civil labourforce has increased
by 1.8 million. Until 1988, the integration of young
people and women coming from the labour reserve("Stillc Reserve") into the labour market was particular-
ly difficult. Now, there is some evidence of increasing
skill mismatches in the labour market. For instance, the
unemploymentlvacancy ratio for skilled blue-collar wor_
kers fell from l4:l in 1984 to 3:l in September 19g9.
The overall unemploymentltacancy ratio dropped from
around ?A:l ia 1984 to around 5: I in 19g9.
A summary representation of these various factors is
somctimes sought in the NAIRU. Recent estimates sug_
gest that the NAIRU for the FRG is around the present
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level of unemployment. Given that further falls in unem-
ployment (using official definitions) can be expected
over the next eighteen months, this might suSSest an
inflationary danger' However, the concept of the
NAURU should be handled with particulsr care for sev-
eral reasons. The NAIRU may have been driven up by
persistent regional, profcssional and demographic in-
hexibility in the labour force. German economic unifi-
cation may reduce these inJlexibilities. From the supply
side, greater flexibility in the production Process
togethir with the recent attempt to combine'a reduction
in the average number of working hours with greater
individual flexibility could reduce the NAIRU further'
However, progressive integration in the European econ-
omy reducis the national independence of trade unions,
i.e. wage settlements should not be undertaken with a
view to the domestic labour market conditions only'
Finally, the tendency to agree multi-annual wage settle-
ments reduces temporarily the validity of the NAIRU
concept. Thus, while in immediate future the NAIRU
may be above the likely level of unemployment, this is
likely to be a temporary phenomenon.
2.5 Saving and inYestment balances: I sectoral
analysis
As a percentage of GDP, private households' savings
have been fairly stable at about 6-7% of GDP since the
mid-80s. While real Private consumPtion rose more than
GDP in 1986-87 savings did not decline 8s a Percentage
of nominal GDB due to terms-of-trade gains, while in
1990. A similar situation emerged as in 1990 as the tax
reductions led to increased disposable income. Private
households'savings arenow below the level ofthe 1970s
and early-80s, probably reflecting a reduced inllation
rate, more optimistic real income expectations and im-
proving emploYment ProsPects.
The financial situation of the enterprise sector has im-
proved substantially. While the financial deficit was
6.5?o of GDP in 1980, it was only 0.6% in 1988. Until
1985, the consolidation of the balances of enterPrises
mirrored the declining share of investment in GDP and
stemmed mainly from a slowdown in residential con-
struction. A significant rise in savings Prevented the
financial balance from deteriorating in 1986-1988' des-
pite a gradual increase in the share of investment in GDP'
lndeed, in 1988, the self-financing ratio ofthe enterPrise
sector was 96.6%. Since then, rising investment together
with a stabilisation in savings has led to a slight increase
in the financiat deficit of the enterprise sector to sround
2% of GDP.
Public sector investment fell from more thanS% of GDP
to 2.4% during the first phase of consolidation (1982-
85). However, since mid-1985 the improvement in pub-
lic savings has reflected the moderate nature of increases
in public consumPtion.
With regard to current account developments, the na-
tional saving/investment behaviour suSgests that the
swing in the current account balance from a deficit of
2.1?o of GDP in 1980 to a surplus of 4.3% of GDP in
1986 is mainly the consequence of a consolidation of the
enterprise balance sheet (swing 5.5% of GDP)' The pub-
lic sector contribution has been 1.6% of GDP' mainly
originating from a restrictive policy aimed at consolidat-
ingthe public budget deficit. Since 1988, strong domes-
tic investment has triggered a balancing effect on the
high current account surplus, while the renewed im-
pto""-"t t in the balance of the public sector is mainly
do" to higher receipts rather than to a restrictive fiscal
policy.
The dynamics of German economic unification will have
important implications for the savings and investment
bal-ances of the combined German economy. [t can be
expected that the current account balance will be sub-
stantially reduced. Firstly, private households savings
may be low in the GDR. Secondly, high investment
needs, together with an initially low saving potential of
GDR enterprises, will lead to a significant financial
deficit in the GDR enterprise sector. Finally, the consoli-
dated public sector balance of the FRG and the GDR will
show a significant deficit.
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The balance of payments
Current account developments in the Federal Republic
of Germany have been looked at as an important macro-
economic disequilibrium during the second half of the
last decade. After a considerable deficit in 1980 (l ln%
of GDP) the current account balance moved into a sur-
plus of 2 lf2?o of GDP in 1985. In 1986, the surplus
jumped to 85 bnDM (4.5% otGDP) andhasbeenaround
this size in terms of GDP until 1989. In more rocenr
years, thc surplus can no longer be attributed to a weak
domesic growth performance and German-German de-
velopments will change the current account position of
the united German economy drastically.
3.1 Determinants of the current account balance
For the Federal Republic, more than for other countries,
the balance of merchandise trade explains the dynamics
of the current account. The German trade surplus in-
creased from 73 bn DM (4% of GDP) in 1985 to 135 bn
DM(6% of GDP) in 1989.
The overall export performance depends on the evol-
ution of foreign markets and the change in market shares
of German exporteni. German export markets grew more
rapidly than those of other countries during the the mid-
80s. From 1983-1988, Gerrran export markets for manu-
factured goods grew by 28?o while French marker
growth was 5 percentage poins lower. This points either
to a favourable geographical structure of exports or a
favourable commodity structure. In fact, both elements
have played a part in the growth of export markets.
Although, the average gain in market shares has been
relatively modest (+2.7 percentage points 1980-82; +0.2
percentage points 1983-85 and 2.1 percenrage points
1986-88), a detailed regional analysis suggests different
rates of penetration in the various markets.
Germany has always been capalle of rapid response to
strongly growing markets. Strong import demand in
Northern America in the 1983/84 period, was accompa-
nied by gains in market shares. Also, developments in
market share in the UK confirm the important flexibility
of German export supply. However, gains in market
shares cannot always be sustained. For example, after
having gained significant markets shares in Canada, ke-
land and also Spain, the more recent past has seen some
losses in these markets. This, however, must be inter-
preted as some kind of normalization.
On a regional basis, trade is concentrated in European
Community countries. The share of total merchandise
exports to EC countries has been steadily growing to
rbout 2R while the share of imports has been declining
but remains at about 213 also. Regional disaggregation
confirms that Germany is a flexible supplier of goods.
Germany is normally gaining market shares if and when
imports to partner countries are increasing rapidly.
Moreover, it is evident that Germany is defending de-
clining markets more actively than its competitors. Ger-
many's trade with the member countries which joined in
the 1970's and 80's intensified significantly.
The sectoral analysis of German trade confirms the im-
portant position Germany has in the investment goods
sector. Nevertheless, some weakness is evident in certain
special sectors (office machines but also transport equip-
ment) where Germany lost market shares. Germany's
export structure is fairly specialized, particularly when
it is compared to France. lmport penetration has not
grown proportionately and remains fairly low in some
sectors i.e. industrial products.
A combination of both geographical and sectoral data
analysis allows some conclusions to be drawn on Ger-
man export developments. By focusing on five products
for which Germany gained market shares during the
period under review, one may observe:
. an almost constantly positive EC contribution to
.changes in German exports; this contribution became
more important in the two sub-periods 1983-85 and
1986-88; for example, exports of chemical and metal
products to the UK and the Netherlands were particu-
larly significant in 1983-85;
. demand from other countries or zones is much more
volatile; the automobile sector is a good example: in
1980-82, OPEC largely conrribured ro exporr growrh
in the automobile sector but later its contribution was
very negative. During this period, demand the dollar-
zone largely replaced this fall. EC demand was steady
and even buoyant in 1986-87.
It seems that Germany is sufficiently specialized to re-
spond to demand in the EC, which provides a solid base
upon which to profit from more volatile opportunities in
extra EC trade.
The volume of German imports grew by abort 4.4Eo per
year during the years l98l-1989, i.e. less than twice as
fast as final demand growrh (2.5%). The implied import
elasticity (calculated as total nor parrial derivative) of
most lmporarnt crport
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about 1.8% is rather low. The low penetration of the
German market by imPorts points to competitiveness
problems, but attention must also be paid to supply and
demand conditions. In particular, the gap between Poten-
tial and actual production may have favoured exPorts
more than imports.
German markets opened uP somewhat to foreign impor-
ters in the 80's. The share of imports in domestic demand
for industrial goods increased trom2l.2%o in 1979-83 to
UJ% in 1983-87 in Germany when it was unchanged in
France and even decreased in Japan. However, the open-
ing was much more pronounced in the IIK and the pene-
tration of the German industrial market is still below that
in France o,r the [IK. In rddition, the ratio of exports to
imports of industrial products in Germany, has tended to
increase in recent years.
France suffered a 20.9% loss of market share in Germany
between 1980 and 1988: -3.4% points in chemicals,
4.5% in motor vehicles nd 4.8% in textile, leather and
shoes. Belgium also lost market share but to a lesser
extent.
In contrast, the LIK improvid its market share by 31.5%
during the same period: +17.2% in transport equipment,
+7.7% in chemicals afi +4.9% in electrical equipment.
For the two last categories, Germany also improved its
market share on the IIK market. Japan, whose share of
German imports went up fuom 4.51o in 1980 to 5.5% in
1988, has also sharply improved its position.
One special characteristic of Gerrran trade is a relatively
high degred of specialization. The exPort/imPort ratio
shows that exports of equiPment goods are twice as large
as imports. In Frairce and in the United Kingdom, this
ratio is around 1. The German industrial machinery sec-
tor has an export/import ratio of more than 3. As regards
agricultural and food industry Products, Germany is rela-
tively more open than France. Also, with regard to tex-
tiles, the export/imPort ratio is around 0.6, suggesting a
fairly high market penetration.
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The rise in the nominal trade balance of 125 bn DM
during the 1980s mainly stems from lower net imports
of energy products (-32bn DM) and higher net exPorts
of manufactures (+50 bn DM).
Important movements have occurred in the balance of
services, which normally works as a powerful balancing
factor to the merchandise trade surplus. The rapid in-
crease in net interest income together with a moderate
expansion ofexpenditures on tourism can explain a large
part of these current account movements.
In future, 8 mderate increase in net travel expenditures
is likeln as real wages increase faster in the short term.
Nevertheless, the opening of the GDR (and Eastern
countries in general), could change travel behaviour
significantly both in thc short term and - to the extent
that the infrastnrcture for tourism improves in the GDR
-, also in the medium term. As regards the GDR, cultural
similarities together with more than 40 years of isolation
as a tourist country might be &iving forces; in other
Eastem countries, the price level might be considerably
lower than in more traditional tourist regions of the EC.
For net investment income, the dynamics of a persistent
current account surplus, the implied increase in net ex-
ternal financial wealth and interest rate income to resi-
dents is obvious. Between 1988 and 1989, net
investment income exploded from a surplus of DM 8 bn
to almost DM 19 bn. Several factors can explain this
rapid increase in net factor income from abroad, which
explains the significant discrePancy between GNP
growth of 4.0% and GDP growth of 3.4% in 1989. Fir-
stln the current account surplus ofDM 85 bn added to
net financial wealth. Sccondly, the DM remained fairly
stable and higher nominal interest rates abroad led to
higher interest rate reccipts of German residents. Third-
ly, significant net capital outflows led to a readjustment
of the stock of wealth towards private households to the
4Jtriment of the external assets of the Bundesbank. This
readjustment has rcinforced the effect of the stable DM
in the EMS as private households are less exposed in
terms of dollar assets than the Bundesbank. Finally, net
income from direct investment rccovered in 1989, after
foreigners had received large dividend payments in 1987
and 19E8.
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On the balance of unilateral transfers, the global deficit
of net transfer payments was about 30 bn DM per annum
on average in the last three years. Net transfers to EC
exceeded those from EC by 8.2 billion DM in 1985 and
increased to 12.5 billion DM in 1989. The contribution
to developing countries was stable or declining in
relative terms (0.2% of GDP in 1985 to O.l?o in 1989
according to balance of payments figures). A very sharp
acceleration in unilateral transfers over the 1990/91 peri-
od rises due to GEMSU.
From a macrocconomic point of view, the most import-
ant determinants of the current surplus are different
trends in macroeconomic growth rates, competitiveness
and oil prices. All these factors have contributed to the
development of the German current account surplus. An
e,conometric analysir, carried out by Commission ser-
vices, suggests that a considerable part of the surplus can
be explained by long-run growth differences. As a result
of a growth differential of about U2?o &tween the
Federal Republic and its majorpartner countries over the
1980s, imports have been some 8 bn DM lower. How-
ever, it is important to note that some of the Federal
Republic's trading partners require higher growth rates
during the catching up process and that such growth
differentials are welcome from a European persPective.
Cyclical differences between the Federal Republic and
its major trading parurerc played a significant role in
particular years. Both in 1985 and 1989, cyclical growth
differences w€re aceountable for 15% of. the total sur-
plus. There is, however, a difference in both periods. In
1985, foreign demand in West Germany was more or less
in line with trend growth, but German domestic demand
was insufficient. In 1989, foreign demand increased con-
siderably fsster than the underlying uend. As domestic
demand growth has also been above trend growth, do-
mestic demand cannot be blamed for much of the surplus
during the last two years.
The Federal Republic's real exchange rate has fallen by
some 1.29o per year during the 1980's, in particular since
1987. Although it is very difficult to say where the real
exchange rate should stay, the loss of some 896 experi-
enced in the period 1987-89 is supposed to account for
a significant part of the current account surplus. The
econometric analysis suggests that the real depreciation
over the last 3 years accounts for about 2O?o of the
overall surplus.
The dramatic fall in crude oil prices in the mid-8Os has
been the third important factor behind the widening of
the current account surplus. Indeed, the drop in oil prices
appears to be the most imPortant single factor behind the
curr€nt account surplus. Without the drop in oil prices,
the surplus over the entire period under consideration
would have been rcduccd by almost 50%.
The combination of a slowdown in world demand and
the explosion of domestic demand relative to supply
within the combined Germany may nalrow the current
account surplus to l-2{o of GDP; this would correspond
to the position, to which the Federal Republic has his-
torically aspired.
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3.2 Capital movements
Between 1986 and 1989, the cumulative capital outflows
were equivalent to the total current account surplus:
more than DM 350 bn. Net capital outflows peaked at
5.7%of GDP in 1988 (5.37oin 1989). Short-termcapital
outflows represented more than 2/3 of the total.
In 1986, Germany recorded an exceptional basic balance
(current account plus long-term capital movements) sur-
plus. Forcign long-term net investment reached DM 89.3
bn with a record net purchase of fixed-rate bonds
amounting to DM 59.1 bn. The long-term capital balance
moved back to "normal" in 1987 with a net export posi-
tion of DM 23.2 bn (1.2% of GDP). In 1988, speculation
about the introduction of a withholding tax (effective rs
from January lst, 1989 until July lst) generated import-
ant movements: large outflows of DM 72.9 bn in the
form of securities transactions by residents (about
3 times higher than in the preceeding 4 years) and a
reduction in the net purchases of securities by non-resi-
dents. Withdrawhl of the withholding-tax purposes pro-
duced an improvement in the balance of long-term
capital movements.
Transactions in securities are the dominant feature on the
capital account. They represented 75.6?o of the long-
term capital exports in 1988. This compares with 58%
for the other big surplus-country, Japan.
ln absolute terms, direct investment in foreign countries
was more than three times higher in Japan than in Ger-
many. Japanese direct investment into the EC exceeded
German dircct investment. This has changed in 1989,
when Germany increased its direct investment in the EC
by 84% (to DM 12.8 bn) reflecting optimism at the
prospects arlthin an internal market. Nevertheless, direct
investment in countries which are considered to be in a
catching-up pr(rcess is limited.
Net short term capital outflows fell dramatically in 1987,
to DM 18.2 bn from DM 113.7 bn in 1986. knding by
German banks to foreign banks decreased from 63.9 to
DM 12 bn and lending by enterprises and individuals ro
foreign banks went down from 35.3 to DM 10.5 bn. As
from mid-1988, the real depreciation of the DM led to a
recovery of net lending by German banks to foreign
banks of DM -28 bn in 1988 and DM -77.8 bn in 1989.
In 1989, the balance of short-term capital became the
most important counterpart to thc curTent account sur-
plus @M -93 bn, 4.7% of GDP).
The changes in the Bundesbank's net external assets
depend upon the extent to which the current account
surplus is compensated by capital flows. [n this respect,
movements in foreign reseryes reflect the assessment of
the markets as to the prospects of the currency. The
reserves increased in 1987 @M +41.2 bn at transaction
rates) when the DM apprcciated and decreased in 1988
and 1989 (DM -34.8 bn and DM -19.1 bn respectively)
when the DM depreciated at least in real terms. In 198-9,
the fall in net reserves was mainly caused by an increase
in the foreign liabilities of the Bundesbank, due to in-
vestments by foreign authorities in DM-assets.
3.3 Prospects and policy conclusions
The German curent account surplus has been considered
to be a major macroeconomic disequilibrium. The pre-
ceeding analysis has shown that the underlying current
account surplus has been declining over the last three
years. Prospects are for a further decline, particularly if
the large deficit of the GDR is included.
The relevance of current account imbalances to econ-
omic policy action will become less obvious if financial
integration within the Community makes considerable
progress and economic integration continues. Policy
changes should then be directed at existing savings and
investrnent balances in the various sectors. The success-
ful consolidation of the public sector budget, although
having contributed to the current sccount sulplus, has
been the necessary condition for the recent upswing in
private investment. Nevertheless, the financial surplus
of the private sector remains the important counterpart
to the current account surplus, This reflects both a high
savings rate ofprivate households and a healthy finan-
cial position in the enterprise sector. An excess ofprivate
savings in the Federal Republic is desirable to the extent
that it provides resources for the catching-up process in
less developed Community and Eastern countries.
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Securities
Lending
Private acquisit. of real
estate
Other invcstment
-30.0 -59.9
-7.5 -17.1
-8.9 -25.9
-il.o -14.0
-1.3 -1.0
-1.2 -1.9
28.2 59.0
-5.5 -14.5
-4.3 22.6
10.8 -6.0
-1.5 -r.l
-t.2 -1.9
-92.3
-25.3
-49.8
-t3.9
-1.2
2.O 2.6 3.4 2.44.6 48.5 33.2 7.721.8 8.0 L9 l.t
-o.2 -0.1 4.2 4.2
Other investment 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0
Bflm:"n1.*r-rcrm capi- -1.t 4.e -23.2 -rc.e -22.8
Source: Deutsche Bundesbank, April l99O
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Chapter 4
GEMSU: assessment and macroecon-
omic implications
Since November 1989, the border between the FRG and
the GDR has elfectively been open. This has led to an
enorrnous inllow of East German immigrants to the
Federal Republic. In late February 1990 the Federal
Government offered the GDR govemment a monetary
union to stop this immigration wave by giving GDR
residents favourable economic prospects in the GDR
itself. As of I July 1990, a German economic, monetary
and social union (GEMSU) has come inro exisrence. This
chapter considers some of the implications of these
changes for the economies of the FRG and the GDR, for
the GEMSU as a whole (especially in its macroeconomic
aspects) and for Getmany's partners within the Com-
munity.
. For the FRG and the GDR viewed separateln the
question can be seen as primarily a regional challenge:
how best to ensure a rapid upward-oriented develop-
ment of the GDR qconomy, so as to avoid the social
costs of massive migration from East to West, without
relying predominantly on long -term transfers.
. For the GEMSU as a whole, events since last Novem-
ber constitute a positive supply shock. Experience in
the United Kingdom and Spain suggests that in such
circumstances, and with an increased availability of
borowing opporrunities (notably for GDR residenrs),
there will be an initial period in which demand, both
for consumption goods and for investment goods, ex-
ceeds supply in Germany. To avoid an overheating and
inflationary tensions either fiscal or monetary policy
will have to become, ceteris paribus, contractionary.
. For the European e,conomy as a whole (including East-
ern Europe) therqjryg now improved prospects for a
strong ly growing c€oSO* fegion with positive implica-
tions for all other European countries. [n particular, an
integrated GDR economy may act as a bridge between
Ivestern and Eastem countries.
4.1 Short term macroeconomic impact of the
GEMSU on the FRG and European
gconomy
The economic unification of Germany will trigger a
positive growth effecr on the economy of the Federal
Republic (about 1% of GDP). This is mainly the resulr
of a shift of GDR intemal demand rowards imports from
Western countries and a general loosening of fiscal pol-
icy in the entire German public sector. Given the high
rate of capacity utilization in the economy of the Federal
Republic and the opporrunity for all EC counrries ro
establish similar import linkg in the GDR, all Com-
munity countries will participate in the import pull of the
GDR economy. Therefore, the overall German current
account surplus may shrink considerably while the cur-
rent account balances of the other EC countries will
improve. This will contribute to more convergence in the
external balances of Community countries.
The FRG labour market has been influenced by signifi-
cant emigration from the GDR, and other Eastern Euro-
pean countries. Integration of thcse new workers into the
labour force may lead to new kinds of working patterns.
Despite the obvious difficulties of finding accommoda-
tion in the FRG, the shortage of qualified labour in the
FRG will continue ro attracr people from the GDR. In
these circumstances, short-term working contracts dur-
ing seasonal or holiday periods would prove attractive
to residents of the GDR. Cross-border contracts will also
become attractive to GDR residents, as they can combine
high salaries (in the FRG) with low rents in the GDR. In
the long-term perspective, the impact on the labour mar-
ket of the FRG can be characterized as positive, with the
regional and sectoral mobility of labour improving con-
siderably.
The overall macrossonomic impact of GEMSU on the
FRG economy will be enhanced by capital mobilitn a
single currency and labourmobility, which will probably
be larger than observablc at the Community level in the
foreseeable future. Therefore, it will be less and less
recommendable to disentangle the economic interrela-
tionships of the two German economies. In particular,
macroeconomic performance within a German Monetary
Union will have to be looked at in a whole German
context. A number of likely features of macroeconomic
policy in GEMSU are clear:
. there will be a very substantial loosening of overall
fiscal policy within GEMSU. Given that the credibility
of German fiscal policy in controlling future trends in
the public finances is to be maintained, this fiscal
loosening will have significant demend-expansionary
effects.
. for GEMSU as a whole, there will be a period in which
the pace of increase in demand outsrrips that of supply.
At a later stage, supply will accelerate.
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. In short, the economy wirhin GEMSU ir likely to be
subject to a long-lasting period ofexcess demand. The
connected problems can be eased by measur€s to in-
creaso imn6{i11sly foreign supplies. The market of the
GDR should be open for all Community counries and
measures should be taken to Promotc imports to the
German oconomy so as to reduce the gap between
demand and supply. Nevertheless, the likely pattern of
supply and demand may pose challenges for monetary
policy.
The macroeconomic impact of GEMSU on the rest of
Europe will be significant and positive: the changing
balance between demand and supply within the GEMSU
will affect trade flows and savings in partner countries.
The significant reduction of the current account surplus
of the unified Gerrrany will stimulatc demand in the
whole Commmunity and will only be partly offset by
higher interest rates. Thus, GDP in the whole Com-
munity could be increased by lf2 percentagc point dur-
ing the fust two years after GBMSU.
In the longer run, it can be expected that the positive
effects which are exp€ctcd from the single market will
be reinforced. Moreover, to the extent that the other
Eastem European economies will make progress in their
moves to a market cconomy, the advantages of a pro-
gressive division of labour within Europe might accel-
erate further. Given the relatively large integration of the
GDR economy into the Eastern economies, the GDR can
act as a bridge between the Community and the Eastern
European economies.
Nevertheless, fears exist as to whether rapid economic
developments within the GEMSU might displace the
catching-up process in other, relatively poor, Com-
munity countries, notably Spain, Portugal, Greece and
Ireland by crowding out invGstment in those countries.
However, investment in these countries is mainly urder-
taken because of an expected high real rate ofreturn. In
general, GEMSU will not sften8e this and in view of the
progressive integration of world financial markets, fin-
ancial constraints should not be overemphasized.
Integration of the GDR in the European Communities
will, furthermore, raise some questions as r€gards exter-
nal trade and market access. In general, problems exist
only for those producB where East Euro,peatr countries
are very competitive on world markets and where access
to the Community market is restricted; access to the East
Germanmarket has notbeen affected by quotas or tariffs.
For other products, affected by tariffs or quantitative
restrictions, it is doubtful whether there will be any
demand for East German goods at all. Also, demand in
East Germany for sub-EC standard products from East
European countries will shrink considerably. Therefore,
it is very likely that trade relations between the GDR and
Eastern European countries will dccline significantly in
the short run, while the possibilities for EC countries to
export to the GDR territory have become much bigger.
4.2 Short-term implications for the
GDR-economy
The introduction of thc DM to the GDR economy will
trigger an important adjustment Pr(rcess. The pressure
for adjustment may be larger than in other eastern coun-
tries moving from a planned economy to a market econ-
omy becausc thc GDR economy must immediately
compete in the world market. However, the impacts will
be cushioned by important financial suPPort from the
Federal Republic. Nevertheless, it is important that the
GDR. rapidly transforms its economic strucrures and the
behaviour of its economic agents into a market economic
frrmework, enabling the catching-up Process in the me-
dium-term and minimizing the danger of long lasting
economic instability. In any event, the short-term impli-
cations for the GDR economy will be significant.
GEMSU has important short-term macrooconomic con-
sequdnces for development in the GDR. koviding GDR
residents with hard currency has led to an important shift
of domestic demand towards consumption of imports.
Consumption is generated not only by additional trans-
fers from West Germrny and foreign investment,but also
by the conv€rtible currency income of GDR residents.
Price competitiveness is only one factor attracting GDR
residents to consume imported products. The inappropri-
ate prduct-mix provided by GDR suppliers may Prove
even more important. The modernization of GDR indus-
try requires Western technology, so that increased
foreign investment will be reflected in imported invest-
ment goods. In addition, investment by viable GDR
enterprises will further boost imports.
The external trade performance of the GDR is seriously
affected by the introduction of the convertible Deutsche
Mark. This is espccially the case for trade with Eastern
countrica. As GDR demand shifts to WGstern products,
special trade structures with COMECON countries will
disappear. COMECON exports to the GDR will quickly
begin to follow the pattern of trade with other Western
countries. GDR exports to both \Yestern and Eastern
countries may diminish quite considerably. This is once
again especially true for exports to Eastern countries in
hard currency.
The effective fusion of the GDR and FRG labour markets
and by extension, integration into the Community labour
markct will have a profound impact on wages in the
GDR. The agrced conversion rate of l:1 may have been
consistent with prevailing levels of productivity. How-
ever, the price reform, newly-introduced indirect taxes
and the introduction of a wage-bill tax and significant
social security contributions have already led to strong
upward pressure on wages. The need for wage differen-
tiation" so rs to provide greater incentives for certain
sections of the labour force, will push average wages
further upwar&. To the extent that GDR workers will
have the choice bctween working in the GDR or in the
FRG, cross-border working contracts will have spill-
over effects on the GDR wage level. Irwer rents in the
GDR will not, in principle, exert a dampening effect on
wages 13 both the advantages of high wages and low
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rents can be combined. Productivity of new inyestment
will be similar to western levels. Thus, wrges will prob-
ably be higher than current GDR levels in order to attrsct
the most qualified labour. Sooner or later, this will affect
the general wage level. Moreover, to the extent that top
and middle management comes from West Germany and
receives West German wages, perhaps even with a sup-
plement, wage differentials between the various sectors
of the labour force may ultimately prove unacceptably
wide. Finally, trade unions in both regions will naturally
seek to promot€ wage parity between the FRG and the
GDR.
However, two factors might reduce the mismatch of the
wage level and labour productivity. Firstln high unem-
ployment will have a dampening effect on wages both in
the GDR and, to the extent that the two labour markets
are integrating, also in the FRG. Secondly, considerable
room exists to increase labour productivity in the short-
term. Reducing labourhoarding, improving the organiz-
ation of the production process and a more flexible use
of the capital stock are possibilities to increase produc-
tivity in the short-term.
Company investment will, in future, be undertaken in an
integrated German or European context in anticipation
of the single market. Although the effect on net invest-
ment will probably be positive, it is uncertain if new
investmenr will shift from the FRG to the GDR or,
alternatively, if production capacities will simply be
enlarged in the FRG with a view to exploiting the GDR
market. Therefore, if capital is to be attracted to the
GDR, it will be important to create a positive investment
climate in the GDR relative ro rhe FRG.
Prospects for the public finances in the GDR are very
uncertain as the entire structure of expenditure and
revenue will be changed. Even if the abolition of major
price subsidies together with the introduction of taxes on
high cost consumer goods will lead to higher net
revenues, the abolition of production levies together
with the introduction of a new tax system will inevitably
lead to a substantial public deficit, at least temporarily.
In summary, the main implications of GEMSU will, at
first glance, be (l) a considerable slowdown ofproduc-
tion in the shorr-term, (2) high unemployment, (3) huge
budget deficits and (a) an extremely high current ac-
count deficit for the GDR region. From this reduced
level of perfomance the catching-up prwess can set in,
after some time.
Given these short-term problems, it is of great import-
ance to create a positive climate for new investment as
soon as possible. A regional development plan for the
GDR should be developed aimed at fostering investment
in the GDR, new business creation and greater labour
market flexibility. It is of crucial importance to
strengthen the performance of the GDR territory as a
place of production. Infrastructural investment is a
mrjor precondition for such a strategy but the whole
frame of subsidies in the FRG basically works to the
detriment of the GDR. Moreover, the possibility of tem-
porary unfavourable developmenrc on the territory ofthe
GDR, necessitates a general review of regional policies.
Most importantly, rigidities which prevail in the FRG
should not be introduced into the GDR; they should
rather be removed throughout Germany. Finally, the re-
vival of private entrepreneurship and a rapid privatiza-
tion of existing industries will be important
preconditions to promote the efficient allocation of fac-
tors of production and thus a successful catching-up of
the GDR economy.
4.3 Longer term considerations: The regionat
challenge within GEMSU
GEMSU is the attempt to inrcgrate two complctely dif-
ferent economies of which one has not ernjoyed even a
minimally integration in the world market. Distortions
stemming from 40 years of centrally-planned economic
and social structures cannot be neglected and a painful
adjustment process is unavoidable. It is, however, also
worthwhile to invest in this process as it can yield an
enormous increase in the wealth of about 16 million
people. The following Chapter deals with some issues
related to such longer-term considerations.
4.3.1 The challenge
GEMSU is characterized by capital mobility and a single
crurency. This implies that real interest rates and the rate
of return on capital must be equalized between East and
West Germany. In turn, on conventional assumptions
about technology, this would require an equalization of
capital/labour ratios in the market sector b€tween the
two regions if labour were homogenous. This could be
achieved by flows of capital or labour or both. In the case
of labour, flows from the East would be predominantly
into the FRG. In the case of capital, flows into the East
could come from anywhere in the increasingly integrated
world capital market.
If there were no social costs involved in labour flows, it
would make little difference which of these two roures
were followed. However, massive labour flows from
East to West would add to congestion in the FRG, create
strains on health and education services and possibly
create social tensions. In the East, they would produce a
"Mezzogiorno" problem, with the remaining population
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largely consisting of the least mobile and least economi-
cally productive Persons, including the elderly. This
would create a lonS-term regional imbalance, social
problems and, as in the West but for different ressolls 
'
"r""t" strains on health and 
education services.l In
general, therefore, there is likely to be a public pref-
erence for capital flows to the East rather than labour
flows to the West.
The difficulty is that in this special case labour flows can
probably take place more quickly than the trensfer of
physical capital. The tendency for greater equalization
of wage rates (for equivalent groups of workers) between
the two regions may take place via labour flows to a
greater extent than is publicly desirable if it is the out-
come only of private choices' There may therefore be
scope for public policy to influence Private choices,
either by lessening the incentives to migrate or by in-
creasing the attractiveness of capital flou,s to the East.
In effect, measures to reduce private incentives to mi-
grate would amount to maintaining a wage differential,
at least as seen by the employer, between East and West.
However, there are clearly political limits to such
measures. So the major emphasis will havc to involve
providing incentives for capital flows to the GDR.
A second set of issues concerns wages and unemploy-
ment in the transition period . Even if wages did not rise
above current productivity levels, an important part of
GDR production would be rendered obsolete and unem-
ployment would rise.
In the absence of very high labour mobility, unemploy-
ment would produce I wage adjustment and many of the
unemployed would take low-productivity jobs in the
informal sector. Wages would rise only gradually during
the period, perhaps prolonged, in which low wage rates
attracted investment in new vintages of capital. How-
ever, in the presence of a high degree of labour mobility'
it would be unrealistic to attemPt to keep wages even in
line with current productivity. Moreover, enterPrises
will bc under pressure to imProve productivity; reducing
labour hoarding is the natural source for increasing la-
bour productivity, As substantial new employment possi-
bilities will be created only in the medium term bcause
they require new investment (industry) or training (ser-
vices), the unemployment rate might increase sharply
during a transition period and, if it is not to 8iv€ rise to
disruptively large migration, will probably have to be
met by generous - at least initially - unemployment
comPeruration.
A third issue concerns the industrial structure that is
likely to develop in the GDR. It would clearly not b
possible for all employment to be provided by affiliates
of western companies. This is most clearly of the ser-
vices sector, whether consumer services or business ser-
vices, end elso of small-scale suppliers to larger indus-
trial concerns. It will be essential to stimulste indigenous
entrepr€neurship in the GDR and the forrration of new
businesscs.
Given the various challenges, it cannot be assumed that
the FRG 'Wirtschaftswunder" will rutomatically be re-
plicated in the GDR. Rathet a regional development
plan for the GEMSU - perhaps comparable to the 'Ber-
iiofora"*og' end the accompanying "Uberleitungsge-
setze' - will be required. It should probably contain the
following features:
. generous ince,lrtives for investment in the GDR, poss-
ibly combined with restrictions on the incentives of-
fered by the FRG Liinder to investment in their own
territory;
. incentives for new business creation, perhaps invol-
ving an income-support allowance to be paid to new,
small scale entrePreneurs over an initial period;
o greater flexibility in working practices in the GDR
than is curently the case in the FRG (so as to allow,
for instance, individual workers to choose longer
hours, the operation of additional shifts, a more flex-
ibile use of part-time work, fixed contracts and tem-
porary work);
. substantial public sector infrastructure investment,
notably in communications systems, in the GDR;
. the imposition of effective bankruptcy constraints in
the GDR so as to encourage the more effective use of
viable capital and the scrapping of unviable capital;
. the encouragement of training and work effort through
a wage strucrure based on qualifications, aptitude and
motivation;
. extension of Eastern European trade and services rela-
tions.
In sumrnary, the risk that the GDR would remain insuf-
ficiently industrialised necessitates a general review of
regional policies. Importantly, rigidities which prevail in
the FRG should not be introduced into the GDR; they
should rather be removed everywhere. This is another
reason for the announcement of a supply-side package
of the kind mentioned later (see chapter 7). An idea of
the amount of resources needed to stimulate activity in
the desired way can be taken from the prevailing Bcrlin-
fOrderung and accompanying measures.
insufficient echools urd horpitals, in ths Esst, qre of inzufficientqualified
personnel to man the existing physical infrastrucurre. In slrort tlre factr pro,pctiots problem would be the rcverse of ttut to
be confronted in themartet sector.
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MAIN ELEMENTS OF GEMSU
l. Monetary unlon
Thc truin clcmc^ts of th. ,norutory-utrion prt of lhe Stuarsvcrtrag
conccn llu convcrsion ratc, rhc ficalrruil of.itcrprbc dcbt atd
rcstrictions on public fiuaccs.
From 1 luly 1990, thc Dtl lus beconu thc only nuau of pynutt
in thc GDR. Sovcrcigaty in tlu condtrct ot rrcnctary portcl trrrs
bcca tottn ovcr by thc Duttdcsfunt. The rcgulations applying to
hnk supcnbion h tlu FRG also apply in ,k GDR. Wagcs aad
pcnsiotrls which prcyailcd ot I ltlay havc bccn coavcrtcd a, a rat.
of 1:1. ln gcacral, dcbt atd clailns luvc bccn coavcrtcd at a ratc
of2:1. Howcvcr,lor rcsidents of thc GDR, thc convcrsion ratc for
savings itrchtding cash mon y was I : I within tlu foltowiag linits:
childrca (agc grou70-14) DM 2000; adults (agc group t5-&) DLI
tl0N); clderly (agc group ovcr 60) DM 6000. Rcnaining noacy in
circulalion and saviags - vith sonu nucroccoaomically mkor
cxccplions - luvc bcca cnvcrtcd al a rutc of 2 :1 .
Non-rcsidcnts luvc bccn allowcd to ctclaagc Mark al a ratc of
3:1 into DM, howcvcr, oalt to thc crr.at tle, tlusc luvc bccr.
bsrudbyGDR bofu afur I Janury.
As cash nuuy has bcca convcrtcd a, tlu tarru corditioru as
saings accoutrts, cqulizatioa activitics first anong lamilbs bu
also anoag thc populotiot h gcrcral hzve bcca ohcctvcd.Therc-
forc, tlu tluorctbal nraxinum anota, of 6,1 ba Mark lat alnost
beca convcrtcd iato Dtrl at I:1, lcading to cqualizatioa clabts(Auglcichsfordcruryca) on the blancc iluct of tlu GDR govcrn-
tunt of about 32 bn DM.
2. Publlc flnance
Regulations affccting public ftrunccs in both thc FRG and thc
GDR budgcts coaccrn (I) tronsfcr paynunts lromVcst ro East,(2)
bndgct ard borrowing rulcsfu tto GDR tudgct, (j) GDR public
debt aftcr taifrcation, (4) rcvcnuc and crpcttditttrc structttc ofttu
GDR budgct.
Pttblic traasfcrs cotubt of thosc gcncrol transfcrs which shall
blaacc tlu GDR budgct ottd of thatc ,o suppoil the old agc
pcnsioa Ech.t u ard wunployttuat iasutancc (AaschtbJinanzic-
ruag). Total tru^slcrs wcn iaitblly agrccd to arrount ,o DM 25
bn for thc sccond half of 1990 and DM 3E bn for 199t.
As rcgards btdgct procc&rcs, th. GDR lrrls bccn odigcd to
iatro&rcc lhc Wcst Gcrnan ta, srstcm. Strict borroving rcquirc-
,ruilt apd, to difrcrcnt budgcts czcluding tlu social sccurityr
bndgct. Approval by ttu Wcs, Gcrnun Ministcr of Firuacc is
rcquircdfor a budgct deficit.
Ptrblic debt which ctists a, tlu tim. of polilical uification will
hcottu pttblic deW of rlu GDR-lnndu. This will rclieyc thc
Fcdcrol bttdgct of ary dditional dcbt bwdcn assocbtcd with a
uificdGurmty
Whilc on thc rcvcnu side the GDR has to introducc tlu tllcst
Gcrnun ,a, rrylt.m, oa thc crpcadittsc side subsidbs lor privatc
lowcholds, itt1nutriz,l producu, ptblic rtanspoil, cacryy uscd by
privalc houscholds adthe dwclling scctorarc bcing rccorcidcrcd
u abolbhed. As rcgards agriculturc, CAp rcgulotiotu will bc
intrduccd. Salorbs fo ptrblic s.rtants will luvc to take accoutt$ the gcaeral cconomic ad fttuaciol conditiotts in thc GDR.
3. Economlc unlon
The GDR iatrcA.ccd th. fusic rulcs govcrning narkzt ccoaomics
c.t. conlract frccdom bctwccn cconomic agcnts, abolition ofad-
minbtcrcd priccr, wagc autonomy on both sides of iadustry, iatro-
dttction of privatc propcrty rights.
As rcgardt trad., lh. cotrditiotrs of Gcrnaa-Gcrnan trade con-
ccrilag goods ol Gcrnun origin arc nortulizcd aad trcatcd as
htcr-rcgioaal tradc'. Tlurc is ao bordcr aad cuttotns coilrol lorgods of Gcrnaa origia aad crports to the othet parts of Gcrnunyb not hitbtc spccbl Yltif proccdwcs. Goods of aon-Gcrnaa
origh orc trcotcd os nornal inports (crports).
Thc slrrctual adjustrruli of cntcrpriscs con bc supportcd by ttu
GDR govcraneat by providing $naacial rcsoyrccs dwing a trai-
sition pcrid.This supprt b, howcvcr, depcndcat upo^ rh. finan-
cbl silutioa of thc GDR budgct and the coucnt of the FRG
govcrnnunl ttos lo bc obtaincd.
4. Soclal unlon
Pcnsion, hcalth, accidcat and utcntploymcnl inswanca arc ad-
miaktcrcd by scff-govcrniag bdics undcr thc lcgal supcrvbioa of
,hc stat.. They arc nainly firunccd through contributiotts by
cttrploycrs ard cntployccs (nornully 50% cach). The GDR tus
ittrduccd an utcttrployncat iwurancc schcnu comparablc to th.
FRG's. A health btswancc schcnu is cstablbhcd. In thc casc of
illacss, wagcs orc pad by cnploycrs according to thc rcgdalions
i^ tlu FRG. Pclsioncrs havc to con!ilbutc lo thc hcalth insurancc
Itsl.m.
Pcnsiotu orc lixcd ot a lcvcl tlvt tcpr.scats Z0% of thc aycragc
,r.l wagcs it thc GDR (after 45 ycars of payiag contibwioa b rhc
pcnsin slst.m). lf thc pcasioa falts bclow the prcvious GDR
pcttsion, thc anoua, of thc prcvious pcnsion will bc paid in DM.
Pcr*iore arc adjukd according to thc devclopnrcnt oJ nct wagcs.
Sincc, durhg o lrauitiotul plusc, rcgular contributiotrs to lhc
pcnsior aad uaeafloyntnt schenus do aot fulty covcr cxpcttdi-
Ittrcs, ,he FRG nakcs a tcnporary contribuioa (Arcchubfitunzic-
runil.
4.3.2 The Staatsvertrag and reglonal development
As yet, it remains unclear to what extent the desirable
features outlined abovc will be realized. The measures
adopted so far are contained in the Staatsvertrag. The
Staatsvertrag deals with the conditions and procedures
of introducing the DM in the GDR. It defines rhe accom-
panying measures the GDR has to take in order ro imple-
ment the basic principles of a market economy. In effect,
the economic system of the FRG will have to bG intro-
duced with the possibility of some changes, parricularly
during the adjustm€nt period. As regards economic
policies, monetary sovereignty is passed over to the
Bundesbank and the West German Minister of Finance
will have a decisive influence on the conduct of fiscal
policy in the GDR.
The Staatsvertrag docs not specify the internal adjust-
ment measures which will have to be tsken by the GDR
authorities. In particular, the issue of privatc ProPerty
rights is not completely resolved. As regards the cnter-
prise sector, a "Treuhandanstalt" will mansge the re-
quired privatizations. Revenues from privatization will
be used to cover the risks of new bank credits and
unavoidable debt take-over which arise from bankrupt-
cy. These revenues from privatization are also con-
sidered to contribute to the balancing of the GDR budget
and to pay back the equalization clains stemming from
asyrnmetric conversion of assets end liabilities'.
The questio,n rrises as to whether such a procedure might
hinder a rapid revivel of private GntreprencurshiP
through distorting the budget constraint on enterprires:
. to the extent that privatization will take time and debt
take-overs will be required immediately, additional
equalization claims (or similar regulations) have to be
established;
. there will be a risk that generous debt take-over possi-
bilities by the "Treuhandanstalt" might reinforce bank-
ruptcy as no own capital of private hous€holds and
management is involved;
. non comPetitive enterprises might have an incentive
to pay as much as possiblc before they becomc offi-
cially banknrpt and the "Treuhandanstalt" takes over
the debt;
. if lending by banks is guaraateed by the "Treuhandan-
stalt", market forces in the process of efficient alloca-
tion of capital might be considerably reduced;
. these dangers would be considerably reduced either by
a very rapid privatization process, which would in-
crease both the risks and opportunities ofprivate econ-
omic behaviour, or a systematic and quick assessment
of the prospects of individual enterprises and the prep-
aration of adjustment strategies by professional rtest-
ern consultencies, perhrps paid by the Government.
A frrrther risk is that the rigidities that currently charac-
terize areas of the West German oconomy (in wage bar-
gaining, in working hour and practices, in the control of
new entry into certain areas of the labour market and
other areas commented on in chaPter 7) might be ex-
tended iirto the GDR.
ChaPter 5
Fiscal PolicY
After thc experience of the 1970's and the beginning of
the 1980's, when activist fiscal policies with only poor
economic resulB had ted to a significant increase in
public indebtedness, the Government's medium-term
stratety has been directed towErds imfroving economic
performance; this is to be achieved by reducing the size
of the public sector rnd the level of State intervention in
the economy rnd by consolidating the public finances.
This policy hes helped to PrePare the economy to suc-
ccssfully copc with the unexPccted claims resultingfrom
GEMSU. The following chapter analyses the stance of
fiscal policy ovor the 1980s and tries to sketch the pros-
pects for the early 1990s.
5.1 General strategY in the 1980s
In the framework of supply-side oriented policies, the
Fcderal Government has followed a multifold strategy
over the period 1982-f990:
. priority was given to the reduction of the deficit, with
the aim of rrresting the rise in the public debt, the
debt/GDP ratio had more than doubled from 18% in
1970 to neerly 4O%it 1982, and interest payments had
bccome a significant burden.
. at the samg time, the continuous rise in public exPen-
diture as a 9o of. GDP during the 1970's was seen to
have contributed to excessive rigidiry in the economy.
Budgetary consolidation by expenditure restraint was
intended to restore confidence and to create room for
tax r€ductions;
. onc€ the reduction of the deficits of central and local
governments was successfully underway' stePs were
taken to reduce taxes and to improve the tax structure'
in order to provide more incentives' to ensure Sreater
allocational neutrality and to favour savings. As set
out in 1984, the Govenrment's fiscal aims have been(i) to reduce the progressivity of personal income
trxrtion; (ii) to have a sustained reduction in the tax
burdon; and (iii) to abolish special tax exemPtiolrg
while broadening the tax base. First measures were
taken in 1986 and 1988, while a more fundamental
reform of the income tax system was implemented in
January 1990. Areform ofcompany taxation in order
to avoid any allcged disadvantages vis-l-vis foreign
competitors has also been discussed;
The f989balqre sheer - which @wr that the enterpise s€ctq has been in&bted
by a grose debt of 260 bn Mat (rct debt 2(X) bn Mrrt). Loure o thc red estarc ecoor mlormred to 108 b,n Mrk Snt€ryris€s
migli rrct be h a position b ber half of their debt ie . bmkuptcy will increes€ the nced for &bt takeover if the borking
sccrm slrould be rmduly hrrdened. All in all, rhc implied initial puHic &bt takc-ovcr miglrt anrormt to some lfl) bn Mart ie.
uound 7 % of theWestGermmGDP impliedby a21 onversionof enterprisc&bt(thecursequenoes forthc ondrrtof
morrctary policy are dealtwidr inCtryter6)
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. I further eim was to improve the structure of expendi-
ture, by increasing the share of investment and by
lowering that ofunproductive and distorting expendi-
ture like subisidies and several other transfers. How-
ever, this policy has had only very limited success up
to the present.
. it was planned to reduce public intervention in the
market process by privatizing public enterprises. Al-
though the Federal Government has had considerable
success in this respect, the overall impact on economic
activity has been rrther limited as the L6nder and local
authorities have not yet edopted a similar privatization
Prograrnme.
This strategy was followed since 1982, and implemented
in an economic context which has been very favourable
in the recent past. It hrs led to a rather satisfactory public
finance situation by the cnd of 1989 - with e nearly
balanced budget for the general govemment (on a nr-
tional accounts basis) and r quite sustainable public debt
ratio. This situation is particularly fortuitous in view of
the unexpected "shock" in connection with politicel
changes in Eastern Europe which have impacted on the
budget as from 1990.
5.2 Main developments over the 1980s
The policy of budgetary consolidation had already led to
r reduction in the deficit from a level equivalenttoS.Tgo
of GDP in l98l to l.lcb in 1985 (general governmenr,
national accounts delinition). This had been achieved
mainly through expenditure restraint - concentrated in
the areas of trqnsfers to households and public invest-
ment - , in accordance with the general conception of the
medium-term strstegy. However, in view of the poor
domestic growth performance and the emergencc of in-
ternational imbalances, fiscal policy in the Federal Rc-
public in the mid-1980s faced criticism as excessively
contractionary.
From 1986 onwards, the Government began to introduce
gfirngc,s in the trxation system. Over the 1986-88 period,
thc general government deficit widened again to reach
2.1% of GDP. This was mainly due ro a tcmporary drop
in the transfers of profits from the Bundesbank to the
Government (resulting from the impact of the USD de-
preciation). Thc two-step tax reform, introduced in 1986
end 1988, mainly compensated for fiscal drag; however
tax revenu€s fell short of expectations as economic
growth werkened. Expenditure continued to decrease as
a % of GDP.
Thc debt/GDP ratio continued to rise and reached 45%
of GDP in 19E8. However, excluding the Bundesbank
transfers - which is the relevant concept when trying to
rssoss the stance end economic impact of budgetary
policy - the budget brlance remained practically un-
changcd during that period.
From the financial point of view 1989 was particularly
favourable. At all levels of government, budgets were
better than in 1988 and for general govemment, on the
basis of national accounts definitions, a small surplus
was even recorded (about 0.2% of GDP). This outcome
resulted in a decrease in the debt/GDP ratio, which by
the end of 1989, stood at abont 43.09o of GDP.
The 1989 outcome was not primarily connected with
exceptional or temporary Gv€nts. The major reasons for
the fevourrble figures lie in
. the favourrblc trend is the Social Security Funds
which, thanlr3 to the consequences of the Health Re-
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form Act and a favourable employment performance,
recorded a surplus of.O,759o of GDP;
. consumer tax increases, implemented as from lanuary
lst to counterbalance additional transfers to the EC
budget;
o a strong rise in tax revenues reflecting 8 substantial
increase in the tax base due to the strength of the
economy: high levels of private consumption and
housing construction, a rise in employment and in
earnings of wage and salary earners, in particular.
However, 1989 was also an intermediate year bctween
two steps of income tax reductions. In addition, the
transferred Bundesbank profits were substantial. On the
other hand, the favourable trend in the ratio of expendi-
ture to GDP continued, despite a marked increase in the
final quarter of the year. In connection with the opening
of the frontiers with the GDR, growth in expenditures
overshot the medium-term target of 3% p.t. set by the
Financial Planning Council. It was, nevertheless, still
lower than the GDP growth rate.
For 1990, the reduction in the State's share in the econ-
omy has been the primary target of fiscal policy. The
implementation of the tax reform, which was already
planned for several years, aimed at alleviating the tax
burden on labour income and on corporate profits, but
also on improving the structure of taxation, in particular
by introducing linearity in the progressivity of rates. The
net financial impact of the reform on the 1990 budget
could represent a loss of revenue of around I percentage
point of GDP.
To sum up, it is clear that budget consolidation has been
very successful in the Federal Republic and, since 1986,
has given room for substantial tax cuts since 1986, in-
tended to improve incentives in the economy. However,
on the expenditure side, apart from the reform in the
health sector, no major improvement in composition has
taken place; the share of investment could not be in-
creased and the reductions in subsidies have been less
than satisfactory. As regards the stanc€ of fiscal policy
in recent years, the expenditure restraining effect must
be assessed with reference to the incentive effect of the
tax reforms, and one should also take into account the
improvement in expectations as regards thepublic sector
financial position.
The consolidation of the 1980s was fortunate ex post in
view of the need to finance the German unification, but
the tax reform (which was welcomed ex ante) may turn
out to be inappropriate at this time. In 1990, fiscal policy
will probably have a significant stimulatory impact on
economic activity, because of the tax cuts as well as the
increased expenditures. The supplementary 1990 federal
budgets, the creation of the "German unity fund" and the
unavoidable additional needs of the GDR indicate a
sharp rise in expenditures as compared to 1989. Due to
high growth and employment performance, revenues
should still increase considerabln although the net-ef-
fect of GEMSU will dcfinitely be negative in 1990.
5.3 Prospects
The need for resources to stabilize and modernize the
GDR-economy will dominate the future stance of fiscal
policy. In the short-term, the integration of immigrants
from Eastern Eruope and from the GDR and assistance
to improve the economic situation in the GDR are going
to put upward pressure on public expenditure in different
fields:
The central government's Finance Minister and the
heads of regional states agreed to set up a fund (Fund
"Deutsche Einheit") to help finance the GDR budget (see
also chapter 4). A total amount of ll5 bn DM financial
aid has been announced and is to be spread over the next
4 years as follows:
1990 l99l 1992 1993 1994
b,n DM 22 35 28 20 l0
20 bB DM will be provided by cuts under some headings
of the central governments'budget, while the major part
of 95 bn DM is to be raised on capital markets by issuing
bonds. The particular instruments to be issued have not
yetb€€ndecided, but all will be denominated inDM. The
liabilities are shared 50:50 by Bonn and the Linder
gov€nrments.
The fund is designed to balance the GDR budget, while
the financial aid to help establish a western social se-
curity system is to be financed directly by the central
govenrment's budget.
At the Liinder Goverament level, assistance programmes
have already been approved by some Governments, and
at the municipal level, the inllow of immigrants is ex-
pected to require additional social spending.
From the point of view of stabilization policies and in
order not to threaten the objective of reducing State
intervention in the economy, this new challenge should
be addressed within the principles of the medium-term
strategy. This implies that these expenditures should
mainly be compensated by extensive cuts in other areas.
Otherwise, significant tax increases may be unavoid-
able. A restructuring of the budget might involve the
following appropriations, in particular:
. militarl expenditure should be cut substantially ("the
peace dividend");
. subsidies, which are still very important (see Chap-
ter 7) should also be reduced. A reform in that field
would be very much in line with the general strategy,
and could also be helpful in th€ context of the catch-
ing-up process in Eastem Europe, in those sectors
where supply could come from the East (mining, ship-
building, steel, basic materials);
. sectoral tax exemptions, which are widespread and
which lead to revcnue losses of more than DM 40 bn,
should also be reexamined as regards their economic
justification.
. regional subsidies rnd tax exemptions related to thc
division of Germany should be phased out ts soon as
possible. The projected 7 year period for this phrsing
. out appears to be much too long.
The regional nature of GEMSU implies that it is not
sensible to treat the FRG and the GDR as seperate econ-
omies: labour and capital markets are integrate{ there
is a single curensy; the state budget of the GDR in effect
becomes a regional budget. In this context, fiscal policy
must be seen in the context of the GEMSU as a whole.
All in all, there will be a very substantial loosening of
fiscal policy for the GEMSU as a whole. This is made
feasible, from the point of view of credibility and debt
dynamiss, by the previous policy ofbudgetary consoli-
dation in the FRG. However, as fiscal policy becomes
expansionary for GEMSU, it does not seem appropriate
to allow a fiuther loosening as a result of a more dynamic
growth performance and, consequently, higher revenues.
All levels of government should adhere to their commit-
ment expenditure confine increases (excluding GEMSU-
related expenditures) to not more than 3 percent a year.
To the 
€xtenr thar the credibility of the FRG Finance
Ministry in controlling the furure development of the
public scctor budget of the GEMSU as a whole is main-
tained high, this fiscal loosening will have conventional
demand-expansionary effects.
Chapter 6
Monetary policy
6.1 Main monetary developments over the
late 19t0s
Given the challenge of GEMSU, and in particular given
likely critical budgetery developments, the task ofensur-
ing macroeconomic ttabilization that rightly falls to
monetary policy promises not to be an easy one. Before
investigating this problem, it is, however, worthwhile to
have a look at monetary policy and the development of
monetary aggregates over the late-1980s.
6.1.1 Quantltatlve targets and monetary
developments
In 1986/87 monetary policy had been subordinated to
some extent to the external constraint following the
Plaza and Louvre accords. The Bundesbank failed to
mcet its money growth rarger in both years: in 19g6 (for
the first time since 1978), and in l98Z actual growth in
central lenk 6e1sy cxceeded its rcspective 3.Sgo to
5.5% and 3% to 6% corridors by more than 2 percentage
points. The Bundesbenk toleration of the target over-
shooting was helpful to contain the sharp appreciation
of the DM against the US dollar and to reduce rhe
tensions within rhe EMS. The fall in the oil price, rhe
cheapening of imports due to the DM appreciation, rela-
tively weak domestic demand, and moderate domestic
cost furcreases made it easier for the Bank to accept the
overshooting.
During the 1988 to 1989 period, the Bundesbank suc-
ceeded in gradually reducing monetary expansion. per-
ceptions of increased inflationary risks from the middle
of 1988 induced the Bank ro righren irs monerary policy
stancc. It was feared, that the monetary overhang repre-
sented an advanced accomodation of incipient irflation-
ary pressures, which stemmed from a boyant growth
performance and cost increases arising partly from the
weak performance of the DM on foreign exchange mar-
kets. The overshooting of the target in 1988 may be
primarily explained by a chain of extraordinary develop-
ment8: the hangover from expansionary measures after
the stock market crash in October 1987 and distortions
due to the announced introduction of a withholding tax;
but also by the strong domestic business activity, espe-
cially in the second halfofthe year. The pace in cxpan-
sion of the money stock slowed from Feb,nrary l9g9
onwards'. From May 1989, M3 growth fluctuated around
its 1989 target of "about 5%'. This slowdown was
mainly attribured to the further tightening of monerary
policy and the abolition of the withholding rax. A con-
tractionary inlluence was also cxerted by the 
€xternal
counterparl, reflecting increased capital outflows. After
a bouyant start in January 1990, when the money stock
lhis elow&ur was indicatod earlier@ M3 calculatod ftrom the figrurec reported for
frve bonk-weck reunns radrer thsr by the aaditionally computed money *ock M3 (from April onwardsiwhich is based on
fie last two end'of-nronth levels. sfupe AFil 1989, rhe Brurdesbonk uses only dre former o compare rcural monetary growth
with 0remonetry trget
Greph GTl9: crowth ol M 3 (f96(t . 1990)
t
I
t
6
I
!ls
..,.. Coabdo t!6ci (I.,r fCS)
D.utroL. hadrdrol
(4)
M3 expanded at the top of the" qo to 69o' target rsnge
for this year, money growth calmed down to 4% in May.
A further and increasingly important problem with the
assessment ofmonetary expansion concerns the interpre-
tation of M3. Since late 1988, the measurement of mon-
etary expansion is somewhat distorted by the unusually
strong growth of Euro-deposits in Deutsche Mark held
by the domestic a61-lankfug sector. When a similar
distortion occured at the beginning of 1986, the Bundes-
bank began to calculate an extended M3 money stock,
including German non-banks' Eurodeposits and short-
lsrm [enk bondsa.
It appears that extended M3 has been growing more
rapidly than domestic M3. While the rates of expansion
were about the sgme in 1987, growth of extended M3
outpaced the traditional M3 by more than l/2 P€rcentage
point in 1988 and by some 3 percentage points in 1989.
It is feared that, in particular Eurodeposits, could be a
source of difficulties for monetary policy if they were to
be repatriated. Even if Euro-deposits arc not fully equ-
ated with domestic money balances, it can be concluded
from the rapid growth of extended M3 that there is still
ample liquidity in the cconomy, and monetary policy
cannot be judged as being very tight.
6.1.2 Interest and exchange-rate developments
Since late 1987, short 8nd lonS-term interest rates have
both increescd; however, the amount 66 liming of the
increases differed significantly. The key discount and
Lombard rates were raised in eight steps from their
historically low levels of 2.5% and 4.57o, resP€ctively'
at the end of 1987 to 6% and 8% in October 1989. The
call rate showed a tendency to lead the hikes, it remained
most of the time near the upper limit of the band and
occasionally exceeded the Lombard rate. The three
months rate started to rise from a level of 3.3% ia
February 1988 to 8.3% ia the first quarter of this year.
The development of long-tenn rates se€ms to havc been
relatively independent from short-term rate movements
during the past two ycars. Between the end of 1987 and
the end of 1988, long-term rates remained roughly con-
stant at a level of around 6.2%. \\ey started to rise
gradually to a level of7.5% in the last quarter of 1989
and jumped to 8.5% in the first quarter of this year.
The yield curve had been positively sloped throughout
1988; this probably reflected the exceptionally lo* in-
flation rate in 1987/88 which was assessed by markets
as being temporary, i.e. long-term nominal rates con-
tained a higher "core" inflation rate expectation (it was
widely believed that the trend inflation rate implicit
targeted by the Bundesbank was about 1.5% to2%),The
short end of the yield curve moved uP as I result of the
increases in official interest rates, while long rates re-
mained roughly constant during 1988 indicating that
markets were quite confident at that time that inflation
would be successfully combated by the Bundesbank.
Since the second quarter of 1989, however, the whole
yield curve has shifted uP. An explanation for the up-
wardg move of long-term rat€s in spite of the further
monetuy tightcning might be that real lonS-t€rm rates
may hevo increas€d for factore other thrn monetary pol-
icy. Obviousln the gredual improvement of the supply-
side conditiotrs has linally changed the expected rate of
return oa capitd, and, through arbitrage among real and
financial sssets, elso affected the real rate of interest.
The brerkdown of the centrally planned economies in
Eastem Europe (for Germany the GDR is certainly the
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most importEnt of these countries) might heve boosted
prolitability prosp€cts further.
According to this analysis, high long-term interest retes
in Europc are now more bearable, with somewhat bcttcr-
functioning labour markets, lower energy prices, and
very strong entreprencurial confidence, than in the early
1980s, when high rates were caused by an inappropriatl
policy mix and by the hangover from inflationary
policies from the 1970s. Ihe more difficult question ir
that of whether recent developments in Eastern Europe
mean that real rates should appropriately be higher in
Germany than elsewhere. In integrated capital markets,
such a differential could only exist if there were me-
dium-term expectations of a real depreciation.
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external demand werc feared as leading to internal
price instabiliry. In Spring/Summer 1989, the Bundes-
bank made it clear that it would have welcomed a DM
appreciation. This known preference had little impact
on the markets, which at that time could see no justi-
fication for a DM appreciation.
. the increasing convergence of inflation rates within
the ERM (narrow band) countries and in particular the
weakness of the US-Dollar (the DM appreciated
against the US curency by some 1l% since the begin-
ning of the year) have, however, relieved the external
inflationary prcssurss. The DM's real extemal value
has regained some groun( it improved by some 6%
from September 1989 to January 1990 and made up for
2/3 of the loss during the past three years. More reccnt-
ly, a real-appreciation tendency seems to have
emerged.
6.2 Policy Issues
The general policy strategy of the Bundesbank is fre-
qucntly describcd in terms of the targeting of an aggre-
gate (currently M3) with a medium-rerm stability
orientation in mind. However, price stability is now most
likely also e policy objective for cach year. The an-
nouncement of m annual growth target has aimed at
influencing expectations that monetary policy was
geared to medium-term price stability.
In practice, the Bundesbank pursued its target in a prag-
rnatic way. A target range (in 1989 an implicit range
*around" 5%) was given, reflecting the fact that the link
between monetary targets and final objectives is occa-
sionally blurred. [n addition, it tolerated deviations
whenever a need (often due to the external constraint)
forpolicy flexibility was felt. The aggregate orienration
is likely to run into considerable problems in the period
of transition of thc centrally planned GDR economy to
e pro,perly functioning market economy. After a period
The short-term and long-term intercst rate differentials
between the Federal Republic and thc other ERIVI coun_
tries hrve gradually narrowed during the past two years
but inparticularsinceFebruary 1990. In April, France,
Belgi"m, the Netherlands, and Denmark lowered their
key intervention rates in a coordinated move. The move
wos coherent with mertet expectations that there will be
no rcalignmeat in thc short run. Thc srne picture applies
to long-term diffcrcntials. The key differcntial bctwcen
French and German long-term retcs camc down from
ncarly 400 basis poinc ar rhe end of lgg7 to now less
than lfi) basis pointq while the inflation differentials
also narrowed from more than 2 to now less than I per-
centage point.
Exchange-rate movemcnts are one important inlluence
on the Bundesbenk's stabilisation policy, notwithstand-
ing the fact, thar it enjoyed the privilege of having a
relatively high degree of autonomy, due to its leadership_
role in the EMS. In particular, developments of the DWg
rate have been an impctant factor. Three recent phases
in the movement of the DM can be distinguished:
. in 1989, the fall of the real external value of the DM,
which deteriorated by some 9% ftwthe beginning of
1987 to aunrmn hst year, was I matter of concern.
Imported inllation rnd overheating due to exccssive
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Steering Monetary Policy after l July
The German monetary unlon poses a three stage
problem to monetarY PollcY:
. What degree of monctary tightncss is required ?
. How is tle degree of tightrcss mcasured ?
. How is thc desired degree of tightness implemented ?
Alter thc lst July, ttw Butdesbar*'s sttatcgy has to tate
into account tlv additiorul uncertair,ties stemning from
ttc still urilllullwn behotiovr of economic agents h thc
GDR. Mainly tlvce risb errotge in the steering of non-
etary policy : firstly, GEMSU boosts denand in thc wider
DM area quicbr than capacity can be extcnded' Thc de-
grec of inflatiotury pressurc will crucially depend on tlc
saving behavbur of East Gernan residents; i.e. to which
etterrt tlre increasc in their current purchaskg PoY'ei
cxpccted hcrease in future real ircones attd itnreased
avaitability of borrouting opPortunities, leads to an itnttu-
diate surgc in consumption. This shall, for the tinu being '
not be considered. The credit demand of firms is also
ettrenuly difficult to Predict, at lcast lot the transition
period. For thc tinu being, thcrc exists evcn the need to
firunce a part of thewage bill.This will cortinue as long
as the production sites are built or rebuilt and the stafr is
in training Fitulty, the likcly impact of the relorm of the
strt/(jtute of reluive prices on tlw price level is still ttot
forseeable. Orc would csPect that inter-statc price dif'
ferences for tradeabtes will vanish rapidly, but the sane is
not tucessarily true for services, and sotme prices (rents
for exanple) will continue to be administered for sonu
time.
In thcse circtmstatues, the question of how to detetmitp
tlv appropriate tightttess of ,rorutar! Policy arises. Guid'
ance by monctatt aggtegates requires a satisfactory
arurwet to the loltowing two questions, First : docs tllc
initial junrp in norcy sr.Ppll coincide with tltc rccd for
means of paynunt or is tlere an initial monetary overlutrg,
that needs to be draited out over time? Second : which is
the appropriate rate of growth of M3 in thc unificd DM
area?
The developments of thc aggregates are hardly predictable
with precision:
. The ofrcial cstirudte is for a 10% initial ircrease in M3
after GEMSU, which is currently assessed to be in line
with thc addition to nomirul income. But the calcula'
tions werc ratlur nechanical, assuming a constanl vel-
ocity atd potenliut. Hapanr, rcthing definite can be
said abou futurunone, dernartd in tlu GDR atd poten'
tiat in the GDR. is rctuatly declining. In addition, West
Gernaw could possibly also clunge tleir behaviour in
view of perccived rists involved in GEMSU. Herce,
velocity in thc widcr orea is ,Pt ver! likely to be equi-
valent to thc currenl valuefor the Fedetal Republic and
it nay evcn bc vrtrrltable during the period of trattition
to an iilegrated, narkzt ccourm) h the East.
. Tlu tinarcbl situation both of cnterPri$e and of tlv
public sector prodtrces aa itnportant credit expansion.
. PrusPects fot productive potential in the GDR is anothcr
sot tcc of utccrtahty and one does not lcnow at ,rasert
whcrc to locatc it.
. Tle level of thc tntarvoidable kflaion rate has also to be
dccided on.
All these issues add to thc usual urterrainties liakcd to the
predbtion of monetary aggregates, atd would point in the
direction of wideaing thc range arourd any envisaged
central path. Monetary aggrcgarcs are thus likely to lose
weight, as least temporarily, in the assessmet of the pol'
icy stancc infavow of other hdicators.
Tlv nain irdicators that might be considered are:
. Interest tatcs onrtuotv and bond narkets and thc move-
,nrlnts of the yield cume. Thcse might becotu more
important as a guide for monetary policy, despite the
fact, tlwt tltcsc itdicators also have sonc shortcomings.
. Separale calculations ol M3 for the Federal Republic,
the GDR and the wlple atea, with tlw htention of using
the conveiliotul neasure for tle Federal Republic as an
indicator in tlut rcgion. It is, howanl doubtful whether
this proposal lulps a lot. It b very ulikzly that more!
balatrces, held h East Gcrmany, ate irtelannt for fians'
aetionpr.tposes int}r. Federal Republic.The closer that
firms and pfirate households of both areos come
togctlut, tlu less lvlpful this proposal becomes.
To sunt up, rrtorrltr]l aggregatcs will be less reliable as
indicatorc of the policy starte in Gernuny, at least for tlu
period of transition. The Bundesbank will possibly up'
grade otlvr available indicators, and in view of the in'
creased uncertainty, judgemental lactors bccome more
important,
of distortions, aggregate targeting might' however, re-
gain a firmer basis.
In mid-1988, monetary policy returned to the approach
of pre-emptive inflation control, prompted by the per-
ceived importance of staying ahead of actual inflationary
pressures. The approach is, however, not without prob-
lems:
. it is difficult to assess the degree of inllationary press-
ures,
. financiil markets may tend to misread short-tcrm blips
in certain indicators and might therefore overreact on
expected policy moves, and
e the strateSy is difficult to justify ex Post: partly if
inllation ir prevented successfully, it may be difficult
to persuade the public that the drnger existed in the
first place.Additional problems are posed by GEMSU.
The policy mix in the GEMSU is to be assessed, in irs
macroeconomic implications, as the policy stance of an
economic entity. Monetary policy, through inlluencing
short-term interest rates, should act to ensure that the
economic reconstruction in the GDR takes place within
a nominal framework that safeguards price stability. Due
to the limited tax base in the GDR and resistence against
tax rate increases in the Federal Republic, fiscal policy
is not very likely to restrain excess demand sufficlently
_rnd monetary policy will remain extremly challenged.However, the merits of this Reagan-Volk"t typ" of a
policy mix are not universaly accepted,
. high real yields should attract some capital from
abroad, required by the development of the GDR but
possibly at the expense of other regions, where some
investment projects could be crowded out;
. high real rates may not be acceptable for all countries
within the EMS, in particular where higher public
indebtedncss tends to become unsustainable;
. nominal exchange-rate stability could be negatively
affected.
On the other hand, howcver:
. thc movement towards a sustainable balance of pay-
ments position in Germany would be reinforced;
. to the extent that real rates in Europe will remain high,
capital from non-European surplus countries, in par-
ticular Japan, can be attracted;
. there might be some room for the Bundesbank to move
separately from its partner countries, without provok-
ing tensions within the EMS, if risk premiums change;
. investment projects, with an insufficient expected
profitability compared to current real rates, are only
postponed. They may be reconsidered, once the most
profitable projects are carried out;
. in the long run, monetary policy has little influence on
real interest rates. High real rates tend to increase the
supply of funds by intertemporal substitution of con-
sumption, and to restrict the demand by crowding out
less profi table investment projects.
All in all, the Bundesbank has been quite successful in
its anti-inflation policy. German monetary union, how-
ever, represents a new challenge. The success ofperfor_
manc€ suggests that these challenges will be dealt with
successfully.
and the need for I
Part II:
Institutional characteristics of the German economy:
some European asPects
ChaPter 7
Regulations, subsidies and the need for a
forward-looking supply-side policy
Like all other national economies run along market-
economy lines, the German economy has a nctwork of
government and private regulation thet impairs compo-
tition and resource allocation. Such forms of regulation
thus hamper growth and employment. For ttris reason'
but also because the dynamic German-German develop-
ments might necessitatc a rethink of the entire system of
regulation, subsidization and tax rules, this chsPter takes
a critical look at govertrment intervention, focusing in
nrrn on tho sectors of thc economy that might lend
themsclves to deregulation and reform.
?.1 Economic justification for goYernment
intervention in the market process
In theory, the allocation tasks should be performed by
the market in guch a waY that:
. the relevant factor and product markets are cleared
(market clearing);
. yields are normalized and hence capacities tailored to
requiremenr (yicld normalization);
. the power of suppliers and that of Gustomcrs are
equalized (erosion of excessive power);
. an increase in efficiency is achieved through advances
in processes and products.
The market will, therefore, have failed where the desired
market developments referred to above do not take place
spontaneously.
Competition theory demonstrates that a certain group of
institutions, a competitive order, is necessary in order to
preserye and foster competitive control mechEnisms in
the economy and, in particular, to avert ths denger that
gfogse 6sstrnnisurs will disintegrate of their own accord.
For, in specific market situations, and in particular slow-
ly expanding and largely satiated markets or marken
where some participants ar€ stronger than others, there
is the risk of agr€ements and restrictive practices that act
in restraint of competition to the detriment of third par-
ties. Normdly, however, the upshot of such practices is
suboptimal allocative performances. This is true not only
of commodity and sen ice markets but also of factor
markets such as the labourmarket. Since they constitute
rigidities and obstacles to growth and employment that
are induced by the market Pr(rcess' such insider restric-
tive practices are to be seen as a form of'market failure".
Starting from thc obscrvation that, in matters of alloca-
tion, the decentralized market-€conomy decision-mak-
ing process is generally superior to the central'
bureaucratic process, special economic justification ir
needed for government intervention in the market-econ-
omy control p(rcess. In accordance with the market
principle of subsidiaritn two conditions must be met: (i)
the market process must have produced highly unsatis-
fsstory results (market failure), and (ii) government in-
tervention must be of such high quality that its results
are far better than those produced by the market process.
Essentielln four situations can be derived from the the-
ory of nrrtet failure rnd collectivc goods in which
goverlment intervention in respect of specific goods or
siturtions might be justified outside the framcwork of
the compctitivc order prescribed by the govemment:
. public goods, i.e. goods such es infrastructures where
consumet! who rre unwilling to Psy cannot bc ex-
cluded from consu-ing the product or service in ques-
tion through economic mechanisms ('free-rider' or
"exclusion problem') and where additional colsumers
gencrete hardly rny additional costs and should not,
therefore, bc excluded from consumption either;
. goods having externalities, i.e. goods which, because
prop€rty rights erc insufficient or lacking give risc to
social cocts (or, in the cese ofbcneficial externalities,
benefits) which arc not taken into account in the mar-
ket-based pricing mechanism; this category includes,
for example, goods harmful to the environment such
as powcr stations, chemical plants and cars;
. merit goods, i.e. goods in respect of which the cus-
tomer does not Possess sufficient information or, be-
cause future risks are underestimated, makes only
inadequate provision in the present; education, protec-
tion et work, end pension and sickness insurance are
some of thc goods falling into this category;
. production proc$s€s with declining sverage costs 8s
rcgrrds the entire demrnd on the relevant market
(nanrral monopoly), such as thc disuibution of elec-
tricity c gas.
The sttt€d rim of govemment regulation and interven-
tion in the market Pfircess is to rectify such market
shortcomings and the adversc effects these have on allo-
cation, disuibution and stabilization. However, those
advocating such interv€ntion frequently overlook the
fact that gov€rnment intervention may itself often lead
initially to complete destabilization or narket sclerosis.
Ihe reason for this ir thc "government failure" refcrred
to in the specialized literature and arising from short-
comings in the political and bureaucratic decision-mak-
ing process. The "common agricultural policy, of the
European Communities, which was set in place at Euro-
pean level by the national Ministers for Agriculrure in
the 1960s, is one example of completely misguided mar-
ket intervention by government. And so, in view of the
problems associated with "government failure',, such
malfunctions of the market process should be allowed tojustify government intervention only where its effective-
ness in remedying a material defect is guaranteed.
7.2 Government intervention on markets in
goods and services
Government regulation, whether in the form of controls
over market access, quantitative controls, price controls,
official orders or prohibitions, is found in numerous
sectors of the Federal Gennan economy (see figures
GT24 and GT26). However, if we look at the economicjustificationfor the individual forms of regulation, doubt
rapidly surfaces as to whether they are genuinely in
response to 8 market failure within the meaning given
above. If we then look at their design, fiuther doubt
arises as to their effcctiveness, with the result that, when
all is said and done, potential market failure is often
simply replaced by actual failure on the part of the
govemment.
7.2.1 Interventlon on speclflc commodlty markets
Macroeconomically significant regulation by goyern-
ment of commodity markets is to be found in the Federal
Republic, especially in (i) agriculture and forcstry,(ii) the power-generaring industry and (iii) the coal and
steel industry. $picalln these are also scctors thrt re-
ceive substantial public subsidies. Ihey account for well
over one quarter ofall financial rssistance and tax reliefs
gf,anted by government to specific aGctors. Other forms
of regulation such as barriers to market entry or price
controls, which ere thought less effective from a macro-
economic viewpoin! exist for a multitude of other pro-
ducts.
Agriculture and forestry
There is little, if any evidence of market failure in this
soctor. It can be assumed that market participans re-
spond to price sipalr in a functional manner, i.e. when
prices rise, demand falls and supply increases. It can also
be assumed that, in principle, the price signals function
correctln i.e. where a product is in short supply, its price
will rise if demand remains unchanged. Nor are there any
discernible signs of exclusion problems to do with inade-
quate and unenforceable property rights. Given the in-
tervening globalization of agricultural markets and the
large number of competing products attempting to find
favour with consumers, there is also a negligible risk of
supply bottlenecks where consumers are concerned.
Therc is no evidence either of distorted prefergncw pro-
viding justification for merit-induced interventio,n in
spccific secton designed to influence producer or con-
sum€r behaviour. Bencficial externalities of agricultural
production are insignificant or could be internalized
through appropriate compensatory payments. By and
lerge, therefore, there is no need, from an allocation
engle, for govenrment intervention to assist agriculture.
Even so, given the extremely high degree of factor im-
mobility and the extensive irreversibility of the capital
stock in this sector, edjustment subsidies granted for a
limited period and on a declining scale mighr be justified
on distributive grounds as 8 means of encouraging re-
structuring at times of persistent overcapacity and an
rssociatcd decline in incomes.
Ia the light of this analysis, the multitude and diversity
of market intervention by government in the form of
marketing guaranteos, price guarantees, import restric-
tions and other regulatory measures are surprising. Al-
though responsibiliry for them has been delegated to the
Communitn they are, after all, national in origin. In the
Federal Republic, measures to protect agriculture date
back to the 1870s. The basis for much of the present
intervention at national level is the 1955 Farming Law.
This Law, the 1950 and l95l Market-regulating Laws
and the l95l Customs Tariff were crucial in paving the
way for the special position which agriculture occupies
in thc social market economy. Over the years, they have
givcn rise to en aray of concessions, especially in the
tax field, and have provided the justification for direct
transfers from the budget. In the Federal Republic at the
moment, there is, alongside a panopoly of EC interven-
tion measures, a wide variety of national and regional
intervention measutres to assist agriculture. At the same
time, a division of labour has, to some extent, taken
place. Whereas the EC is primarily responsible for con-
trolling access to thc market and for quantitative and
price controls, national intervention extends to a hotch-
potch of additional Iinancial ai& and tax concessions.
Thus, the Federal Government's Twelfth Report on Sub-
sidies liss thirty-three national financial aids and six-
teen tax concessions that are available for agriculture.
Many of the new measures are designed to offset the
effects on farmers in the Federal Republic of the cautious
deregulation rnd dismantling of subsidies at EC level.
Economists and politicians alike have long been in
aSrecment that govemment intervention in agriculture
should be substantially pruned and reformed. Although
it is difficult to determine the effects of regulation and
intervention on agricultural markets since a comparison
with unregulated agricultural markets does not seem
possible, the following can be said about the impact of
agricultural policy:
rilithout a policy on agricultural markets, stnrctural ad-justment in agriculture, would cerlainly have proceeded
at a much faster pace, the reduction in employment
would have taken place sooner and in a more favourable
macroeconomic environment, producer prices would
have aligned thcmselves on world market levels, and
consumer prices for agricultural products would have
been correspondingly lower.
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subsldles and the need lor s
Between 1970 and 1987,950 00Ojobs were losr in agri-
culture and forestry a decline of 42%. Other industries
including textiles and clorhing, leather and leather
goods, and building also had ro contend with similarly
exacting adjustment constraints. Over the same period,
they witnessed the loss of some 1.3 million jobs, a de_
cline of 459o, but were unable to ',benefit" from the same
intensity and diversity of market intervention. Neverthe-
less, they chiefly comprise healthy, competitive firms
and the structural adjustment process appears to have
been successfully completed, whereas- igriculture is
more dependent than ever on the drip-feed of subsidies.
The attempt to achieve distributive goals through spe-
cific allocative market intervention has resulted in pio-
nounced losses in efficiency and hence in an unnocesssry
misallocation of budget resources. Ihis comes to light in
a co[lmon survey conducted by the West German re_
search instituts taking part in the structural-reporting
exercise (see table GT27). It transpires rhat, in lgg5;
subsidies paid out of all public budgets (including the
EC budget) to assist agriculture and forestry totalled
DM 2l billion, equivalenr to well over llo of GDp or
65% of the sector's gross value added. This works out atjust under DM I 300 a month for each person employed
in the sector. According to this surrey, howerer, orriy a
good one third of these resources, i.e. DM S.3 billion(DM 500 a month per person employed), went to farmers
themselves. A large rhare of these resources benefited
other industries, such as the food, drink and tobacco
indusry and the wholesale trade, or was accounted for
by storage and denaturing costs.
Initial, successful attempts to dismantle the inefficient
and perverse arrangements for intervening in themarket
allocation process have been madc only at Community
level with lirrle supporr coming from the Federal Repub_
lic. However, the reform measures taken fall *ay ,hort
of what is needed. Further attempts at reform should be
guided by the following considerarions:
. agricultural markets are, in theory indistinguishable
from other functioning commoditymarkets and do not,
therefore, need any specific forms of intervention that
interfere with the allocation process;
. a policy of income stabilization should focus on in_
comes and income levels and not on the sector in
question or on other aggregates that do not correllate
to actual income.
For all the national financial aids and tax concessions
identified in the Federal Government's Twelfth Report
on Subsidies, and there were nearly fifty of them, a
deadline should be set for their abolition and it should
be ascertained whether they are economically justified.
A thorough reform of agricultural policy, e.g. restricting
it-to incomedependent income support and dispensin!
with meesures having a bearing on price formation and
with import and production restrictions, could lead both
to r reduction in consumer prices and to a lightening of
the tex burden. At the same time, the factors of produc-
tion would be channelled into more efficient uses, and
this would favourably influence growth, employment
and the economy's absorptive capacity.
Mining and steel production
The framework for rcgulation and market intervention in
the coal and steel industries is set by the Treaty estab-
lishing the European Coal and Stecl Communiry @CSC
Tleaty). The Law prohibiting resrrainrs of competition(GWB), together wirh its ban on rcstrictive practices and
price agreements, does not apply in so far as the ECSC
Treaty contains special provisions (Section l0l GWB).
Whereas Member States made over to the EC compre-
hensive powers relating to the steel industry, the national
authorities may themselves intervene in the coalmining
industry subject to approval from the EC Commission.
Since the first marketing crisis in the German coalmin_
ing industry in 1957, an cxtensive range of national
measures to assist the marketing of German coal has
been introduced. Alongside stringent import restrictions
on coel from non-EC countries, it includes in particular
subsidies tnd price discrimination against competing
sourccs of energy through the introduction of specific
cxcisc duties on hearing oil (1960) and narural gas(1989).
! 1964, the then High Authoriry, conrrary ro rhe provi-
sions of the ECSC Treaty, authorized the.Federal Gov-
ernment to grant subsidies to coalmining. The subsidies
are designed in prrticular to boost the use of German
coal in the production of electricity, to encourage the
steel industry to uso more coking coal, to rationalize coal
production and to adapt capacities to marketing poten_
tial. Currently, over 80% oftotal coal sales in the Flderal
Republic is accounted for by power srations and by the
stecl industry. Since the mid-l9d)s, a number of so_
celled electricity-from-coal laws ("Verstromungsge_
setze') have been enacted to encourage the construction
and operation of coal-fired power stations and, since
197?, the power-generating industry has committed it-
self to purchasing a fixed quantity of Gcrman coal("Jabrhunderwertrag"). Under this agreement, power-
station operators have been p_romised subsidies financed
out of the "Kohlepfennig" 5 to offset the exra costs
involved. The agrecment nrns until 1995.
(5)
itt&lstry' The pooecds ue used to finrnce thc extsa ccts of using Gcrnrur coal in power statims. In 1990, the levy was equal
to 8.5% of thc price of elecnicity urd yielded mae thm DM 5 billiqr.
subsldles and thc need for a forward'lookl
Under the agreement concluded back in 1960 between
the German coalmining industry and the steel industry
("Hiittenvertrag"), the latter undertakes to Purchase
fixed amounts of Gerrtan coking coal. For it to appear
as though the ste€l industry were obtaining supplies of
coking coal on the world market, the coal mines receive
subsidies from the Federal and the Linder budgets enab-
ling them to align their selling prices to the steel industry
on the lower world market price. This agreement nrns
until the year 2000.
It is difficult to find any economic justification for the
intervention Policy in support of the German coal indus-
try, which has now been in oPeration for thirty years'
Traditional market-failure criteria (public goods, exter-
nalities, merit goods, natural monopoly) do not apply
even though they are cited as justification. The argument
that the security ofenergy supplies shouldbe guaranteed
from domestic supplies by means of government inter-
vention simply goes to show that German coal is a merit
good like inoculations or elementary schooling' Accord-
ing to that argument' no proPer sssessment has been
made of the utility of German coal because of distorted
preferences on the part of the market particiPants, and in
particular the power-generating industry. However, in
view of the globalization and interlinking of markets, it
is doubtful whether the preferences ofpotential consu-
mers are actually distorted. What is more, the price to be
paid for ensuring security of energy supplies from do-
mestic coal aPPears excessive. Taking the average for the
1980s, domestic coal has cost almost 70% more than
imported coal.
Nor is the second argument deployed by policymakers
as justification for intervention in the coalmining indus-
try convincing. According to this argumcnt' the import-
ance in terrrs of regional policy of coal mining for
coalmining districts stands in the way of too rapid a
reduction in capacity. But in no w8y has there been too
rapid a reduction in capacitn as the trimming of capacity
has now been going on for more than thirty years and no
end is in sight under the current policy of intervention.
Over the last thirty years, capacity has only been halved'
At the very most, measures to underpin and accompany
a rapid capacity-dismantling Process that were to be
phased out by a particular date would be justified. Such
measures would, at any rote, €nsure that, in spite of poor
competitiveness and overcapaciry, extra productive ca-
pacity would not be crcated by exploiting new coal
deposits as part of the shift of mining northwards, since
this would perpetuate the existing forms of intervention'
At the moment, the Federal Government and the L6nder
each year grant subsidies worth some DM 10 billion'
equivalent to 0.59o of GDB 150% of gross value added
in coal mining and DM 4 400 a month per Person em-
ployed in the industrY.
In the case of the steel industry, the EC Commission
makes extensive use of the oPPortunities for intervention
at Community level provided for in the ECSC Treaty.
These include import quotas ("reference quantities"),
production quotas, compulsory rcstrictive Practices and
the like. The combination of production quotas, sub-
sidies and external Protection means that excess capa-
cities are not dismantled as a matter of priority in those
areas where production is unprofitable, and firms that
are particularly efficient have little, if any scope for
expanding their market shares since it is the loss-making
firms that receive subsidies. In 1985, subsidies were
equivalent to 0.1% of GDR 4% of gross value added iu
thi industry and DM 870 a month per Person employed
in the industry. At the turn of the decade, subsidization
for this sector phased out, thanks to an unexpected
worldwide boost of demand.
Power-generating industrY
Although, compared with agricultural markets' govern-
ment regulation of the power-generating industry is a
much more recent development, the role of the govern-
ment in this industry is significantly more far-reaching'
The government not only restricts market access and
fixes prices and other conditions but it is also a major
produier in its own right. In the electricity industry,
partly as a result of the protection afforded by long-term
!oat"nt""t for regional monopoly positions, production
pro""ss"t in which fixed costs loom large have been
introduced. Concentration on a small number of large
generating plants has direct effects on the structure of
the distribution network, which itself is ultimately deter-
mined by the predominance of fixed costs. Ancillary
conditions in the form of minimum technical size or
realizable size-related advantages (economies of scale)
and interlinkage-related advantsSes (economies of
scope) have, in fact, given rise to the problem of natural
monopoly and the associated problem of price setting
and competition in much of the industrY, and especially
in power distribution. In addition, there are major Poten-
tial negative externalities in power generation. All these
factors focus attention on what the role of government
intervention should be in both Power generation and
power distribution.
At the nrrn of the century, the municipalities in Germany
had, under the banner of "municipal socialism", begun
to involve themselves increasingly in the operation of
what had, until then, been privately owned Power-
Scnerating companies. Today, more than two thirds of all
such companies are still run by public authorities. The
key provisions governing regulation of the power-gener-
ating industrY are:
. the 1935 Law to Promote the power-generating indus-
try @nWiG);
. the legislation on energy prices, together with the
Federal schedule of elecuicity and gas Prices (BTO);
. the General Supply Conditions (AVB) for electricitn
gas and district heating;
. the Law prohibiting restraints of competition (GWB);
. the regulation on large combustion plants.
subsldles and the need for e
These provisions constitute the legal basis for the bar-
riers to market entry in the power-generating industry,
price regulation, investment controls and various re-
quirements to which producers are subject as regards
supplies to consumers and environmental protection.
Pursuant to Section 4 of the Law to promote the power-
generating industry, the construction, renovation, exten-
sion and closure of power-generating plants are subject
to a notification requirement and may be prohibited "on
grounds of the common good", As a result, once estab-
lished on the market, electricity producers are, in prac-
tice, shielded from any new competitors. What is more,
Sections 103 and l03a of the Law prohibiting resrraints
of competition exempt the power industry from the ban
on restrictive practices, clearing the way for the licens-
ing, demarcation and interconnected-supply contracts
that are so prevalent in the industry. These long-term
contracts between power companies and the public auth-
orities or between power companies themselves provide
permanent protection for established producers (since
1979 only for another twenty years or so) against poten-
tial competitors on their supply territories (territorial
monopoly).
The price which the - mostly municipal - monopolisrs
who are protected in this way have to pay is that they are
subject to the supervisory arrangements for preventing
abuse of their positions and to specific supervision in
respect of energy mstters by the competent Land Econ-
omics Minister, that they must seek approval for their
prices and that they are obliged to enter into contracts,
i.e. power companies must supply all customers as long
as this does not expose them to any unfair hardship.
The main problem facing any plans to deregulate the
power-generating industry is the difficulty in ascertain-
ing the consequences this might have, since present
production structures are based on the existing regula-
tory aranSements and on the protection these afford.
Deregulation should be guided by the following:
. power generation and power distribution are two dis-
tinct activities which, where possible, should be man-
aged by separate bodies, thereby sharpening
competition, e.g. by way of transmission rights;
o porv€f generation is not an inherently public-sector
task since property rights are economically enforce-
able vis-l-vis consumers - an exclusion problem does
not arise; even in a competitively organized market it
can be assumed that, in practice, price-setting and
investment behaviour will be functional;
. existing large-scale production structures, which carry
the risk of market monopolization, have received as-
sistance only since the present regulatory arrange-
ments for this sector came into effect;
. arguments emphasizing the peculiar characteristics of
energy as a good - e.g. "capital intensity", "non-sto-
rability", "transmission-dependence and networkde-
pendence" and "peak-demand problems" - are also
characteristic of other sectors of the economy not
subject to such intensive regulation.
Other manufacturing industries
In the other manufacturing industries, there is no branch
that does not in some way receive subsidies. Table GT27
shows that specific tax reliefs and subsidies for this
sector amounted to over DM 15 billion in 1985. In abso-
lute terms, they went chiefly to mechanical engineering(DM 2.6 billion), electrical engineering (DM 2.1 bil-
lion), the food, drink and tobacco industry (DM 1.5 bil-
lion), the chemical industry (DM 1.2 billion) and the
motor vehicle industry (DM l. I billion). As a proporrion
of gross valuc edded in the branch concerned, shipbuild-
ing (25% of grors value added or DM 940 a month per
person employed) and the aircraft and aerospace indus-
try (12% or DM 880 a month per person employed)
benefited most from the Govemment's policy on sub-
sidies.
Government regulation in the form of barriers to market
entry, import quotas or price regulations is not wide-
spread in manufacturing, apart from a few macroecon-
omically insignificant restrictions. The textile and
clothing industry is, however, an exception since, when
the first vigorous steps were taken to liberalize foreign
trade in industry in the 1950s, numerous import restric-
tions were kept in place here. For example, the EC has
concluded almost thirty "voluntary restraint agree-
ments" designed to curb imports while the trade in tex-
tiles worldwide is hampered by the Multi-fibre
Arrangement. And y€t, not least because of the conti-
nuing pressure of supply from other countries, the Ger-
man textile and clothing industry has shrunk drastically,
with over half of the workforce losing their jobs since
t970.
7.2.2 Speclflc sectoral lnterventlon on markets ln
servlces
There is scarcely a servicc which is not affected in the
Federal Republic in some form or other by government
regulation relating to the branch in question (see figures
GT25 and GT26). This is primarily intervention de-
signed to protect suppliers established in the marker
from additional competition and to help them achieve
adequate income levels.
Retail trade
The retail trade plays a prominent role in all economic
systems because it shows citizens directly whether or not
they are living in a properly functioning economic sys-
tem.
In the Federal Republic there are three forms of regula-
tion relating to the retail trade:
. Market access was restricted by the inclusion, in 1968,
of a third paragraph in Article 1l of the Regulation on
the use of land for building purposes. This requires a
municipality to designate special areas for the siting
of shopping centres and supermarkets, which are to be
located outside central areas. The location of large
business concerns within central areas is scarcely
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possiblc now undcr Article ll(3) of that Regulation.
As a result of these restrictions on market access,
competition and thus efficiency in the retail trade are
reduced and, at thc same time, insiders are unjustifi-
ably protected.
. Price competition is restricted through the 1932
Gifts Order, the 1933 Rebates Law and rhe 1935 De-
cree on special events. Under these laws, it is pro_
hibited (l) to offer, alongside a principal item (or
service), a further item or ecrvice without a specific
charge being madc for it, (2) to grant r rebate of more
then 3% of the solling price and (3) to organize a
special event without sound reason for doing so.
Besides protecting small and medium-sizedfirms from
financially powcrful competitors and preventing
cut throat competition, these rules are also designed to
protect consumers. It is clear that those responsible for
the legislation were - and still are - convinced that the
final consumer - unlike the business customer - cannot
provide himself with sufficient information, is more
easily influenced and misled by advertising and cannor
ascertain the ultimate price/product relationship.
However, just as much doubt must be cast on this
attitude as on the lssumption that the retail uade _
unlike, for exemplc, the wholesale trade - is charac_
terized by rpecial market-failure conditions which re-
quire specific branch regulation by government.
. Shop-opening hours are regulated by the 1956 Law on
the closing time of shops, as last amended in 19g9.
Sincc 1956, the maximum opening hours permitted by
law has been 54.5 hours a week (68.5 hours where
Saturday is a full working day). Social policy reasons(protcction of employees) were given first of all tojustify the highly rigid regulation of shop-opening
hours; competition and consumer policy aspects too
were then cited latcr on. There is no economic justifi_
cation for the Lew regulating shop-closing tirnes. On
thc contrary, it inhibits flexibility and thus rhe capac_
iry, particularly of smaller retail establishments, to
compete.
The regulation affecting the retail trade can by no means
be justified by e pattern or combination of maiket-failure
circumstances peculiar to this branch of the economy.
This interference in firms'marketing-policy mix of con-
ditions (price-setting, rsnge of goods, location and
presence) must instead be seen as the result of sectional
interests and insider-protection motives underlying
legislation and thus rs a forrr of ',government failure;.
Attempts at deregulrtion should accordingly be gov-
erned by the need to Gnsure that the framework estab_
lished by the general system for regulating comperition
is also adequate for the retail trade.
Communications sector
Until recently the communications sector in the Federal
Republic was characterizedby a national monopoly of
the Federal Postd Administration over both the oper-
ation of the network and the equipment market. The
Federal Postrl Administration was the only network
oferator, and equipment had to be authorized by the
Administration and - on the telecommunications market
- was offered for sale or rent only by the Administration.
Since the 1989 postal reform, which led to a rhree-way
division of the Federal Postal Adminisrration, the na-
tional monopoly has been restricted to the operation of
the telecommunications network and to the telephone
service. In the postal field in the real sense (i,e. the lerter,
parcel, postal newspaper, post office bank and post of-
fice savings bank services), the monopoly is limited to
the letter service (Article 2 of the Law on postal mat-
ters).
There is no longer any economic justification for regu-
lation in the communications sector. public production
or provision cannot be justified, since the services pro-
vided by the Federal Postal Administration are not those
with exclusion problems. The widest possible privatiza-
tion of the postal services would therefore be quite jus-
tified and could even be required according to the free
market subsidiarity principle. In the case of the letter
service, for example, regional letter delivery licences,
valid for a given period, could be put out to tender;
licensees would have to undertake to effect letter de-
Iiveries to all customers (contractual obligation). There
is also no evidence of appreciable externalities which
might trigger government intervention. A national net-
work monopoly that might previously still have beenjustified on grounds of falling average costs in the rele-
vant field of demand (natural monopoly) is also increas-
ingly being deprived of its justification through
conlinuing technical progress (e.g. satellite technology).
Although the 1989 postal administration strucrural re-
form represents some degree of progress compared with
the past (particularly on the equipment market, where
new prospects are being opened up by competition), it
must therefore be considered to be insufficient.
Transport markets
Like the communications markets, transport markets are
key markets in national economies based on division of
labour. It is therefore all the more regrettabte that these
markets are characterized by closely meshed anti-com-
petitive controls and high subsidies. Apart from occa-
sional transport by coach, all subsections ofthe transport
market in the Federal Republic are affected by market
entry restrictions and price controls.
These market-entry and price controls were originally
introduced in Germany to protect the nationalized rail-
ways against emerging competition from freight and
passenger transport by road. But what is important here
too - just as, perhaps, in the case of the retail trade - is
not only that the original intention badly miscarried but
also that the consolidation of the controls has protected
old-established suppliers ("grandfathers, righrs',) at the
expense of potential competitors. Overall, therefore, the
controls have contributed to inefficient transport market.
structures which should be corrected as soon as possible.
The regulation encountered today on transport markets
differs only negligibly from that of the 1930s:
subsldles and the
. On the railways the State-run German Federal Rail-
ways has a socure legal monopoly over its railway
system.
. Road haulage is - for whatever reason - divided up into
local, regional and long-distance transPort. In the case
of local transport, there are no market-entry restric-
tions, although authorization has to be sought for
prices charged. In the case of regional and long-dis-
tancc transPort, market-entry restrictions (conces-
sions) exist and authorization has also to be sought for
prices charged. Unregulated works trsnsPort is a spe-
cial case which is characterized by the fact that no
return loads may be carried for third Parties.
. In the case of passenger transPort by road, licences
must be sought for buses operating over specific routes
and for taxis (concessions), and prices are controlled
by the government.
. Air transport is regulated very strictly, with the result
that domestic air transport is reserved almost exclu-
sively for the State-owned Lufthansa.
The high level of Sovernment regulation and public
production on transport markets cannot be justified on
the basis of economic theorY.
. A separation of the operators of the route network and
the transport services should - as in the case of all other
carriers - be carried out on the railways. A State take-
ovcr of the railway network and its infrastructure (in-
cluding thc essociated liabilities) would 8t the same
time open the way to the privatization of the
Fcderal Railways.
. As there is no exclusion problem in the case of trans-
port services (passenger and goods transport) - those
bencfiting can readily be identified and asked to Pay a
contribution - the provision of such services is not a
fundamentally public task. Consequentln there can
also be no justification for public production; the pri-
vatization of what are curently publicly owned sup-
pliers of services (Federal Railways, Lufthansa, public
p.ssenger 6ansport) should thereforebe examined im-
mediately. The costs of meeting any existing public
need (e.g. area service) could then be covered by
tax-financed comPensatory Payments.
. Externalities associated with transPort markets (e.g.
environmental pollution) cannot - and indeed should
not - be internalized by the existing controls.
. While the argument of falling average costs in the area
of relevant demand (natural monopoly) may perhaps
be valid for the physical route systems of the various
carriers, it cannot be valid for the transport services to
bo rupplied. Otherwise the fierce comPetition btween
tho various suppliers, the organization of forwarding
burinpss based on small and medium-sized firms and
the advent of individual transport would not be justi-
fied.
. The spectre of cut-throat comPetition' i.e, excessive
competition on transPort markets, must be consigned
to the realm of fables. Unfortunately it has become one
of themajor arguments for defending existing market-
entry barriers (concessions). And yet neither is there
on transport markets - compared with other, also capi-
tal-intensive branches - a combination of low market-
entry costs, high market-exit costs and price
inelasticity of demand, nor are the restriction of mar-
ket entry and the grantinS of "grandfathers'rights" the
appropriate means of making a market "contestable".
It can be rssumed that the market ParticiPants react
functionally to price signals, that price signals are
generally corrcctly set and that disfunctional invest-
ment behaviour catr be excluded. The sharp changes
observable in the past in the shares of individual car-
riers on the railways, in shipping, in the forwarding
sector and in works transPort are evidence of thc truth
of this thesis.
Deregulation measures on all the different transPort mar-
kets should not be deferred. Prevailing govemment mar-
ket-entry restrictions and price and capacity controls are
the result of government failure: old-established sup-
pliers and their "regulation returns" are being protected
at the expense of potential competitors and consumers.
Deregulation efforts should be prompted by the fact that
these markets - despite frequently repeated assertions to
the contrary - are not characterized by market failure and
the transport markets generally could therefore manage
in an ideal case completely without market-entry restric-
tions and government price and capacity controls.
In addition to the unjustified regulation, the transPort
sector is also highly subsidized. In 1985, subsidies to the
railways alone amounted to more than DM 13 billion;
other transport branches, in particular public PassenSer
transport, were also subsidized to the tune of almost
DM 5 billion. The transport sector thus received just as
many subsidies as the agricultural sector (see abovc) or
the housing sector (see below). Thoy amounted in 1985
to l7o of GDB to 3O% of gross value added and to
DM I 700 per month per emPloYee.
Financial services
In the Federal Republic of Germany, the characteristic
feature of the financial services is the dominant role of
the banking system. The external funding of enterprises
mainly consists of loans from the banks. The banks have
strong relationships with enterprises and exercise real
control over capital within the productive system. This
is mirrored by the limited role of the market: market
capitalization is low and hostile takeover bids unknown.
The sector as a whole is not subject to a high degree of
regulation. Some activities may even seem under-regu-
latedby comparison with international standards, inpar-
ticular if Frankfurt's ambitions as a financial centre were
to be realized.
The bonks, typified by the "universal banks", play the
leading role in providing finance.
In 1989, bank loans accounted for 54% of the debts of
enterprises (compared with 30% in France, for example).
Some banks have majority control of the capital of large
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enterprises (e.g. Deutsche Bank's control of Daimler
Benz). However, minority holdings are more frequent
and the bank's role at general meetings is mainly exer-
cised through voting proxies on the shares they hold on
deposit for the small shareholders who are their custo-
mers (exercise of the "Depotstimmrecht").
Whereas compartmentalization exists in many countries,
in Germany most credit institutions are engaged in thc
entire range of financial activities. The few institutions
which specialize in a certain type of activity, such as
factoring, are subsidiaries oflarge banks. Institutions of
the universal type accoturt for some 8O% of total busi-
ness volume. The savings banks, institutions govemed
by public law, hold around 5O?o of the universal banks'
market, compared with some 20% held by the cq)pera-
tive sector aoLd30% by the private sector, which includes
the "big three" @eutsche Bank AG, Dresdner Bank AG
and Commerzbank AG).
The role of the financial market is limited. First, only the
banks have access to the money market. The capital
market is therefore segmented. In addition, there are
barely 2000 public limited liability companies and only
600 or so are quoted on the stock market. Of the 500
leading European enterprises in terms of market capital-
ization i.e. in relation to the total amount of shares
guoted ou the stock market, the market capital of Gennan
enterprises is only 34% of that of British enterprises. The
graph below comparing the six leading German and
British firms (excluding oil companies), clearly illus-
trates the relatively low level of capitalization in the
Federal Republic.
At the end of 1989, equities represented only ?.t47o of the
debts of enterprises (compared wirh 59?o in France, for
example), nd294o of their claims (compared with 65%).
In the financial assets of households, equities repre-
sented 6.6% nd bonds 15.7% (compared with 43.7%
ard 4.8% respectively in France).
The German financing system has its own cohercnce and
is based on solidly established collective preferences:
the desire of enterprises to retain control over their
capital and the scale of self-financing, the prefcrence of
savers for fixed income stocks, etc. [t is also relatively
difficult to make a judgment in terms of economic effec-
tiveness between the capital markets systems (United
States, United Kingdom) and the sysrems in which bank-
ing intermediation is dominant (Japan, FRG). In the case
of Gennany, it is however, possible to indicate the in-
stitutional factors which tend to discourage enterprises
from raising capital directly from the general public.
First, the dispersion of stock exchanges: eight stock
exchanges operate on the Federal Republic territory.
Second, the relatively limited role of institutional inves-
tors because of the virtual absence of pension funds (the
"pay as you go" pension system being generally used).
Lastly, the high level of corporation tax which encour-
ages self-financing or borrowing from the banks rather
than the payment of dividends.
Within a financing system where banking intermediation
is predominant, the essential criterion is that of compe-
tition between the institutions. There is no absolute in-
dicator in this area. Nevertheless, on the one hand, the
cost of benkilg services reveals no significant distor-
tions b€tween the FRG and thc other countries (see
Cecchini report). On the other, there is great freedom of
access to the German banking market and the number of
foreign institutions in particular has substantially in-
creased in recent years.
A number of rigidities, nevertheless, remains, i.e. the
discrimination with regard to non-residents and the fact
that certain products do not exist for institutional rea-
sons:
. non-residents are not allowed to purchase certain ca-
tegories of bonds ("Bundesschatzbriefe", "Finanzie-
rungsschitze");
. also, they are not allowed to issue DM-denominated
bonds with a maturity of less than two years;
. only a bank domiciled in the FRG iS permitted to be
the lead manager in a syndicate for the issue of DM
bonds;
. the secondary market in certificates of deposit and
commercial paper is virtually non-€xistent because of
the stock exchange turnover tax based on the amount
of the transaction ("Btirsenumsatzsteuer") but also be-
cause of the absence ofrating and because this type of
security has an uncertain legal status;
. there is no futures financial instrument on the German
market which enables those involved in business ac-
tivity to cover their interest rate risks. Paradoxically,
the long term interest rate which serves as a reference
for the German market is traded on the London futures
market (LIFFE) where the volume is some 50 000
contracts a day.
On the other hand, Frankfurt's desire to become a major
financial centre is giving rise to reservations: these are
related to the fact that the securities market is entirely
self-regulated. In the FRG there is no supervisory body
of a judicial nature, similar to the SEC or the COB.
Insider dealing is not punished by law. Yet the role of the
universal banks tends to give rise to potential conflicts
of interest between different activities (loans, syndica-
tion, "offbalance sheet" operations, trading). The build-
ing of firewalls between the various types of activity
could prove necessary. This is recognized by the profes-
sionals.
Similarly, the prudential rules will have to be reformu-
lated in order to comply with Community Directives.
The Secord Directive of 15 December 1989 coordinating
provisions on the taking-up and pursuit of the business
of credit instirutions in particular sets strict limits for
banks'holdings in enterprises. The Directive of l8 De-
cember 1989 fixes the solvency ratio for credit institu-
tions at 8%.
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Measures to encourage competition have already been
taken. Controls on interest rates were lifted as early as
1967 and all barriers to the movement of capital were
removed at the beginning of the 1980s. S/ith effect from
I January 1991 the stock exchange rurnov€r tax ("BOr-
senumsatzsteur") paid as a percentage of the amount of
the stock exchange transaction will be abolished. With
effect from I January 1992, capital duty ("Gesell-
schaftssteuer") paid on the first acquisition of shares in
companies and othercontributions to companies, and the
bills of exchange tax ("Wechselsteuer") will be abol-
ished.
On I January 1990, a financial futures market ("Termin-
b6rse") opened in Frankfurt. So far it has only traded in
German equity options. From September 1990, a Ger-
man long rate futures market is due to open (of the
"Bund" futures type).
In January 1990, the Cartels Law ("Gesetz gegen Wett-
bewerbsbeschrlnkungen") was amended for the fifth
time to include abuses of dominant position ("Miss-
brauchsprinzip") in the banking and insurance sectors
which until then had not been covered by the Law.
Progress is still necessary in order to eliminate the re-
maining rigidities in financial services: in general terms
these are discrimination with regard to non-residents and
the level of corporation tax, but also more specific
measures such as the need to introduce longer trading
hours or to reduce the minimum face value of shares
(now DM 50). The freedom to provide services with
effect from 1993 should greatly help to remove many of
the obstacles to competition in the financial sector. At
the same time, the updating of the prudential rules
should favour Frankfurt's competitive position.
Housing
Adequate housing is a basic need of every individual. It
is therefore not surprising that there are many instances
in the Federal Republic of government interference in
freedom of contract between landlords and tenants. The
1899 Civil Code, which is the central and comprehens-
ive instrument for regulating relations under civil law,
has from the very outset had a special section on tenant
Protection.
Relations between landlords and tenants are currently
governed primarily by these Civil Code rules in conjunc-
tion with the provisions of the second Law governing
termination of the occupation of accommodation
("Wohnraumkuendigungsgesetz"). From a macroecon-
omic viewpoint, the provisions governing tennination of
the occupation of accommodation and the restrictions
regarding maximum allowable rents are of interest, since
it is these which affect landlords'rights, devalue them
and have an appreciable inlluence on the level of yield
obtainable in the accommodation letting sector. Further
government action reducing landlords'rate of return can
be identified on the cost side: a large number of extreme-
ly exacting and standardized building provisions not
only severely restrict individual building but also tax
residential construction considerably. For example, the
Town Planning Law stipulatcs thrt for each new housing
unit either evidencc of e parking place for r privatc car
has to be providcd or e substantiel compensatory levy
has to be peid to thc municipal ruthorities. On the other
hand, there are rlso Sovernmcnt measurcs which can
lead to an incrersc - in some casss a very marked in-
crease - in the rrte of retum from the letting of accom-
modation. Primc cxamplcs of this are the payment of
housing allowances to low-income tensnts and special
depreciation rtrangcments under tax law for promoting
the creation of private property.
The economic justification for such mlssivc subsidiza-
tion is highly quostionable. Property ownership is
neither e public nor e merit good (who would not gladly
own propcrty?); nor rrc externalities internalized
through the existing subsidies and other forms of inter-
vention. Furthermore, the considerable negative effects
of existing property ownership on the mobility of the
factor labour should not b underestimated.
The regulation aimed at protecting tenants can be seen
as reflecting the politicians' fear of a disnrption of the
superiority erosion process on the rented housing mar-
ket. In fact the tenant - in contrast to the landlord - incurs
high removal costs when his contract is terrrinated. Fur-
thermore, while rhe eccommodation serves to moet I
basic need of the tenant, it merely represenm an (addi-
tional) llrrurce of income for the landlord.
Intervention in thc housinS scctor, whether in the form
of direct subsidies, low-interest loans or tax concessions
or in the form of indirect assistance (e.g. boosting the
purchasing power of tenants with the help of the housing
allowance), must b viewcd very critically, however,
since it distorts prices and thus factor allocation consid-
erably. In 1985, it amounted to almost DM24 billion or
a quarter of the housing sector's gross value added.
First of all, the reduction in the cost of building brought
about by tax concessions has not just prompted the 'mar-
ginal" owners to build. Its prime effect has instead been
to bring in all those who ever wanted to build or to tempt
potential ownens into more expensive building. The pro-
motion of luxurious properties at times of excess demand
for inexpensive accomrnodation is well known. At the
same time, the introduction of the housing allowance for
low-income tenants has ensured that the yield obtained
by landlords on the accommodation-letting market did
not havo to be adjusted downwards. The promotion of
residential building has therefore primarily bolstered
yields in the rented housing market and has helped to
boost house priccs rnd rcnB: whcreas between 1962 end
1989 the cost-of-living index for all private households
rose by an sverege of 35% a ye8r, the corresponding
index for rented accommodation rose W 4.7% 8 year on
average. The implicit deflator for investment in residen-
tial building showed a similar trend, with a rise of 4.9%
a year over the same period, while the corresponding
deflator for investment in non-subsidized building rose
by 3.6% a year. The negative impact on factor mobility
and the taxation of labour and capital should also not be
underestimated.
Chapter 7: Rclulatlons. subsldles and the necd for a forward.lo,
7.2.3 Interventlon cpannlng a number of sectors
In addition to the specific sectoral regulation and sub-
sidies so far describod, there are many instances in the
Federal Republic of broader intervention on goods and
services markets spanning a number of sectors. This
paragraph deals briefly with (l) the degree of legislation
goveming environmental protection and the approval
procedure, and (2) market-entr5l and other restrictions
affecting small-scale crafts and the professions.
Environmental protcction and the 8ppro-
val procedure
The scarcer environmental assets become and the more
populated a region is, the more negative external effects
9f lonomic activiry can be expected. Taking GDp perkm2 9r indlstrial gross value added per km2 as rough
and simplified indicators of environmental scarcity or of
potential negative external effects, it is clear that, under
identical legal conditions, negstivc extemal effects are
considerably more likely to occur in the Federal Repub-lic of Germany than in, for example, France, the
United Kingdom or the United Srates. There is a similar
result when the number of inhabitants per km2 is com-
pared for different countries.
According to that" there should also be considerably
more stringent environmental legislation and a more
elaborate approval procedure in the Federal Republic
than in countries with lesser population densities,
Of course, stricter environmental legislation and more
stringent approval procedures indicate a locational dis-
advantage for a region or country. However, it is not the
legislation itself which constitutes the locational disad-
vantage but the fact that the high level of industrializa_
tion and urbanization impose additional costs on
production which are not incurred to the same extent in
less industrialized or less thickly populated countries.
Nevertheless, the environmental legislation and also the
approval procedures should be thoroughly reviewed to
establish whether they really represent the most cffective
means of achieving desired aims or of preventing exter_
nal effects.
Crafts Code and the professions
In the case of professional and craft activities there are
many controls in thc form of objective and subjective
market-entrSl restrictions which are frequently combined
with rules governing supplier behaviour in the form of
restrictions on price competition and advertising. In
some instances these controls are a relic of medieval and
economically unjustified professional and guild inter-
ests and are primarily designed to protect old-estab-
lished supplicrs against competirion from their own pro-
fession or guild or from new competitors. A clear-out of
existing controls would certainly bring to light consid-
erable potential for deregulation. Marry controls cannot
bc justified on economic grounds. Systematic deregula-
tion would lead, through increased competition, to price
reductions and so increase demand for services and em-
ployment in these areas.
7.2.4 Summary
From a macroeconomic point of view, market entry and
competition-reducing regulations are important for (l)
agricultural products, (2) coal and sreel, (3) energn (4)
transport, (5) financial markets, (6) telecommunication
services and, last but not least, concerning services re-
lated to (7) professions, legal adviserc and craftsmen.
Such regulations not only allow insiders to receive a
quite substantial "regulation-yield", they also work as
impediments to innovation, growth and thus employ-
ment. As the relative size of the service sector in all
modem economies is now increasing, the prevailing rig-
idities are obstacles ro the full for exploitation of growih
and employment possibiliries.
ln economic terms, the argument for regulation depends
on the assumption that a free market for the respective
sector or service would lead to market failures. However,
sevcre and sector-specific market failures on regulated
markets are not evident and the effectiveness ofchosen
regulations is not obvious. Even in cases of natural
monopolies, i.e. the cases of networks for electricitn gas
or telecommunication services, or externalities, e.g- in
energy production, the chosen regulations seem to be
inappropriate to alleviate the negative consequences of
such constraints. The economic case for these regula-
tions remains to be provedi in the absence of such proof
they should consider the outcome of rent-seeking acti-
vities resulting in a reduction of competition and leading
to a protection ofinsiders. Very often, these regulations
protect public suppliers against private competitiory en-
ergy, tramport and telecommunication services might
serve as examples. As competition is reduced, regula-
tions rre to the disadvsntage of consumers. Therefore,
the abolition of existing sector-specific regulations or at
least less intensivc intervention in the market process are
recommended. This applies particularly to market-entry
and price regulations and to production and import quo-
tas.
Furthemrore, the economic justification is not clear in
terms of the public goods argument for public production
in the mining, energy production and distribution sec-
tors, for the three public enterprises Bundesbahn, Luf-
thansa, and the Bundespost and for all local public
transportation as the respective goods or services. The
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ar8'ments for privatization should therefore bc con-
sidsr€d. In case ofpublic interest, i.e. extcrnalitier eris-
ing from provision of certain services, private s€ctor
supply of these senices should bc encouraged by appro-
priatc public tr'ensfers.
As regards some soctors, regulations exist on the Eruo-
pean level e.g. agricultural products, coal and steel. In
the transportation and the financial markets, rules will
soon also be established at the European level. This
should provide tn opporonity to make the regulatory
rdgime in these sectors more market-friendly. In addi-
tion, the new economic order of the GDR provides the
opportunity to estsblish economic competition in many
regulated fields in the GDR and to reduce prevailing
rigidities in the FRG.
7.3 Sectoral and regional subsidies:
An assessment
The subsi{ report of the Federal Government distin-
guishes between survival aids ("Erhalnrngshilfen,), ed-justment aids ("Anpassungshilfen"), productivity and
growth aids ("Produkrivitlrs- und Wachstumshilfen,)
and other subsidies. The report menrions about 220 dif-
ferent individual mcasures implemented at nation8l
level, of which about l(X) are financial-aid measures and
about 120 tax-reducing measures.
According to r rece,ntly published study by the five
leading economic research institutes, subsidies to all
ssctors together amount to DM ll8 b,n or 6.4 lo of GDp
in 1985 o. Despite rome rcductions @C-related subsidies
were reduccd and thc l990-income-tax reform has cut
some more subsidies) no rignificant reduction of thc
subsidieslcDP ratio ir cvident.
Howevetr, doubts eriso as regards the economic justifica-
tion of several existing subsidies. In particular the sta-
bilization firnctim of regional end sectoral subsidies
will work in an efficient way only if they are time limired
rnd degressive. Otherwiso, no incentive is given to in-
vest in a painful but worthwhile regiond rnd scctoral
structural adjustment pr(rcess. Otherwise subsidies work
s impediments to growth and employment in healthy
se,ctors by imposing an additional tax burden.
Most of the prevailing sectoral and regional subsidize-
tion can hardly bc justilied for allocative or distributive
reasons. As in the case ofregulation, there is a general
presumption that subsidies are harmful to welfareunless
there is weighty evidence to the contrary. Such evidence
seems to be lacking, end there is a strong argument for
reducing thc scope and scde of subsidization in the n est
Germrn cconomy. The argument for reduction or even
ebolition now appeers to be overwhelming in the case of
regional subsidies. Ofthese, about 95 % ofthe total cost
concenr measures arising from the division of the two
Germeny's. The political justification for such measures
is disappearing; moreover, their continuation would, as
argued in more detail in chapter 4 threaten appropriate
regionel development within the GEMSU as a whole.
Genuine regio,nd subsidies are dilficult to identifn as
sectorrl subsidies heve often also r very important re-
giolral impac! e.g. coal, steel rnd shipbuilding sub-
sidies. Nevertheless, thc subsidy report of the Federal
Governme,lrt enumerater about l0 regional state-aids and
another l0 regional tax-reduction measures. They are,
however, mainly (95 % of ell money involved) measures
related to German-German problems, i.e. Zonenrandftir-
derung and Berlinfiirderung. tn 1988 their net effect on
the public budget amounted to at least DM I 3 bn or 0.6 %
of GDP.
7.4 The labour market - govcrnment and
collective agreement regulation
A feature of tho lebour martet in the Federal Republic is
autonomy of wage-rate negotiations, i.e. employers and
workers or their respective representative bodies (em-
ploycrs' associetions and trade unions) negotiate pay and
all working conditions without government involvc-
ment. Neverthelcss, there tre ma[y govemment regula-
tions; however, thcy meinly lay dowa the rules to be
observcd. Thesc rulcs covcr ell areas of conllict of inter-
est betwGen (potcntiel) contracting parties, ranging from
recruiment proccdrue to termination of employment.
However, they primarily outlinc a framework of mini-
mum conditions which mugt then be filted out by the
parties to collective agroements.
7.4.1 Government regulatlon
In fact many of the minimum conditions laid down by
central govertrment no longer play any spprociable part,
since the parties to collective agreoments have already
agreed on much more far-reaching rules. Exemples of
this ere the provisions relating to minimum statutory
leave and norrral weekly working hours. According to
Article 3 of the Fcderal Leave Laq the minimum leave
guarantc€d by law amounts to 18 working days in a
calendar /ear (= 3 weeks), whereas for 99% of workers
covered by collective rgreoments annual leave amounts
) Tlrcse instiotes anploy a &finition of "subsidiesn
subsidy rc,port of thc Fodcral Governnrent, i"e" their &finition conprircs all prblic orrrent ard cryial rqrsfers urd special tax
redrctiqrs o the €nterpri$ sector, all leoding paymeots o the antcrpise scta md rll uansfere to pivare households which
have eecor-rpecific cfret in the enterprise sector. Ar a means of onpuisom, hc rubefoty report of m ruaou Repgblic
showed subsllies of DM 72 bn (3.9 % of GDP) while nrbeidies in tenns of naiqral lsountr asnorurtod !o DM 38 b,n (2.1 %
of GDP).
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to four weeks or more; two thirds of all employeer are
already entitled to sir weeks of annual leave. And while
"normal" weekly working hours still amount to48 hours,
1990 has seen the conclusion of the first collective agree-
ments on the introduction of a 35-hour week.
Nevertheless, the imfact of government regulation on
the labour market and on the economy as a whole should
not be underestimated. From I macroeconomic view-
point, the favourable treaiment principle and the dis-
missals protection legislation are of perticular
significance.
. According to the frvourable treatment principle (Ar-
ticle 4 of the Collective Agreements Law), departures
from collective agreements are generally permitted
only if they favour the employee. As a result of this,
however, collectively agreed wages, for example, take
on the character of minimum wages (i.e. the nominal
wage rates cannot be adjusted downwards), and the
recruitment of workers with a marginal product of
Iabour lower than their remuneration under collective
wage agreements is prevented. The favourable treat-
ment principle thus encourages the replacement of
labour by capital and prevents a rapid adjustment of
wages when there is a sharp economic downturn.
. The dismissals protection legislation and the legisla-
tion governing the duration of work contracts deprive
employers of some of the possibilities open to them to
react flexibly to fluctuations in demand. While this can
lead to a smoothing-out of employment, since demand
for labour reacts to cyclical fluctuations only with a
cousiderable time-lag, the real question is whether this
smoo&ing-out does not take place at at lower level
than would be possible without this regulation. Fur-
thermore, the dismissals protection legislation mainly
favours those already in employment and constitutes
an additional recruitment barrier to those seeking
work. This applies particularly to subgroups rhat enjoy
extensive protection against dismissal. The involve-
ment of the employees'council - both dismissals and
new recruitment are dependent on the agreement of the
employees'council - also reduces the owner's capacity
to react quickly and flexibly to changing market con-
ditions.
. Statutory ancillary labour costs (notably employers,
social security contributiots, payments for Sundays
and public holidays and continued payment of wages
for a limited period of time in the event of sickness)
have direct consequences on relative factor prices and
costs and thus on the ecouomy's competitiveness.
They are linked to the level of the direct wage actually
agreed (remuneration for hours actually worked) and
range, according to economic sector, from 3l%
(wholesale trade) to 36% (industry) of the direct wage.
However, they are in some cases considerably lower
than the additional collectively agreed and business
ancillary labour costs, which in l98Z ranged from3?%
(wholesale trade) to 66% (banking) of the direcr wage.
Thus at times when there is a surplus supply of labour,
thebalrncing of supply anddemand on the labourmarket
is made more difficult by the favourable treatment prin-
ciple and the dismissals prorection legislation. At times
when labour is in short suppln the provisions governing
working hours in particular can inhibit the balancing of
supply and demand.
7.4.2 Collcctlvely agreed regulatlon
More than 8O% of all employers in the Federal Republic
belong to a recognized employers' association and are
thus bound by collective agreements, A good 4O% of
employees belong to trade unions. As a result of the high
percentage of employers belonging to representative as-
sociations, some 90% of their contractual relationships
with their wage- and salary-earners are subject to ar-
rangements laid down by collective agreements. For this
reason alone, the relevant Minister's designation of col-
lective agreements as generally binding - an instrument
sometimes regarded as an^obstacle to more employment
has relatively little effect 7.
In looking for possible rigidities in the Federal German
labour market, attention can be concentrated on an exam-
ination of the following questions:
. whether relative labour costs (including ancillary
costs) are too high and too inflexible to permit down-
ward adjustment and, for that reason, have the effect,
firstly, of substituting capital for labour rnd, secondly,
of undermining German industry's capacity to com-
Pete;
. whether there is insufficient regional and sectoral dif-
ferentiation ofwages and salaries and whether, for that
reason, there are not the necessary mobility incentives
to ensure successful structural change;
. whether the skills of workers and the unemployed
match the types of skills required;
'Ihrough a govemment declaration of this kin4 tlre scope of a oo
employem not bound by such agreements. The Fedcral Minister for Labour srd rhe Social Systenr may desigrate a collective
agrecrnent as being gemerally binding at the request of one of the two prties o tre agreement and always with 6re agreement
of a collective agreenrent committee made up of three represantatives ftronr bo& the employers' srd tlre uade union
organizations (having equal voting righs) whcre the enrployers bormd by the ollctive agreement employ at least 50% of the
workcrs covcredby th* agre€m€nt urd where the &eignaion of thc oliective agreenrent as binC generally binding is
necessry in the prblic intere*.Text of Footnote
. whether othcr collectivc rgreemens (e.9. on working
hours, worker Participation in menrgem€nt, etc.)
underrrine the rigour of the labour market.
As in all other countries, the nominal wage rates neSo-
tiated in the Federal Republic betwe€n the prrties to
collective sgreements 8re too inllexible to permit down-
ward adjustment. As thc Federal Republic is, howeve&
8t the same timc a country with a relatively low inflation
rate, thc scope for any reduction in real wages is virtually
non existent. Compared with other countries, thcrefore,
real wages in the Federel Republic havo proved to be
relatively inflexible; falling real wages have not becn e
means of enlivening the labour market in the past and
are scarcely likely to be so in the funre.
In the Federal Republic, almost all collective agreements
are negotiated at regional and specific economic branch
levels. This has led in the Past to a surprisingly wide
range of working conditions and remuneration. In 1988'
for example, av€rage gross hourly earnings in manufac-
turing industry (for male employecs and taking the aver-
age for all categories) were 12.8% higher in Hamburg
than in Bavaria; in 1980, this difference was 17.0%. The
rerson for thc narrowing of tho rcgional labour cost
diffcrentid mey lic in tho fect thet the southern regions
suffering - possibly beceuse of excessively unattractive
wege rrtcs - from r relativc scarcity of labour recorded
higher wago rises in thc 1980s than in their northern
counterparts, which wcre worse affected by the slow-
down in economic growth. A firrther reason may be that
more rnd more of those branches paying above-average
wrScs set up oprations in the southern regions.
If the regional labour-cost differential is also broken
down by individuel brrnches, it is clear that the 1988
differential was widest in the clothing industry and nar-
rowcst in the capital goods industry al a whole. The
regiond hbour-cost differential narowed sharply be-
tween 1980 and 1988 in the consumer goods industry'
whereag it widened W 5% over the same period in the
clothing industry. If, furthermore, the regional and sec-
toral labour-cost differentials are combined, this rough
breakdown shows an astonishing discrepancy of fi%
between everage gross hourly earnings in the clothing
industry in the Saarland (DM 14.15 per hour) and those
in the mechanical cngineering industry in Hamburg
(DIs,22.52
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Diffcrqee MininUO. Maximum Difference
Basic materials and intermediate
goods industry
Chemical products indusry
Investment goods industrY
- o.w. mechanical engineering
Consumer goods industry
Textiles and clothing industry
Food and beverage industrY
Manufacturing (average)
5.99 17.6%
(Hambwg)
15.93 25.8%
(Rh-Pfalz)
$.n 10.3%
(Hunburg)
16.03 l5.l%
(Hamburg)
17.09 33.8%
(Hamburg)
13.60 30.9%
(Hessen)
14.35 l3.t%
(Hamburg)
15.79
(Hamburg)
L7.0.b
It.39 2134 16.0%(Beyern) (Hamburg)
16.68 21.96 31.7%(Breme,n) (Rh.-Pfdz)
19.17 21.47 l2.O%
(Schl.-Holst) (Hemburg)
t9.26 22.52 16.9%
(Niedcrsach.) (Hamburg)
17.09 20.62 20.7%(Bayern) (Hamburg)
14.15 19.10 35.0%(Saarlrnd) (Hamburg)
t7.23 19.38 12.5%
(Schl.-Holrt) (Bremen)
18.73 21.13 12.8%(Bayern) (Hamburg)
13.50
@ayern)
12.66
@remen)
13.85
(Baycrn)
t3.93
(Bremen)
12.77
@ayern)
10.39
@remen)
t2.70
(Rh-Pfdz)
13.50
@ayern)
Source: Federal Ministry of Economics, Monthly Bulletin, Supplement ll/19t9
Although oo much should not be made of these findings,
the conclusion should perhaps be drawn that any rig-
idities in the labour market 8re not due to too narrow a
regional and/or sectoral differentiation in wages.
Chapter 8:
Budgetary coordination in an economic
and monetary union: 20 years of experi-
ence in the Federat Republic of
Germany
The Federal Republic of Germany is the most federalist
state in the European Community. As a result of the
Constitution, not only the Bundestag and the Fcderal
Governmenl but 1l Linder parliaments and more than
8.000 municipal courcils decide upou budgetary and
fiscal measures. This has repercussions on all levels of
economic policy mating. The need for binding budge-
tary rules, e.g. for borrowing limits, budgetary cooper-
ation, reveDue sharing and taxation, is obvious.
The Delors report on economic and monetary union in
the EC proposes new procedures for budgetary coordi-
nation, with precise guidelines for the financing struc-
ture and quantitative limits on public deficits. In
addition, grcater coordination of budgetary policy
among the member countries is required. After more than
20 years' experience of institutionalized budgetary cq)r-
dination among the diffcrent levels of Govennrnent, the
Federal Republic provides a good example ofbudgetarypolicy coordination in an Economic and Monetary
Union. Iherefore, looting in more detail at the FRG
experiencc of fiscal policy cooperation at the regional
level could provide some information on the necds for
fiscal policy cooperation at the European level during e
period of monetary integration. This might be of special
interest to the narrow-bond ERM-countries, as difieren-
ces in economic performances betwecn individual Liin_
der are, in most resp@ts, cven more pronounced than
differences between ner:ow-band ERM-countries.
In addition, the experience of largcly decentralizcd fis-
cal policy cooperation within s monetuy union (as rep-
resented by ccntrslized monetary policy decisions of the
Bundesbank), could provide some insight into the need
for and the fcasibility of rules and adjustment mechan-
isms for regionel imbalances or shocks and structurally
balancing metsutres. Some light could also be thrown on
the practical problems involved.
t.l The FRG and narrow.band ERM countries:
I comparison of economic performance
A comparison of the regional economic performance
within the FRG and the narrow-band ERM countries
reveals some striking features. Growth discrepancies
within Germany wcre even more pronounced than within
the narrow-band ERM zone. This holds also for per
capita income: while in 1988 real per capita GDp in
Denmark w$ 32Eo higher than in the Netherlands, real
per capita income in Hamburg was more than 100%
higher than in Lower Saxony t.
Unemployment rates within Germany also differ to a
larger extent than emong narrow-band ERM-countries.
While the maximum differential among the ERM-coun-
tries wrs 8.2 percentage points in 1988, (Lz 2.2%; B:
lO.4%; SOEC def.) it was 10.3 percenrage points within
Gerrrany (Baden-Wiirttemberg: 596, Bremen : lS.37o,
nat. def.). Inflation differentials yithin Germany have
been significantly lower than differentials among ERM
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Aggregation whipce ort regional differcnces. Real per caprtaincqne differentials in West Germany, exc6ing the hree
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rignificantly.
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countries. This holds, however, not any longer thanks to
the fact that inllation differentials at the European level
converged significantly downwards in the course of the
1980s. They do not any longer differ much from those
recorded within Germany.
As regards the public sector, comParisons are quite dif-
ficult as, for example, the functions of the Liinder Gov-
ernments and their budgets differ significantly from
general govenrment's functions as a whole. Some basic
financial data show that the Federal Government's bud-
get accounts only for 33% of General Government ex-
penditure arlrd44% of the spending of the three levels of
government (Federal level, Llnder level, local level).
Furthermore, revenue-sharing and automatic stabilizers
working through social security budgets have r signifi-
cant impact on the individual financial balances of re-
gions in the Federal Republic; in consequence these are
less volatile in response to economic shocks. This is
shown in graph , where discrepancies among regional
public finance balances within the FRG before and after
revenue-sharing and equalizing fiscal community (Fi-
nanzverbund) are compared with ERM-countries'
general govemment fiscai balance discrepancies 9.
Whereas before balancing regional social security bud-
get discrepancies within Germany were significantly
more pronounced than among ERM-countries, after bal-
ancing social security and additional horizontal and ver-
tical revenue-sharing, they were significantly less
important: while regional public finance balances differ
by more than 10 percentage points of GDP before bal-
ancing regional social security budgets and before hori-
zontal and vertical revenues sharing, they differ by only
2.57o $ter these equilibration procedures took place.
8.2 The framework of binding rules, budgetary
coordination and revenue sharing
t.2.1 Flnanclal balance and borrowlng requlrements
For all levels of governrnent, there exists the general rule
that the deficit in any budgetary year must not exceed
investment expenditures. Further restrictions are im-
posed on the size, conditions and timing of borrowing
requirements of different levels of govemment. These
can be enacted by the Federal Government to avoid
macroeconomic disequilibria (Article 109.4 GG). Re-
strictions require the approval of the Bundesrat, i.e. the
representatives of the Lnnder. Exemptions to exceed the
borrowing limit are only allowed for the Federal Gov-
Gmment and the Liinder in situations of macro-cconomic
imbalances (Article 115.1 GG). Therefore, borrowing
limits have become to a lesser extent objective-related
(borrowing to finance investment) and morc situation-
related (borrowing to reduce or avoid a macro-economic
imbalance).
While it is quite obvious how "borrowing" is defined, the
concepts "macroeconomic imbalance" and "investment
expenditures" are more difficult to oPerationalize. How-
gver, a general rule has been, to calculate 'investment
expenditures" by adding to investment expendinrres (na-
tional accounts definitions: gross fixed capital forma-
balances cover the respective l5der hrdget irrluding ttre local level and hospitals, the
budget of the respctive regional labour office body (Lan&sarbeisanrtsbezirt) ard ttre respective regional workers' pension
frmds (conributions = revenues; domestic pensions = expendiunes). Altlrough it should be borrp in mird 0rat this proxy of
regional public ftrances irrcluding social secrnity is only a rough apprcximstion of a general goverrmeot budget sd includes
etill some ctatistical problems, it gives a quite ilhufative message whbh will not change if one appliee mo,re sophisticated
definitions fq regioral gener.al govemmenL
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tion) some other investment-related expenditures, e.g.
subsidies to public enterprises (e.g. Federal Railway)
and also subsidies to the private sector which aim at
fostering private investment.
Despite the requirement in the constitutions, however,
there are no clear cut and operational Federal and Liinder
laws which define, e.g. the item ',investment expendi-
tures". The Federal Constitutional Court compiained
about the absence of such rules in 1989.
Until recently, another point of uncertainty in this re-
spect has been whether limit-exceeding borowing re-quirements shall only materialize to reduce
macroeconomic imbalances (objective-related) or
whether they are also allowed to materialize when mac_
roeconomic disturbances threaten to occur (situation-re_
lated). In this context, the Federal Constitution Court
published the following general rules concerning the
Federal borrowing requirement:
. PSBR is only allowed to exceed investment expendi-
tures if there is (the risk of) a severe macroeconomic
disequilibrium.
. Exceeding borrowing requirements must be justified
by the need to reduce the (risk of severe) macroecon_
omic imbalances.
. The limit of Article ll5 is a maximum limit and a
simultaneous application of Article lO9 GG (public
bodies have to make allowance for the needs of the
macroeconomic equilibrium) might require smaller
budget deficits in periods of favourable economic per-
fonnance or a risk of overheating.
As a whole, the 1989 decision of ttre Federal Constitu_
tional Court can be interpreted as a reanimation of the
objective-related borrowing requirement rule, at least at
the Federal level. Furthermore, this decision presses for
a Federal law operationalizing the terms "investment
expenditures" and "macroeconomic imbalances". At
present, such a law is under discussion.
As far as rhe monetary financing of the public deficit is
concerned, the Bundesbank is not obliged to finance the
deficit. The Federal Government, however, has access to
the seigniorage of the Bundesbank if it emerges as a
profit in the annual balance sheet 10.
t.2.2 Budgetary coordlnafion: purposes, rules and
lnstltutlons
Legal regulations ll fostering and strenghtening coordi-
nation and coo,peration of the different public bodies can
be split into those rules aiming at an efficienr allocation
of production facrors and optimal distribution policy and
those aiming at an efficient stabilization policy.
The fiscal constitution lays down the competences of the
different levels of Government and the procedures to be
followed if a federal law has impects on revenues or
expenditures of other budgets. In general, such federal
laws need the approval of the Bundesrat. Furthermore,
this part of the constitution describer the rules for taxa-
tion and the system of tax revenue allocation and shar-
ing. Specific taxes refer to the Federal State (ll% ofall
tax revenucs) and the L{nder (S% of all tax revenues)
and some taxes are raised by local authorities (2% of all
tax revenues). However, the major pert of taxation (more
than 80% of all tax revenues) consists out of coltmon
taxes (income tax, corporate tax and VAT); they are
shared between the levels of Government accoiding to
special keys.
To fulfil the allocation function of the different levels of
govemment, a system of horizontal and vertical revenue_
sharing tries to equitibrate the fiscal needs and fiscal
strength of all bodies. This is to foster the convergence
ofliving standards throughout the country. The financial
constitution guarantees that all bodies have access to the
financial relx)urces they need to fulfil their allocation
function.
Responsibility for (re)distribution policy is shared be_
tween the Federal Government and the Llnder Govern-
ments (Article 74 GG). lvhile compulsory
unemployment andpension schemes are organized at the
national level, statutory health insurance schemes are
organized at a local level. All respective framework
laws, however, are federal laws, adopted by both the
Bundestag and the Bundesrat. Thus, social security agen-
cies have no room for regional differentiation. Individ-
uals who cannot rely on benefits under a social-security
scheme (i.e. unemployment, health and old age or han-
dicapped pension scheme) have access to benefits from
the local budget at a minimum subsistence lcvel (Sozial-
hilfe). This minimum level is defined by the L[nder
parliament concerned. These local expenditures are,
however, ultimately charged to the Ldnder budget, as
there is horizontal and vcrtical revenue sharing within
each Land.
10 ) Thc emergeooe of pro6ts, howwetr, ir subjet o very restictive conditions. Thus foreign exchmge has jo be val,ed o tlreloweet vahre principb.
11) CooperationbetweentheRderalGovenunentadrhelrnderGovenm€nbadamongtheL&rderGovernmentsthenuelveg
is regulared by several uticles laid down in the Gnmdgeseuz, nunely in Article 50 Ccl,tm urrao p"rttiparc in rhelegisl*ion and the administration of the Federal Govemmurt trnough the Brudesru"), Article 20ff GG (Jurisdiction in theFederal Republic), Article 91a urd b GG (corunur responsibilities) ud Articte lo4a GG - 115 GG (fiscal onstinrtion).
While rules on cooperation of allocation and distribution
policy were implemented in the legal framework of the
Fea"iat Republic at its foundation in 1949' legal rules
on coopcration in the freld of stabilization policy were
only impleme,nted in f96? following the experiencc of
the l9(f,167 recession. On the basis of the Keynesirn
paradigm, the l5th amendment of the Grundgesetz ob-
liges Central Governments (Federal and Liinder Govern-
ments) to Pursue thc target of macroeconomic
equilibrium (Article 109.2 GG).
Two Federal laws, the "Stability-and4rowth" law (Sta-
bilit[ts- und Wechstumsgesetz) of 1967 and the "Budgct-
Basic-Rules' law Qlaushaltsgrundsltzegesetz) of 1969'
which had also to be adopted by the Bundesrat requirc
the Central Governments
. to run a budgetary Pollcy which is consistent with
macrocconomic cquilib,rium,
. to plan revenues and expenditures in a medium term
also consistent with macroeconomic needs,
. to implement a comparable and homogeneous system
of budgetary procedures,
o to guarantee the coordination and compatibility of
measures implemented by the various territorial auth-
orities.
Furthermore, the Grundgesetz and the Stability-and-
Growth law allow for additional specific rcstrictions on
budgetary policy at all levels of government in periods
of sovere macroeconomic discquilibrium. These restric-
tions can be introduced by the Federal Government in
such periods (sec e.g. Article 109.4 GG).
To support the coordination and comPatibiliry of the
budgetary measures taken at various levels of territorial
government, two councils were setuP: the "conjuncturd
Council of the public bodies' (Ko'njunknurat der Offen-
tlichen Hand) rnd the "Financial plrnning Council' (Fi-
nanzplanungsrat). While thc'Conjunctural Council"
primarily discusses thc broad lines of budgetary and
itabilization policn the "Financial Planning Council"
deals with the operationalization and implementation of
these broad guidelines. In view of the budgetary suton-
omy of the territorial authorities, neither council has
exccutive power and they are only advisory bodies. They
can only influence by convincinS. However, as thc mem-
bers of these advisory bodies are rePresentatives of the
different Governments their advice and recommenda-
tions rre politically more binding than the advice of
extemal bodies, e.g. the Council of Economic Advisers
(SachverstXndigenrat). Nevertheless, their advice has
first to be implemented into Federal and Llndcr laws
before becoming legallY binding.
Membcrs of thc 'Conjunctural Council" are the Federal
Ministcr for Economic Affairs (chairman), the Federal
Minister for Financial Affairs, one rePresentative from
each Land, four representatives from the local auth-
orities'bodies and - as 8n observer - a representative of
the Bundesbank. The Minister for Financial Affairs
supervises onc Pcrmanent committee of the "Conjunctu-
ral Council', thc 'Boud for borrowing affairs of the
public bodies' (AusschuB fllr Kreditfragen der Offen-
ilichcnHrnd), which coordinates the timing and the size
of borrowing demrn& on the capital market by the
vrrious lcvek of Govcrnmcnl
Membcn of thc "Finencial Planning Council" are the
Fedcrrl Minigtcr for Financial Affairs (chairman)' the
Federel Ministcr for Economic Affairs, the Minister of
Finance from cach Land, four representatives from the
local authoritieg'bodies and - again as an observer - a
reprcsentrtivc of thc Bundesbank. An imPortant subcom-
mittec of the Finrncial Planning Council is the "Working
Group for Tax Forecasting' (Arbeitskreis Steuerschnt-
zung). Members of this working SrouP' chaired by a
representative of the Ministry of Finance, are repre-
sentrtives of ell thc ebove mentioned bodies plus repre-
sentatives from thc Statistical Office, the Council of
Economic Advisers and the Economic Research In-
stitutes.
t.2.3 Revenue.sharlng and other reglonal automatlc
stablllzers
The requirement in the Grundgesetz for uniform living
conditions throughout the Federal Republic's territory
led to a set of legal taxation and revenue-sharing rules,
affecting the fiscal stance of the different sections of
general govetnment's budget. Consequently, there exists
no room for regional differentiation in tax rates with the
exception of the local trade tax (Gewerb€steuer)' which
equats 7% of total tax receipts. Since 1949, a compli-
cated network ofhorizontal and vertical revenue-sharing
sytems and tax-allocations rules has been implemented.
The last major revision of these legal rules took place in
1969.
Recent horizontal revenue-sharing unong different Lnn-
der is laid down in Article 107 GG and the Liinder-
revenue-shrring law (Uinderfinanzausgleichsgesetz) of
1969 and its several rmendmens. According to these
laws there is I two-steP pKrcedure for horizontal revenue
shrring:
. thc first step affccts the original allocation of tax
receipts. While revcnues from income and corporate
taxstion are allocated broadly in line with revenues
collected on the territory of the individual Llnder' the
distribution of VAT-revenues is determined by the
numbcr of inhabitants of each individual Land. Fur-
thermore, tp to 25% of total VAf-revenue share of the
Llnder is reserved for supplementing the tax-revenues
of thosc Llnder, whose total tax revenues per head
(excluding VAf) arc below thc average (Erglnzung'
santeil).
. In e second stslr, revelluc-weak Llinder get additional
revenueg from other Lnnder if their individual tax-
power indicator (SteuerkraftmeBzahl) is smaller than
95% of the average t8x-Power indicrtor for all Liinder
(AusgleichsmeBzaht). The tax-power indicator cor-
rects actual tax-rcvenues of an individual Land for
demographic and egglomerative factors and for other
special burdens of rn individual Lrnd.
Consequently, every individual Land's tax-revenu€s
reach at least 95% of the average tax-power indicator.
Furthermore, in the course of a vertical revenue rharing
system, the Federal Government is allowed to redistrib-
ute up to 2lo of its own VAf-revenues for grants-in-aid(Erglnzungszuweisungen) to those Llnder whose
revenues rre still considered to be insufficient to meet
their public expenditure obligarions. Whether the linanc-
ing of common responsibilities, introduced into the
Grundgesetz in 1969 can be interpreted as a part of the
vertical revenue sharing system is uncertain. It should
perhaps be interpreted as a system ofinternalizing 
€xter-
nalities since common responsibilities are defined as
Lt'nder functions although they havc an important im-
pact on living conditions and growth prospects in the
entire country.
Laws concerning compulsory social security systems,
e.g. unemployment insurance and pension schemes are
Federal laws. Benefits and contributions of individual
participants are - with the exception of the locally or-
ganized compulsory health-insurancc system - similar
throughout the Federal Republic. Regional subbodies of
e.g. the "Federal Body for Labour" (Bundesanstalt liir
Arbeit) or the "Association of Pension-insurance Com-
prnies' (Verband der Rentenversicherungstrlger) is per-
mitted no regional differentiation. Deficits of regional
subbodies are automatically balanced by the federal
body or - in cases where this is not possible - by the
Federal Government'r budget. Consequently, automatic
stabilizers begin to wort when regions are affected dif-
ferently by a slowdown of economic activitn wage dc-
velopments and demographic trends.
t.2.4 Summary
The Grundgesetz, the constitutions of the Llinder, the
Stability-and-Growth law of 19 67, the Budgetary-B asic-
Rules law and the Revenue-sharing law of 1969 provide
the legal framework for the budgetary policy of different
levels of Government.
As a result of the legal rules governing budgetary policn
all levels of govenrment have sovereignty over their
budget but must take account of the need to maintain
macroeconomic equillibrium.
As long as additional borrowing requirements are not
trecessary to avoid macroeconomic disequilibrium, the
borrowing requirement of the budget authorities must
not exceed their investmcnt expenditures. Access to the
seigniorage of the Bundesbank is guaranteed to the
Federal Government. In cases of severe macroeconomic
imbalances, the Federal Government is allowed to im-
plement further budgct rules, i.e. force the central gov-
ernments (the Federal and the Llinder level) to sterilize
a part of their tax revcnues (Konjunkturausgleichsrltck-
lage) and to set absolute maximum limits on the borrow-
ing requirement for all lcvels of Governmcnt
(Schuldendeckel). However, a legal definition of macro-
economic disequilibrium and investment expcndinrres
has not yet emerged. Sanctions in case of non com-
plience with thcse legal rules erc not foreseen.
Furthermore, budgetary and accounting procedures have
to follow some basic guidelines and e medium-term
financial plan is compulsory at all levels of government.
To support the coordination and accounting of fiscal
policy at all levels of governments, two advisory coun-
cils were implemented: the "Conjunctural Council of the
public bodies" (Konjunkturrat der Offentlichen Hand)
and the "Financial Plarming Council" (Finanzplanung-
srst).
In consequence of the requirement of the Grundgesetz
for uniform living conditions throughour the Federal
Republic, e detailed set of legal rules has been estab-
lished in order to provide both regional territorial bodies
and regional social security bodies with adequate finan-
cial resources. These rules form the basis of a system of
horizontal and vertical revenue sharing and of regional
automatic stabilizers.
E.3 Experience with budgetary rules in FRG
t.3.1 Borrowlng requlrements
In comparing borrowing requirements with the wide
financial definition of investment expenditures (i.e. in-
cluding investment-related expenditures) the Federal
Government's borrowing requirement only exceeded in-
vestment-related expenditures in 197 6n7, 198263 and
1988. Graph indicates, however, that the borrowing re-
quirements of theFederal Government andof theLlnder
Governments as a whole have gencrally exceeded invest-
ment expenditures (national accounts definition) since
the mid-1970s. This holds particularly for the Federal
Government here the deficit excceded investment expen-
dirures by up to 2% of GDP in 1975. Municipalities'
borrowing requirements as a whole never exceeded in-
vestment expenditures; however, this performance must
be seen in the context of the struclure of local expendi-
tures. While this level of government accounts for only
14% of general government's total expenditures, its in-
vestment expenditures count for 64% of total public
expenditure (nat. acc. def.).
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The definition of the investment term is the crucial point
as regards the question whether a budget rule limiting
borrowing requirement to investmcnt succeods in keep-
ing public debt under control.
Between 1973 and 1989 Central Government's debt rose
fromDM 101 blt or Ll*o of GDPIoDM 801 bn or35.8%
of GDP. Assuming lirst that the national accounts defini-
tion of investment was the borrowing limit and Central
Government's budgets had exactly met this limit every
year, Central Govemment's debt would have reached
only DM 464bn in 1989 or 2O314% of GDP. Assuming
that, however, the wide definition of investment was the
borrowing limit and that the Federal Government and the
Llnder as a whole had exactly met this limit in each year,
Central Government's debt would have risen to DM l2O2
bn or 53 314% of GDP.
In other words, in the case of the Federal Republic, the
narow (national accounts) limit results almost in a sta-
bilization of the public debVGDP ratio (+().5% a year)
while the wider timit allows for a significant Srowth of
the public debt/GDP ratio by tbout 2ll4% a year.
Amendments to the Budgetary-Basic-Rules law of 1969
and to the Federal-Budgetary-Law, 8t pressnt under dis-
cussion, will lead to an operational definition ofthe term
'investment expenditures". However, it will be the wide
delinition.
t.3.2 Medlum-term flnanclal plannlng
All levels of Government engage in medium-term finan-
cial planning on a S-year basis: the year where the budget
is already under exccution, the following year where
there normally erists a lirst draft of the budget and three
further years. Most experience of planning is at the
Federal level, so the Federal budget will serve as an
example.
However, it is important to recognize that it is difficult
to plan and to control the deficit in any specific budge-
tary-year. In those years where the Federal Govern-
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ment's borrowing requirement exceeded cven the ex-
panded investment definition, i.e. the yeus 1975116,
1981182 and 1988, thc financial plans covering these
budgetary years showed significantly higher deviations
of estimeted borrowing requirements from the actual
outturn than for all other ycars. According to the finan-
cial plans of 1974,1980, 1981 and 1987, borrowing
requirements of the resPoctive following budget year
were planned not to exceed the limit. Only the budget
deficit of 1976 was definitely planned, and according to
the financial plan of 1975, was intended to be even
higher.
In reviewing the medium-term financial plans presented
for the Federal budget, the following tentative assess-
ments can be made:
. It has been easier to project expenditures than to Pro-
ject revenues. The Mean Absolute Deviation (M.A.D.)
for the five plans for each budget between 1970 and
1988 was less than 39o fot total expenditures but 4%
for total revenues.
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. Expenditures have normally been underestimated
while revenues have normally been overestimated.
The Mean Deviation (M.D.), which takes account of
the sign of a deviation was -0.7.% for expenditures 12
and reached l.l9ofor revenues "
. Estimation results for each individual budget year im-
prove in thc course of the financial plan. While in the
year t-4 M.A.D. reached more than 5% for expendi-
tures and almost 7?o fot revenues, it declined to less
than 1.5% for the year in course. Surprisingln a shift
from underestimsting expenditures to overestimating
them has been recorded as the execution of thc budget
approaches l).
. Projections for thc borrowing requirement are only
derived from revenue and cxpenditure cstimations al-
though they are in a way framed by political gui-
delines. As a result, they can generally deviate much
more from the actual outturn than estimations for
revenues and expenditures. Moreover, as revenues
have been over-estimated and expenditures underesti-
mated, projections for the borrowing requirement have
been biased significantly downwards.
. S.Estimation resuls of the Financial Planning Council
improved as experience increased and external and
internal shocks became less pronouced. WhileM.A.D.
in the early 1970s peaked * LO%o, the highest M.A.D.-
peak since the plan for 1974f'18 was that of the plan
for 198 1185, with 4.3% for revenues.
t.3.3 Budgetary coordlnatlon
Budgetary coordination at the three levels of Govern-
ment takes placemainly in the Financial Planning Coun-
cil. According to the statutes of thc council, its
recommendations and comments will only be published
if they are unanimously adopted. This rule takes account
of the Council's advisory character: if it is not possibleto
convince the individual members of the Council, it will
not be possible to convince the different Governments.
The successes of the "Financial Planning Council" in-
clude:
. The recommendation of compulsory medium-term fin-
ancial planning for the local level as well as the
Federal level led to a corresponding legal rule in the
"Local Authorities Budgetary Law" (Gemeindehau-
shaltsrecht) of 1975.
. In the eady 197(h, the Council agreed upon a corlmon
scheme for financiel planning at all levels of Govern-
ments. This scheme was lirst published in the Finan-
ciel Report of 1975, allowing a comparieon the me-
dium-term plens for differcnt categories of revenues,
expendinres rnd othcr strategic items of the different
budgets. Medium-term projections at all levels of Gov-
ernmcnt follow this scheme.
. Since 1977, the Council ESrecs evsry year upon a
common sct of hypotheses concerning short-term
economic prospects and upon medium-term revenue
end expenditure prospects for the different levels of
Govenrment. As these projections are fed into the
budgetary procedurc of the different cabinets, these
projections must be published before the drafting of
the budgets for the forthcoming year, i.e. in May/June.
In OctobcrNovembcr, just before the budgetary pro-
cess is finalized, en update of these projections is
published.
. However, as the budgetary procedures of the different
Governments are not totally synchronized, the feeding
in of these projections into the decision-making pro-
cess cannot be guaranteed. The projections are based
on an economic forecast presented by the Ministry of
Economic Affairs and a financial projection presented
by the Ministry of Finance. The latter projection relies
heavily on the results of the "Working Group on Tax
Estimation" as far as revenues are concerned. The
Financial Planning Council discusses these projcc-
tions and adopts a final version, to be published in the
Financial report of the Ministry of Finance.
. For several years, the Council has been able to agree
upon quantitative and qualitative guidelines for the
expenditurcs and borrowing requirements of the dif-
ferent levels of Government. Until 1980, these gui-
delines aimed at bringing expenditure increases in line
with macroeconomic needs. From 1981 onwards the
goal of budgetary consolidation has been more promi-
nent. Since 1983, the reduction of the public sec-
tor/GDP ratio, fiscal consolidation and an improving
of the structwe of public expenditures have been the
objectives underlying the fiscal recommendations of
the Council.
. On four occasions (1969, 1970, l97l and 1973) the
Council has recommended the sterilization of tax
revenues by depositing them interest-free on an ac-
count with the Bundesbank (Konjunkturausgleich-
sr0cklage); thus, the overheating of the economy was
reduced. The bodies concerned, i.e. the Federal and the
Llinder Governments acted in line with these recom-
mendations on three of the four occasions in accord-
ance with a special law based on Article 109.4 and Art.
15 of the Stability-and-Growth law.
12 ) The trend of M.D. exhibite4 howwer, a strucoud break es from the hrdget fq 1983 : While fu all budgets before 1983
expendinres were significurtly ud€(estimat€d they wcre over+stimated as from that yer. Obviously, the Finurcial Pluuring
Coutcilhas rptyGtdjustediu estimstionmethods to trecautious expendiunepolicyof thenewGovemrn€nL
13 ) This Gerrnan exluience differs somewhat ftrom 0re IJK cxperience in the UK both cxpcndinnes ard twenucc of Gersal
governrnent werc rigdficently und€restinded (M.D. cqualled -1.5% ad -22% reepetively).
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. On four occasions also (1971, 1972,1973 rnd 1974)
the Council recommended ebsolute meximum limitr O
the borrowing requirements of the Federel rnd iadivid-
ual Llnder Governments. Tivice (1971 rnd 1973r,
these recomme,ndations were followed by corespond-
ing special laws. In 1972, the limie could alreedy be
met without legal ectim, the special law planned for
1974 was withdrewn in the light of the first oil-price
shock.
The abiliry of thc Financial Planning Council to edopt
unanimously recommendations for the budgets of thc
three levels of Government, doesnotmean automoticrlly
that these recommendations were followed in practice:
. Initially, quantitative guidelines for expenditurc
growth were met only by chance. Significant dcvir-
tions were recorded especially in the 197(h. The gui-
deline for 1970 was to limit expcnditure increases to
7%; 12% was the actual outnrm, mainly as a result of
an unexpected increase of the wage bill (guideline:
+7.5?o, rerl outturn: +15.8%). In the course of the late
1970s and 1980s, however, Central Governments'
tried to meet the expenditure guidelines. The Federal
Govemment was quite successful in doing so.
. Qualitative guidelines for expenditures included rec-
ommendations to control the wage-bill increase, to
check subsidies and to finance new expendinre intens-
ive progremmes by cutting expenditures on other pro-
gramm€s. As there recommendrtions have been
worded quite vaguely, the extent of their actual im-
plementation is hard to verify.
. According to Article 51.2 of the 'Haushaltsgrundslt-
zegesetz', the Financial planning Council was asked
to establish a list of priority of what are the most
important public expenditure programmes, taking ac-
count of the need to maintain macroeconomic equili-
brium. The Council never succeeded and derided in
l98l that this task would be more properly assigncd
to the Parliament.
Despite such failures, the work of the Financial Planning
Council cau be assessed as a good support for budgetary
coordination, especialln if one considers its advisory
character.
t.3.4 Revcnue sharlng and other reglonal automatlc
stablllzers
Vertical revenue sharing in its narrow definition (i.e. not
including grants-in-aid for common responsibilities) be-
tween the Federal Government and the Linder was
limited to 1.5% of VAT-revenues of the Federal Govern-
ment, in 1989 this limit was increascd to 2?o. T\cse
"Ergiinzungszuweisungcn' increased from DM 0.5 bn in
1970 to DIl/{2,4 b,n in 1988, i.e. l% of totel revenue! rt
the Liinder level. Horizmtal revenue shering smong the
L6nder, designed to lift individual Llhder tax-power
index to 95% of the average tax-power index rore from
DM 1.2 bn in 1970 to DM 3.4 bn in 1988, i.e. 1.5% of
all revenues of the Liinder budgets.
Although vcrticd rnd horizontal revenue sharing is uot
very importrnt, if compared to total revenues of the
lggrcgrtcd Llnder lcvel, it ir essential for certain Lflnder
(c.g. ebout 17% of rll revenues or 2% of GDP for the
Serrlrnd in 1988). fhig rcvenue sharing makes regional
budgctr lccs liable to cyclicel revenuc shortfalls.
Automatic stabilizcrs working through the social se-
curity system are more important for regional public
finances. Stabilizers working through the unemploy-
mcnt-insurencc schcme amounted to more than
DM f0 b,n in 1988, rs the Federal level equilibrated the
deficits of thc regional subbodies. In the case of Saar-
land, this meenr thrt an edditional DM 0.8 b or 2,6%
of GDP wes trrnsfercd to this region which suffers from
high unemployment.
t.35 Summary
An assessment of how effective the limits drawn by
different laws have been in controlling the borrowing
requirements in the 1970s and 1980s is quite difficult as
the limits and exemption-rules have not been adequately
defined. In the past, the borrowing requirement of the
Federal Govenrment and some individual Linder ex-
ceeded the wide investment-expenditure definition
(GFCF plus investment-related subsidies) only in some
ycars. However, both, the Federal Government and the
Llnder Govenrnents rs E whole have had higher borrow-
ing requirements than their outlays for investment ex-
penditures as defined by the national accounts since the
mid-1970s.
A borrowing limit, however, which allows borrowing
requirements to bc es high as investment expenditures in
the financial definition, i.e. gross fixed capital formation
plus investment related transfers to other public budgets
or to the private sector, is not at all sufficient to keep
public debt on a sustainable peth. In the FRG, the public
debt/GDP ratio has increased in particular during the
197& rnd carly 1980s and a further increase by almost
2O% of GDP would still have bcen in accordance with
this wider defined borrowing limit.
Before criticizing the political prrcess, one must con-
sider the difficulties in meeting borrowing plans when it
is equally difficult to $timate the real outturn of expen-
ditures and revenues. . Even estimations of the budget
already under execution has shown a Mean Absolute
Deviation of 1.5% for both expenditures and revenues,
Twenty years of medium-term budgetary planning in
Germany indicates that it is more difficult to estimate
revenues than to estimate expenditures and that there is
a systematic bias in underestimating borrowing require-
mcNrts.
The Finrncia[ plrnning Council pleys a key role in co-
ordineting thc budgetary policy of the different levels of
Governrnent. Although it is only an advisory body it has
been quite successful in inlluencing the budgetary policy
in the Federal Republic. In designing a commontudge-
tary schemc for dl levels of Government and in making
unanimously recommendations, it has become more in-
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fluential in the course ofthe 1970s. The Federal Govern-
ment has tried to meet the quantitative guidelines for
expenditure increases, and several recommendations be-
came legally binding as corresponding laws were
adopted by the Parliaments, e.g. the sterilization of tax
revenues, the absolute maximum limits on borrowing
requirements in the early 1970s and the introduction of
compulsory medium-term financial planning for local
authorities. In its attempt to synchronize budgetary pro-
cedures, the Council provides the Cabinets (every
May/June and every OctoberNovember) with updated
forecasts concerning the economic environment and fis-
cal baseline scenarios.
Revenue sharing and regional automatic stabilizers
working through the social security system, haveproved
to be a very important suPport to the requirement of the
Grundgesetz that living conditions be equated
throughout the whole Federal Republic. Although the
total amount of money involved in horizontal revenue
sharing is quite small (0.3% of GDP), these transfers
play an important role for the financial balance of indi-
vidual Liinder. Assuming that there were no revenue
sharing and automatic stabilizers, regional public finan-
cial balances would differ by more than 10 percentage
points, i.e. more than emong ERM-countries and not by
only 2.5 percentage points of GDP as is shown in the
Llnder budget . However, the price all levels of Govern-
ment has to pay for this, is to cede their sovereignty over
tax and social security rules: taxation and social security
contributions and allowances are identical throughout
the Federal Republic.
8.4 Executive summary: lessons for Europe
The Federal Republic of Germany is the most federalist
state of the European Community. In particular, fiscal
policy is to a relatively large extent orSanized at a sub-
national and regional level. By the end of the 1980s,
economic indicators such as inflation, growth and unem-
ployment are as different within Gerrnany as among
ERM countries. Therefore, the FRG as a model of fiscal
policy coordination might provide information about the
instruments and necessary degree of fiscal policy coor-
dination in a monetary union and the problem likely to
be encountered.
However, it has to be borne in mind, that the strucnrre of
the public sector within Germany is very different from
the structure in the other ERM-countries. The Federal
level in Germany (incl. social security), equals 34% of
GNP while the EC-budget equals only about l% of GDP
in Europe. Furthermore, the Federal budget in the
Federal Republic works as an sutomatic stabilizer both
on the expenditure side as e.g. centrally financed unem-
ployment benefits are distributed in favour of the regions
with high unemployment but also as regards revenueg
e.g. economically strong regions contribute relatively
more than pq)rer regions to overall revenues. Such
equilibrating mechanisms do not exist at the EC level
(see box).
As e result of signilicant revGnu€ sharing and the oper-
ation of other regional automatic stabilizers, discrepan-
cies in regional budgetary imbalances are much less
pronounced qrithin Germany than within the narrow-
band ERM-zone. Although horizontal revenue sharing
among thc Llnder is not very important at the aggregated
level, it is quite pronounced for individual Llnder. So,
trevenus sharing makes regional budgets less liable to
cyclical and sectoral revenue shortfalls. This is even
more true for the different regional budgets of social
security schemes which are balanced at the federal level.
The following conclusions can be drawn for European
integration:
. A single monetary policy and cooperative fiscal pol-
icy, including revenue sharing and important regional
automatic stabilizers, can moderate negative rePercus-
sions of different economic performances for individ-
ual regions. They are, however, not sufficient to lead
to a convergence of regional growth, unemployment
rates, inflation and per-capita-income discrepancies.
. A convergence ofpublic financial balances can only
be achieved by significant revenue sharing and an
implementation of automatic stabilizers working at the
regional lcvel e.g. an European Social Security Sys-
tem. Significant revenue sharing and other regional
stabilizers are, however, not likely to be established as
long as important differences exist among national
systems of taxation and social security.
. Fiscal policy coordination among sovereign Govern-
ments can be supported by an advisory body which
consists of representatives of these Governments.
Such a body would have to convince all governments.
In this context, it might be helpful for its decisions to
be bound on unanimity.
. Binding targets give the necessary framework for
budgetary coordination. They are, however, very dif-
ficult to achieve when they are very detailed, giving
precise quantitative constraints, as outturn normally
differs significantly from ex-ante plans. The quality of
medium-tenn expenditure and revenue estimates can
be improved in the course of the planning period and
estimation errors c8n be reduced as the resPective
budget year approaches. However, experience in the
FRG showed that estimation elrors could hardly be
pushed bclow a 1.5% for revenues and expenditures,
even at a time when the budget was already under
execution.
. Quantitative and qualitative binding targets, e.g. for
budgetary deficits not exceeding investment expendi-
tures ask for clear definitions of the targets them-
selves. They encounter difficulties since the definition
of e.g. investment expenditures is not clear and exemp-
tions also ill-defined for by-passing the rule are
allowed. Nevertheless, they arc a very useful guide as
to the appropriateness of the fisal performance.
. To define, as it is done in the Federal Republic, invest-
ment expenditure as gross fixed capital investment
plus investment related transfers to other budgets or to
the private sector is not at tll restrictive enough to
avoid an unsustainable public debt/GDp performance.
In the case of the Federal Republic, it would have
allowed for an annual increase of the public debt/GDp
ratio of more than 2.25% over rhe l9?0s and l9g0s.
General conclusion: the Federal Republic of Gerrrany
can serye as an exemple of relatively successful budge-
tary cooperation and of what can be achieved in an
economic and monetary union with a coordinated budge-
tary policy. It gives examples of rules, conditions and
problems for budgetary policy coordination and it shows
that budgetary coordination and strong revenue sharing
hrvc been the major instruments to foster conycrgence
of living conditions throughout the FRG. However, the
German system has numerous specific feanrres which
may not be realized at the European level. Therefore, the
EC might have to find different ways and means of fiscal
policy coordination.
Part III:
The GDR economy and implications of GEMSU
Chapter 9
Main charactaristics and implications of
GEMSU
9.1 Main characteristics of the GDR economy
In the past, several models have been developed to trsrts-
form a capitalist economy into a planned economy: how-
ever, such a model does not exist for the reverse
procedure. [n consequence, neither economic theory nor
politicians are coping with the rapid progress in Eastern
Europe towards a market economy. TLe intra-Gcrman
development is even morc particular. Thc monettry
union with the GDR is on condition that the framework
of a market-oriented economy is implemented. The besic
political objective has been to stop the massive immigra-
tion wave which has been observed after the opening up
of the inner Gennan border by promoting economic
prosperity in the GDR and not by administrative
measures implemented by the Federal Republic. The
German Economic, Monetary and Social Union
(GEMSU) is seen as a firm signal and commitment that
differences in living standards will shrinlc in the fore-
seeable futurc, thus cteating positive expectations rs to
the economic prospects in the GDR.
The conditions for mo,netary union relate to the need to
implement the basic conditions of a market economy.
They mainly concern:
. contract freedom between economic agents;
. abolition of administered prices;
. wage autonomy onboth sides of industry (independent
trade unions and entrepreneur organizations);
. reform of private property rights;
. implementation of r tax rnd social security system
which is similar to the West German system.
However, the offer also contains rccomPanying
measures supporting the transition Perid. This, in per-
ticular, cotrcerns financial support for the public budget
(German Unity Fund) rnd for the newly created social
security system, mainly unemployment insurance and
pension scheme (Anschubfinanzierung). In addition, fin-
ancial support is promised to improve the GDR-infra-
structure and to provide financial and technological
support to reduce heavy environmental pollution in the
GDR, which is a common interest.
As regards the implications of GEMSU, a variety of
opinions have been put forward. The following chapters
9 and l0 put relatively more weight on the development
of thc GDR econony. Chapter 9 provides an overview of
the stnrcture rnd perfomance of the GDR economy. It
starts with rn uelysir of demographic ProsPecB and an
assessment eg to thc general level of living standards.
The rnalysis of the present structure of the GDR-econ-
omy provides some basic information on the need for
structural changer.
Chapter 10 is devoted to a discussion of the consequen-
ces of economic unification in the GDR economy. Two
scenarios for the economic development of the GDR
cconomy are developed. Firstly, the scenario of an inde-
pendent catching-up Process will be put forward which
- admittedly in a stylized way - compares the potential
for development in the GDR with the West German
Wirtschaftswunder in the 1950s and early 60s. It will be
shown that zuch a scenario depcnds upon important con-
ditions which are not necessarily fullfilled in the GDR.
Thc second scenario starts from the notion that economic
integration, mainly because of strong labour mobility,
will accelerate to a very large extent after GEMSU.
Consequently, an independent development (catching-
up) of the GDR would hardly be possible, i.e. the GDR-
issue will havc to be discussed more under
regional-policy aspects rather than as a general macro-
economic challcngc. Although important differences are
obvious, thc Itdian example with the stylized picture of
an underdeveloped South despite massive public aid,
may be mentioned in this context.
9.2 The population
At the end of 1988, 16.6 million people lived in the GDR.
Since then 6fl).(XX) have emigrated to the FRG. Although
the average density of population is fairly low, its con-
centration is high. More than 50% of the population lives
in East Berlin and in the centres of the South (Halle,
Leipzig, Dreden and Karl-Marx-Stadt). It is important
to note that some of thege centres are neer to the border
of the Federal Republic.
The age pyramid is more favourable than in the Federal
Republic. The proportion of the population below 18
years of rge is larger (2,4%) thtt in the Federal Republic
(19%t, while all other agc groups are somewhat lower
particularly the age group above 60 years (18% GDR,
23% FRG). Nevertheless, the GDR is also confronted by
a growing number of elderly compared to the working
agc groups. This problem is aggravated by emigration
concentreted in the younger 88e groups.
Labour fo,rce participetion b extremely high according
to international standards (almost 90% of the population
is working compared to just ovet 6O?o in the FRG)
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mainly due to amuchhigherparticipation rate of women.
Total employment rmouats to almosr 9 million (55% of
the population) compared with 26 million (41% of popu-
lation) in the Federal Republic.
The level of professional qualifications is relativcly
high. Three quarters of the labour force have finighed
their professional education. However, to the extent that
education has been ideologically influenced, in particu-
lar in the academic professions - economists, lawyers,
general administration - shortcomings have to be cx-
pected. Engineers should, in general, be in a position to
meet the new challenges. At the level of skilled workers,
important adaptation to new Western technology will be
necessary. Moreover, a crucial condition for r succegsfirl
integration of the GDR economy into theWesternmarket
economy will be the regeneration of the spirit of entre-
preneurship and market oriented management methods
in the GDR.
The standard of living in the GDR is undoubtedly the
highest in Eastern Europe, but comparison with Western
countries is hardly possible. Nevertheless, despite a high
degree of uncertainry, per capita income is probably
higher in the GDR than in keland, Greece and Portugal
and somewhat below that of Spain. Real per capita
income seems to be about 1/2 that of the FRG. Therefore,
the immigration problem is less related to general pov-
erty in the GDR than to proximity to a high income rrea
with marked cultural si'ililErities. The supply of food,
basic household equipment and cars is relatively high.
Problems exist with the quality of consumer durables
and housing. Moreover, bad working conditions, infra-
structure and envirolrmental problems considerrbly re-
duce living standards in thc GDR.
9.3 Industry. a sectoral overview
The development-of the GDR economy has becn domi-
nated by autarchic policy of minimising dependence on
inputs from Western countries, partly motivated by a
permanent shortage of foreign curency. Therefore, the
GDR does not show a high degree of specialization. The
target of self-reliance has even led to some noticeablc
excesses: companies were not only encouraged to pro-
duce their own investrnent goods, but the large conglom-
erates (Kombinate) were also obliged to make their own
repairs and to produce at least a certain amount of con-
sumer goods (5% of total production) irrespective of
their main production line. In addition, compared to
western industrialized countries, the sectoral structure of
the GDR economy has changed relatively little over the
past few decades. Industry is by far the most important
sector, while in Community countries services in general
play the most important role. [n fact, the present seotoral
employment structure of the GDR closely resembles that
of the FRG in the latc 1960's.
Labour productivity in the GDR is generally considered
to be somewhat below 40% of the FRG level, depending,
however, on the specific sector under consideration.
Three main factors arc responsible for this pfoductivity
gap: organization (bureaucratic central plenning), moti-
vrtion (lack of incentives) 8nd tGchnology (outdated
crpitel stock). Thc latter frctor has been particularly
sgSrsvated during the eighties es the share of investment
in netionel income fell considerably. (In the producing
Eectors, for cxrmple, this share is said to have been only
about 10% in 1988 comprred to l6%ia 1970). Moreover,
the integration into the static COMECON rrade rela-
tions, together with only a marginal integration into the
world economn contributed to the obvious inefficiency
of the GDR economy.
A short sectoral analysis shows that an assessment of the
carching-up possibilities vrries from fairly positive to
almost non-existent.
Energy
Energy production is mainly basedupon the only mineral
riesources available to the GDR: lignite. With 310 mil-
lion tonnes (25% of world production), the GDR is by
far the world's largest producer oflignite. 85% ofelec-
tricity generation is lignite-based. Lignite is also the
basis for household heating. Consequently, over 2R of
primary cnergy inputs consist of brown coal. Nuclear
energy curently provides about 1096 of electricity. How-
ever, securiSr standards are considered to be below ac-
ceptable levels.
Energy consumption per head of population in the GDR
ir vety high relative to international standards (15%
ebovc the level of the FRG). High energy input in indus-
try, low efficiency of power stetiong and a general lack
of rcalistic energy prices and of insulation of housing are
the major ressons for this.
S tcel
Because of disadvantages in transportation and mineral
rosoutrces, the GDR has had no genuine basis for steel
production. Nevertheless, the GDR developcd its own
steel production capecity after the war, mainly based on
scrap iron as input. Production costs are fairly high
because the Siemens Martin technique is prevailing; this
techniquc was completely abandoned in 1982 in rhe
FRG. High quality steel crnnot be produced. ln the steel
industry, labour productivity is well below 50% of the
FRG level.
Chemicals
The GDR-chemical industry is largely based upon coal-
using plants built before the 2nd world war. The syn-
thetic material industry is far behind Western standards.
Production in this strongly growing sector is only 10%
ofFRG production, even leaving aside quality consider-
atiotrr. As regards fertilizers - generally a low profit area
- the GDR is an important net supplier on the world
market. Modernizetion of existing enterprises which is
nscessery to enable them to compete on the world mar-
ket, involves severe environmental problems .
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Machinery rnd car industry
Statistics on this sector, the most important sector after
chemicals, are hardly comparable with Western coun-
tries mainly because quality aspects are very important.
Almost 1 million persons are employed in this sector.
Production in the machinery-tool industry is relatively
less important compared to the FRG. However, this in-
dustry seerns to be or could become competitive on the
world market. The machinery sector suffers very much
from theunavailability of electronic control mechanisms
(COCOM-list) which are becoming increasingly import-
ant in the production of machinery (industrial robots).
Nevertheless, GDR exports in this sector amount toSO%
of all COMECON-exports to Western countries. Despite
the key position, which the car industry has in Western
countries, it is of minor importance in the GDR industry.
A symptom of the very low efficiency of the GDR-car
industry is that motor lorries can barely be exported to
Eastern countries. Heavy lorries arc not produced in the
GDR also because transportation relies much more on
railways, which make up for 75% of all transportation
(FRG:22%),
E lec troni cs
lnvestment in micro-electronics has been extraordinarily
large in order to build up a monopolistic position in
Eastern countries. C;ompetition with Western countries
will probably render these industries (Robotron) ob-
solete. It should be borne in mind that in this area even
Community industries have competitiveness difficulties
on the world market. As regards the growing production
of software, developments are much more favourable
because of highly skilled proSrarnmers. In the tradi-
tional industries of precision mechanics and optics, the
GDR-industry is relatively well prepared for interna-
tional competition.
Cong truc ti on
The constructioo s€ctor is mainly orientated towards
large-scale housing constructions. It employs 6.6% of
the labour force. Although the technigue of prefab,ricated
housing construction is guite advanced, it is highly
doubtful whethcr large blocks of flats will meet future
demand in this area. Instead, modernization of the exist-
ing stock of housing and building of small housing units
will require much more craftsmen. Therefore, although
demand will certainly 8row, a restructuring is required
within the construction sector. As regards underground
building, investment in new equipment is necessary in
order to achieve both a high standard of production and
high productivity.
Textiles
The production of textiles (6% of total GDR production)
is mainly devoted to standardised mass-products. This
leads to strong competition with developing countries on
third markets. Shortage of capital prevene these Gnter-
prises from introducing automatic end flexible produc-
tion lines. Most of the capital stock still stems from the
pre-wr pcriod.
Food industry
The main problem for the food industry (15% of total
GDR production) is a lack of variety and low quality.
High quality products are not available in consequence
of previous self-sufficency objectives and to avoid im-
ports. Productivity is particularly low in this sector.
Agriculture
Agriculture contributes about l0% to GDP (employment
10.8%). About 95% of the agricultural sector is so-
cialized. The ratio of agricultural acreage to population
is twice as large as in the Federal Republic. Neverthe-
less, labour productivity (per employed) is below 50%
of the FRG level. Productivity of land is therefore much
higher i.e. about 75% of the FRG level.
Private economy
Before recent economic reforms, only 458.000 people
(5.3% of total working population) werc employcd in the
private sector. This sector produces 3.6% ofnet national
product. This figure, however, does not include all acti-
vities as services are not included. The private economy
is concentrated in the traded handicraft sector, i.e. re-
pairing, trade and construction.
Banking
The GDR has adopted the two-stage banking system.
Nevertheless, some kind of specialization will exist,
mainly because ofpast experiences and historically es-
tablished relations. For example:
. the Kreditbank AG (formerly part of the Staatsbank)
will provide industry and the construction sector with
credit (genuine universal bank).
. the Genossenschaftsbank will mainly provide agricul-
ture with credit.
. the Sparkassen will collect local savings and provide
public suthorities with credit.
. the Aussenhandelsbank will specialize in international
transactions.
Within the banking sector, the Kreditbank holds most of
the credits to industry. Therefore, it will have to be
financed by the Sparkassen since atpresent these institu-
tions hold about E0% of all savings deposits. Without
somc guarante€ on the loans to the industrial sector, the
Kreditbank would in fact be bankrupt since many enter-
prises, once privatized, will uot be able to scrvice their
debr inDM.
A major problem for the Sparkassen is that 95% of its
personnel are without even secondary education since
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their only task has been to collect savings deposits. The
Sparkassen will thereforc initially nor be cquipped ro
provide loans on a commercial basis. Although each
Sparkasse in the GDR is supposed to have a counterpart
in the FRG, they receive little effective assistance.
A further problem concerning the overall commercial
banking system is that the capital base will be very
narrow; at present the own capital ratio for Sparkassen
seems to be about l% of total assets. Given that the
Kreditbanli will take over most of the loans and that the
Sparkassen hold most of the savings deposits, it is not
clear how important the specialized institutions will be
and how their balance sheet will be structured.
9.4 Infrastructure and environmental
characteristics
A major impediment to private investment in the GDR
could be substantial infrastructural and environmental
problems. The railway is the most important means of
transport. Although the network is only half as intensive
as in the Federal Republic, the railway achieves about
the sarne transportation performance. About l/3 of all
railway transport is devoted to the carriage of lignite.
The reason for the preferential treatment of the railway
was not based on environmental or economic efficiency
concerns, but on the need to save crude oil. There is a
great need to repair and modernize the existing railway
network.
ln terms of coverage, the road network is fairly good
relative to European standards; however, quality is much
below the FRG-standard. Thus, transport is very slow
not least because of the many railway crossings. In
future, bottlenecks will increase bgcause of more intens-
ive private traffic. Increased tourism from the West and
probably more cars per inhabitant in the GDR, are rea-
sons for this. Public transport within cities is provided
mainly by tramways. With the exception of East Berlin,
communication systems are very bad. The telephone
system is overburdened despite the very low number of
connections.
Modernization of the system will probably mean a com-
plete rebuilding of the communication system. This,
however, is also an opportunity to establish the most
advanced technology in this area. private capital might
increase the efficiency of a new system.
In the other areas of vital public infrastructure, invest-
ment needs are substantial also. This is particularly the
case for sewerage facilities as only 50% ofhouseholds
are connected to purification plants. Environmental
grollems are important too. Although the GDR is only
half the size of the FRG (25% of population) the sulphui-
dioxyde emission is morc than twice as large. Rivers are
polluted to a very large extent and the availability of
potable water is a problem. Forests have suffered severe
damage i.e. the Waldsterben is very advanced particular_
ly in the South.
Although it is difficult to 
€stimarc the amount of invest-
ment needed to remedy thesc unsatisfactory conditions
and to modemize the infrastructure, there can bc no
doubt that substantial effort is needed. The German en-
trepreneurs association has estimated that an overall
investment of more than 600 bn DM is required.
9.5 The trade pattern
The GDR is poorly integrated inro the inrernarional
economy for a country of its size; this reflects previous
objectives of self-sufficency. Although it is hardly
possible to obttin reliable statistical information, esti-
mrtes suggest thet the GDR's export shere is in the order
of E% of GDP. Thig would indicate a comparatively
smell participation in the international division of labour
for a country of its size (the Netherlands, for example,
with a population of approximately the same size has an
export share of 55A% of GDP). At present, about 213
of the GDR trade is with other CMEA counrries, notably
with the Soviet Union (around 37% of the total trade).
The CMEA division of labour, however, has been char-
acterized largely by extra economic considerations. As
trade with developing countries plays a minor role, most
of the remainder is with western industrialized countries(of which l/3 is with the FRG).
As far as the product profile of GDR trade is concerned,
it is useful to distinguish between different destinations.
GDR exports ro other CMEA countries (especially the
USSR) largely consisr of machinery and equipmenr (2/3
of exports), while imports contain a high share of energy
products and raw materials. This complementary trade
pattern offers relatively small welfare gains (typically
related to substitutable trade); normally such a trade
pattern is to be found in relationships between (highly
industrialized) core countries and (much less induj-
trialized) peripheral zones. Exports to wesrern indus-
trializcd countries show a very underdeveloped pattern
with a certain emphasis on simple consumer goods. In-
vestment goods are exported to western countries to a
considerably lesser extent.
An analysis of GDR trade flows with the Community
reveals that the GDR is a net exporter of energy- and
labour-intensive products (the production of which also
causes a high level of pollution) while it is a net importer
of products with a high raw materials, R&D and technol-
ogy content. In the light of the fact that the GDR has little
fossil fuel deposits except lignite and taking into ac-
count the alleged high quality of GDR employees, it is
unlikely that this trade pattern corresponds to East Ger-
many's comparative advantage.
Overall, it is noticeable that the GDR's trade is still
dominated by inter-industry trade (i.e. imports and ex-
ports belong to a different product group) while the
Community countries are characterized by a high degree
of intra-industry trade.
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thus from the conversion rate. Probabln GEMSU could
make production equal to U4 of GDP obsolete; this in
turn lcads to substtntial ruremployment in the short term.
This rigc in unemployment can only be partly avoided by
paying subsidies to fitms as demand for GDR production
is largely pricc inelastic. Nevertheless, subsidies are still
necessary for industries which are able to survive in the
nedium tenn so es to brlance productivity and labour
cogts in the short term.
Unemploymcnt in the GDR will - at least over the ad-
justment pcriod - increese further because enterpriscs ore
under sevcrc prossurc to increase productivity. In addi-
tion to improving thc organizetion of the production
pr(rcess, rcducing lebour hoerding is the natural source
for increasing leboru productivity. Substantial new em-
ployment porribilities will be created only in the me-
dium term because they require new investment
(industry) or training (services).
10.1.2 Consequenccs for publlc flnance ln the GDR
Prospects for the public sector balance of the GDR are
very uncertein as the whole structure of expcndinrres and
rcvenues has been changed. On the onehand, majorprice
subsidies are abolished, on the other hand production
levies paid by enterprises ere abolishcd also. Although
the budget deficit will depend upon the development of
the economn e messive deficit seems to be unavoidable.
Several factors are resPonsible:
. rn insufficient tax base
. time-lags beceuse of the necesssry tlx reform
. expenditures to Promote invcstm€nt
. imbalanccs in the sociel eccurity tccount
. new exlrenditures (infrastructure, environrnental pro-
tection)
. interegt pryments on public debt.
A priority task will be to eim at low wage costs of
enterprises. In order to achieve a level of purchasing
power which avoids emigration, the level of net wages
cannot be considerably lower than gross wages, i.e.
wages cannot be taxed significantly. In addition, the
West German tax system applied to the low GDR wage
levcl suggests thtt rcvcnues are considerably below the
corresponding Wcst German wsge tsx (somewhat below
l0% of GDP). Mott GnterPrisos do not record profits.
During the trsnsition period, it can be exPccted that
many of them might record losses which will heve con-
scquenc€s es regards tsxation of profiu in future (Ver-
lustvctrag). Evcn if this period is short, €nterPrbes
would build up intcrnal reserves in order to strengthen
their own capitel base. In order to foster investment,
retained profiu might be taxed to a lesser extent than
distributed profits. Finalln introducing the W€st Gennan
tax system of assessed income tax and corPoratc tax
involver considerrble time lags (about 2 yearr) in the
psymcnt of texes on profits.
Chapterl0
Implications of GEMSU for the GDR
economy: two scenarios
10.1 Introducing GEMSU: initial conditions
and Gonsequences
10.1.1 Consequcnces for the GDR cconomy
A monetary union between the FRG rnd the GDR will
inevitably have severe implications for the GDR econ-
omy in the short term. Although the economic goal may
be clear to both sides, the process of unificetion is
fraught with difficulties. In the long run, there ir the
prospect of economic prosperity in central Europe acting
as a bridgehead between the EC and the emerging East-
ern European democracies.
After GEMSU, the GDR economy is immediately con-
fronted by competition from market economies. How-
ever, the GDR economy was not competitive on the
world market. Exports to hard curcncy countries only
amounted to 49o of GDP. Moreover, in order to eam I
DM from exlx)rs, rround 4 East-Mark had to be in-
vested. Therefore, one cannot expoct that with prevailing
economic structures the GDR-economy will be able to
increase its exports in the short term particularly as real
wages are probably above prevailing levels ofproduc-
tivity. Exports to Eastertr countries will suffer to the
extent that trading partncrs would have to pay in hard
currency. Therefore, such exports would have to be sub-
sidized considerably or will bereplaced by exporu from
other Eastern or Western countries.
Much bigger problems for the GDR economy arising
from monetary union stem frqm the considerable re-
placement of domestic outPut - both consumption rnd
inyestment - by imported goods. This effect is triggered
by the immediate and complete convertibility of money
balances in the GDR after GEMSU. Providing GDR
residents with hard currency hrs led to 8n imPortant shift
towards imported goods. After full monetary union, not
only transfers and foreign investmcnt but tlso hard cur-
rency income of GDR residents contribute to higfter
imports. This is obvious from the fact that the GDR
economy is not compctitive; in this contcxt, competitive-
ness does not primarily mean price competitiveness but
more particularly the mix of production. Most GDR-pro-
ducts, e.g. GDR-cars, have been bought only bcceusc
they could be purchased with East-Mrrk or non-convert-
ible currencics. Conseguently, domestic demand for
such goods is substituted to a large cxtent by imported
goods.
The problem is even more obvious in regard to invest-
ments. Modernization of the GDR capital stock requires
western technology. Consequently, increased invcstment
will be reflected in imported investment goods.
All in all, demand for GDR production is falling &ameti-
cally after thc introduction of GEMSU; this is inde-
pendent from the gucstion of price comP€titiv€ness and
Indirect trx rovenues can be achieved earlier although
the introduction of a sophisticated value added tsx sys-
tem is difficult. As the structure of consumption is biased
towards basic needs, which are taxed at the lower rate,
revenues will bc lower. This effect could be reduccd by
introducing higher taxes on special products, e; g; crrs.
As regards the expenditure side, no substantial cuts cen
be expected cxccpt in thc provision of price subsidics.
The net impact is, however, substantially reduced by the
abolition of high taxer for special consumer goods. Al-
though the number of civil servants wifl decline consid-
erabln the adjustment of the wage srructure leads to a
substantial increase in the public seclor wage bill. There-
fore, overall wage expenditures will not decline to the
same extent as it is suggested by declining public em-
ployment.
As regards the newly created social security system, the
threat of big deficits is reduced as both contributions and
benefits will be linked to income. This concems the
pension and unemployment scheme. The main danger
resulB from a substantiel discrepancy between contribu-
tors and beneficiaries. Therefore, high unemployment
leads to a high deficit. In addirion, a low wage level leads
to the need to increase very low pensions by special
payments. A special risk is involved in the heelth se-
curity system. While conrributions are linked to income,
the expenditures would be linked to the "Gebiiluenord-
nung", which is not related to wages. Therefore, higher
income for specialisrs in the health system mighi be
inconsistent with low wages. All in all, it has to be
expected that high social security contributions burden
the wage cost level of enterprises and disposable income
of employees further. The necessary self-financing of
social security in the GDR might trigger additionat prob-
lems.
New expenditures result from the fact that the public
debt and deficits have to be serviced at market interest
rates. Therefore, a high initial public debt level will
reduce the room for manoeuwe of fiscal policy in the
GDR further. Moreover, public expenditure on infra-
structure investment and in the provision of inccntives
for private investment might increase.
All in all, the public sector in the GDR will show a
considerable deficit The estimate of the five German
research institutes of 15% of GDp could prove to be on
thc low side.
Privatisation could reduce the gap between expendinrre
and revenues. However, large-scale privatisation would
overburden domestic GDR savings at least in the short
term. Therefore, large-scale privatisation would only be
possible by selling public assets to "foreigners". Ii no
market prices were realised this would trigger negative
wealth-distribution effects.
10.2 An independent catching.up process
Prospects for economic developmcnt in thc GDR are
uncertain. Xrhile in the short term a drastic fall in pro-
duction because of changing demand and unprofitable
production seerns to be incvitable, - production figures
of August dropped elready by morc than 40% if com-
pared with the output 8 yesr ago - several analysts are
more optimistic about the medium term prospects. They
belicve in a repid catching-up process for the GDR
economy, which might be comparable to the develop-
ment of the West-German oconomy in the 1950s and
eady 196(h. However, nrch a development would de-
pend upon importent conditions which have still to be
crertcd. Comparcd to the German "WirBchafBwunder,,
three fundamental differences ctn be identified: the
wage level, the cxchange rate 8nd the proximity of the
FRG.
The most important condition for an independent catch-
ing-up pr(rcess are high expected profits in catching-up
regions. Fundementel condirions for this are a low level
of wages and a favourable tax scheme. Wages have not
only to be in line with the lower prevailing level of
productivity 
- this might have been on avertge the case
after the l:l conversinon -, they have also to be low
enough to lead to a high rate of returnon new investment.
Moreover, it is not only the prevailing wage level which
has to bc low. The expected wagc level during the life
time of new inyestment should also bc favourable.
Several reasons lead, however, to the conclusion that the
GDR economy is confronted by an upward pressure on
wages which will hinder the GDR economy from carch-
ing-up independently.
. First, the price refonn together with newly-introduced
indirect taxes will push up many prices, leading to
compensating wage pr€ssure effects despite the fact
that many prices will also be reduced.
. Second, the necesmry increase in wege differentiation
will increase aversgc wages.
. Third, cross-border working contracts will have spill-
over effecr on the GDR wage level.
. Fourth, new investment in the GDR will have a much
higher productivity and respectivc enterpriscs can af-
ford comparably high wages. This will s(x)Der or later
affect the wage level in general.
. Fifth, to the extetrt that top and middle management
will come from West Germann the wage pyramid
might provc unacceptrbly 'colonial, with West Ger-
man employees receiving West German salaries maybe
even with a supplement.
. Finally, newly established trade unions will aim at a
rapid wage equalization in the two parts of the econ-
omy; for West German unions a low wage area of the
GDR would endanger employmenr possibilities in the
FRG while GDR unions have ro aim ar rapid wage
increases.
All in all, it is very unlikely rhat wages and wage expec-
tations can be brought to a level which will lead to the
re4uired high real ratc of return on investment.
A second fundamental difference between the experi-
ence of the West German "Wirtschaftswundern and the
GDR concerns the exchange rate. While in the Federal
Republic the exchange rate has been undewalucd, re-
lated to the performanco of the GDR cconomn GEMSU
et a l:l convcrsion rate leads to a real overveluatio'n of
the Eastern curency which hed to earn 4 BNtmerk to
yield 1 Deutsche Mark. Even bigger problems, howcvcr,
relate to the immediate full convertibility of thc ctu-
rency. In the Federal Republic, restrictions in the arer of
capital movements have been maintained until 1958 and
even then most other Europcan countries were frr from
having achievcd convertibility.
Therefore, providing the GDR residents with herd cur-
rency leeds to 8n imPortant shift towrrds imported
goods. These imports arc cherper becausc of rn overva-
lued curency - snd better - becausc the GDR oeonomy
does not itself provide the product mix to resist import
penetration. An obvious cxample is thc carindustry. ThG
variable cost of producing such carg are significantly
above the price which is accepted by potential cotlsu-
mers. Therefore, existing GDR industries are confronted
by a significant fall in demand which aggravates the
catching-up P(rcess.
The third fundamcntal diffcrence from the "Wirtschaft-
swunder'-model concerms the integratioTr of the GDR
into Germaay. Workers have the choice between staying
in the GDR or looking for e job in the high wage arer of
the Federal Republic. This is a fundamental diffcrence
as compared to the 1950s where in the Federal Republic
there has not been the possibility of large scale emigra-
tion. Due to the high level of income imbalance, quali-
fied workers enter the West Gemtan labour market. For
the Federal Republic, this can be compared to a positive
labour market shock. However, for thc GDR' the outflow
of qualificd workers impedes domestic and foreign in-
vestment.
Finally, it has to be kept in mind that the East Gennan
population is conce,ntrated near the inner Germanborder.
The labour market in Berlin is an example of extreme
wage differentials at I v€ry localized level. It is hardly
imaginable that such large wage discrepancies can pr€-
vail for a long time.
l0.3Policies to avoid a less developed region of
Germany
The regional approach to the future development of the
GDR economy starts from the notion that the integrating
forces of monetary union will affect factorc of produc-
tion even faster than they will affect goods and serviccs,
which migftt remain directed to Eastenr Europe fo'r come
time. Factor mobility might be so high that it will not
permit thc distinction between two independent Gcon-
omies.
After German monetary rrnification, it bccomes increas-
ingly meaningless to look at the economic "regional"
variables independently; consolidated consumption, in-
vesrment and trade figures are the variables which mat-
ter. Private consumption is shifted significantly from the
GDR towards goods produced in Western countri€s.
Therefore, the purchasinS lnwer and savings behaviour
of GDR residents will have strong effects on consumer
demand in the FRG.
lnvestment bcheviour of enterprises is undertsken in a
wholc Germrn contcxt. Although the cffect on net in-
vestmcnt will probebly be positive' new investment
might be shiftcd from the territory of the FRG to the
GDR. It is, however, elso possible that FRG €nterPrkes
will s€rve thc GDR-market from West-Germany. As re-
gards the current rccount, the overall German surplus is
thc relevrnt vrrieble, e.g. for the determination of the
DM.
In eddition to the lebour market the capital market
bccomes immediately intcgratcd. The common intcrest
retc lcvcl is dctermincd by the co'nsolidrted savings and
invcstmctrt behnces of dl s€ctors, including the public
lectd in both cconomics tnd by thc policy of the Bun-
desbank. Thercforc, evcn if the public sector deficit of
the FRG rcmains in a fairly heatthy position, the massivc
deficit in the GDR public sector affecrc thc German
interest ratc level, inllation and exchangs rate exPecta-
tions. Thereforc, the policy mix has to be assessed
against the background of the co,nsolidated public sector.
The strong and fairly rapid integration of the GDR econ-
omy into the Wegt Ge,rman cconomy has the effect of
equaliring factor costs of production in both parts of the
newly integrated economy. Moreover, in addition to the
obvious obstacles to investment in the GDR (infrastruc-
ture, environmental problems), the GDR economy has -
as long as East-European markeb do not recover - to be
looked at as I periPheral region of the Community econ-
omy. Rapid integration reinforces centriPetal tendencies
in wage differences and accentuated market sizc dif-
ferences between the centre and the periphery. Such
forces are particularly driven by economics of scale
which could be gained by increasing production in the
centre and costs of transPortation from the periphery to
the ccntre.
In other wo,rds, to avoid a "Mezzogiornalization" of East
Germany, ell efforts have to be focused on sttracting
private capitel to this region (and maintaining a skilled
iabour force there). However, in comparing the GDR
with Southern Italn some strikinS difference can be
recor&d. Firstly, the GDR is the former core region of
Germany and is still I very industrialized country' i.e.
hfrastructure and labour force are - although not yet
enough - designed to serve the needs of private capital.
Secondly, West end East Berlin 8rc very imPortant cen-
trcs to all modern economic activities: l/5 of total GDR
populetion lives in this region. Therefore, Berlin will
probably soon bccome an srea ofprosperity. Thirdly, as
soon as the other Erstern European economies and mar-
kets recover, the GDR may benefit from its historic and
regional linkr to these countries.
Nevertheless, rn economic recovery programme aimed
at modemizing the GDR economy must comPcrsate for
negative conditions the GDR as a place of production.
The following elements could be envisaged:
. Wage costs for existing industry could be reduced
temporarily by favourable social security regulations
in order to enablc these cnterpriscs to mdcrnizc their
production.
. Less rigid labour-market regulations, including the
possibility of a motp flexibtc use of the crpitel rtock
would improve profit cxpcctations of enterpriser rnd
migbt justiry incrcaring salaries of workers.
. Less rigid rcgulations on working hours (longcr
weekly worting hours) would also bc consistent with
the wish of employees to increasc selary et low horuly
rates of pay.
. A flexible use of thc capital stock would also reduce
thc necessity to firc omployees i.c. productivity would
grow by incrcasing production.
. A gcnerous but tcmporary and degressive texetion rnd
depreciation scheme of rctained end reinvccted prcfits.
seems appropriate in ordcr to foster privrte invest-
ment.
. Incentives fornew business cr€ation.
. Tccbnicd progress can be accelerated by rppropriate
infrastructural investment particularly in commnnica-
tion systems.
. Tredc rclations with Eastcrn countries sbould bc ex-
tcNded rystematically. This should reducc the pcriph-
erel forccs of r one-sided Westcsn intcgration.
. In the Foderel Republic, ryeciel incentiveg for invest-
ment and cubsidies should bo rcduced signilicantly in
ordcr not to privilege investmcnt in the FRG. This
relatcg to nrbcidies peid by the Fcdcral Governnenr
but elso to subsidies for new invesunent paid by the
LXnder.
. Tte whole ryltem of regionel ruboidies, which rrc
meinly thc rcarlt of thc divisioo of Gcrmany has to be
fundrmentrlly rovised ar quickly er porsible.
It is now ebovc dl cruciel that invortment activities in
thc GDR take plecc al loon as possiblc in order to create
rn c,nvironnent of positive cxpectetionr. Such rn envi-
ronmcnt combined with efairlyhigh incomc level, could
stem the wavc of emigrrtion which is thc rccond pre-
condition for e hcalrhy developmenr of the GDR. public
aid has to bc nrbstantial. The carching-up of the GDR
needs strong support from economic policy.
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